



Racially Polarized Voting 
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Whether voting is racially polarized has for the last generation been the 
linchpin question in vote dilution cases under the core, nationally applicable provi-
sion of the Voting Rights Act. The polarization test is supposed to be clear-cut 
(“manageable”), diagnostic of liability, and free of strong racial assumptions. Us-
ing evidence from a random sample of vote dilution cases, we argue that these ob-
jectives have not been realized in practice and, further, that they cannot be realized 
under current conditions. The roots of the problem are twofold: (1) the widely 
shared belief that polarization determinations should be grounded on votes cast in 
actual elections; and (2) normative disagreement, often covert, about the meaning 
of racial vote dilution. We argue that the principal normative theories of vote dilu-
tion have conflicting implications for the racial-polarization test. We also show 
that votes are related only contingently to the political preferences that the polari-
zation inquiry is supposed to reveal and, further, that the estimation of candidates’ 
vote shares by racial group from ballots cast in actual elections depends on racial-
homogeneity assumptions similar to those that the Supreme Court has disavowed. 
Our analysis casts serious doubt on the notion—promoted in dicta by the Supreme 
Court and supported by prominent commentators—that courts should establish 
bright-line vote-share cutoffs for “legally significant” racial polarization. The 
courts would do better to screen vote dilution claims using either evidence of pref-
erence polarization derived from surveys or nonpreference evidence of minority po-
litical incorporation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Ever since the Warren Court constitutionalized the right to 
vote, judges have recognized that an electoral system in which 
every adult citizen votes without hindrance may nonetheless be 
fundamentally unfair, owing to the mechanisms for aggregating 
votes into outcomes. Votes cast by citizens with distinct political 
interests may be “diluted”—“minimiz[ed] or cancel[ed] out”—by, 
for example, the design of legislative districts or the choice be-
tween at-large and districted elections.1 Congress drew on this 
insight in 1982 when it amended § 2 of the Voting Rights Act2 
(VRA) to provide a statutory remedy for racial vote dilution.3 
 
 1 Fortson v Dorsey, 379 US 433, 438–39 (1965). See also White v Regester, 412 US 
755, 765 (1973); Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533, 567 (1964). 
 2 Pub L No 89-110, 79 Stat 437, 437, codified as amended at 52 USC § 10301. 
 3 See Voting Rights Act Extension: Report of the Committee on the Judiciary Unit-
ed States Senate on S. 1992 with Additional, Minority, and Supplemental Views, S Rep 
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At the heart of vote dilution law is the concept of racially po-
larized voting. Voting is polarized when (1) the political prefer-
ences of majority-race and minority-race voters diverge substan-
tially4 and (2) the racial majority votes with enough cohesion to 
usually defeat the minority’s candidates of choice.5 We call these 
the “preference polarization” and “voting power” requirements.6 
Since the Supreme Court’s 1986 decision in Thornburg v Gin-
gles,7 plaintiffs have had to satisfy both conditions and propose a 
remedial district at the outset of their case.8 Only if this thresh-
old Gingles showing has been made does the court apply the lia-
bility standard prescribed by statute: whether the “totality of 
circumstances” indicates that plaintiff-race voters “have less op-
portunity than other members of the electorate to participate in 
the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.”9 
The Supreme Court understands the Gingles test to serve a 
dual purpose.10 The test keeps vote dilution law manageable by 
limiting the number of cases in which courts must make politi-
cally delicate totality-of-the-circumstances judgment calls about 
racial fairness in the distribution of political opportunity. An 
important premise of the manageability story is that the polari-
zation test is objective and rule-like—and thus that it is likely to 
be applied consistently by judges whose “personal political 
views” may diverge.11 The second purpose is normative diagnosis. 
 
No 97-417, 97th Cong, 2d Sess 19–24 (1982), reprinted in 1982 USCCAN 177, 196–201 
(tracing the concept of racial vote dilution to Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533 (1964)). 
 4 See Thornburg v Gingles, 478 US 30, 56–63 (1986) (requiring plaintiffs to show that 
the minority community is a “politically cohesive unit” that “vote[s] differently” than whites). 
 5 See id at 56 (“[A] white bloc vote that normally will defeat the combined strength 
of minority support plus white ‘crossover’ votes rises to the level of legally significant 
white bloc voting.”). 
 6 These definitions correspond, respectively, to the second and third prongs of the 
test established by Gingles, though many lower courts in the years since have analyzed 
majority-race preferences as part of the third prong rather than the second. This is a 
purely stylistic distinction; nothing turns on it. See Part II.B.2.b. 
 7 478 US 30 (1986). 
 8 Plaintiffs must also show that their racial group could compose a majority of a 
single-member electoral district. This is the first prong of the Gingles test. Id at 50. 
 9 Johnson v De Grandy, 512 US 997, 1009–11 (1994) (concluding that the Gingles 
factors are “necessary” but not “sufficient” to prove a § 2 claim). 
 10 See Part I.B. 
 11 James U. Blacksher and Larry T. Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mo-
bile v. Bolden: Have the White Suburbs Commandeered the Fifteenth Amendment?, 34 
Hastings L J 1, 43 (1982). See also Vieth v Jubelirer, 541 US 267, 291 (2004) (treating 
partisan vote dilution claims as nonjusticiable for want of an adequately constraining 
legal standard, and specifically rejecting an abstract fairness or totality-of-the-
circumstances standard). 
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The polarization test helps courts to make quick, rough judg-
ments about whether serious harms within the meaning of § 2 
are likely to be present. It “ensures that clearly meritorious 
claims will survive summary judgment . . . while appropriately 
closing the courthouse to marginal cases.”12 
Implementation of the Gingles test is subject to a constitu-
tionally derived side constraint (or parallel objective): judges are 
not to indulge “prohibited,” racially essentialist assumptions, 
such as assuming that voters of the same race “think alike, 
share the same political interests, and will prefer the same can-
didates at the polls.”13 
Responding to the Supreme Court, we argue that the lower 
courts cannot—under current conditions—implement the racial-
polarization test so as to satisfy the Court’s stated objectives con-
currently. The test cannot be at once diagnostic of liability, 
constraining of judicial discretion, and free of strong racial 
assumptions. 
There are two reasons for this. One is the normatively un-
settled state of vote dilution law. Several competing theories of 
racial vote dilution each find some support in Supreme Court 
precedent, and these theories have radically different implica-
tions for the racial-polarization test.14 That there is no generally 
accepted theory of racial vote dilution is common knowledge 
among legal academics,15 but, with limited exceptions, academics 
have not considered how normative disagreements shape judi-
cial application of the polarization test.16 If anything, law profes-
sors have tacitly assumed that the putatively objective polariza-
tion test covers for the lack of a theory, allowing judges who may 
have very different normative understandings of racial vote di-
lution (or no understanding at all) to make reasonably consistent 
decisions.17 This is mistaken. We show that the polarization test 
 
 12 McNeil v Springfield Park District, 851 F2d 937, 942–43 (7th Cir 1988).  
 13 League of United Latin American Citizens v Perry, 548 US 399, 433 (2006), quot-
ing Miller v Johnson, 515 US 900, 920 (1995). Despite the Supreme Court’s use of the 
word “prohibited,” it is not clear whether the injunction against racial assumptions is an 
absolute side constraint or rather an objective (“minimization of racial assumptions”) that 
is to be pursued concurrently with the manageability and normative-diagnosis goals. 
 14 See Part III.A. 
 15 See, for example, Lani Guinier, [E]racing Democracy: The Voting Rights Cases, 108 
Harv L Rev 109, 113 (1994) (characterizing the VRA as “a statute in search of a theory”). 
 16 See note 218 and accompanying text. 
 17 See, for example, Kareem U. Crayton, Sword, Shield, and Compass: The Uses 
and Misuses of Racially Polarized Voting Studies in Voting Rights Enforcement, 64 Rut-
gers L Rev 973, 989, 1016 (2012) (noting that, despite the fact that the “federal courts 
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leaves district judges with broad discretion18 and that many of 
the lower courts’ disputes about how to exercise this discretion 
correspond to often-unspoken normative disagreements about 
the meaning of racial vote dilution.19 
The second problem is the long-established convention, en-
couraged though not compelled by the Supreme Court, of 
grounding racial-polarization findings on “voting preferences ex-
pressed in actual elections.”20 The working assumptions have 
been (1) that the average level of bloc voting among coethnic vot-
ers in some class of typical elections reliably indicates the extent 
of within-group preference homogeneity and between-group 
preference divergence,21 and (2) that the level of racial bloc vot-
ing in any given election can be estimated from precinct-level 
vote totals and demographic data without making strong as-
sumptions about political homogeneity within racial groups.22 
Neither premise is tenable. 
We show theoretically and with evidence from survey exper-
iments that the presence (or absence) of racial polarization in 
vote shares is an unreliable indicator of preference polariza-
tion.23 The root of the problem is strategic behavior—by candi-
dates, parties, donors, and voters. Because of strategic behavior, 
the relationship between polarization in vote shares and polari-
zation in underlying political preferences is highly contingent. 
This threatens to render the Gingles test quite arbitrary, unless 
judges either make very strong assumptions (some racial) or else 
abandon the notion of an objective, quantitative polarization test 
in favor of a subjective inquiry that requires close attention to 
the very thing that the creators of the Gingles test wanted the 
 
have been just as ambiguous as Congress has been about how [racial-polarization data] 
ought to figure into a vote dilution claim,” racially polarized voting analysis “provides the 
factual foundation for trial courts to justify their use of structural remedies and reforms”). 
 18 See Part II. 
 19 See Part III.A.2. 
 20 Gomez v City of Watsonville, 863 F2d 1407, 1415 (9th Cir 1988) (noting that, un-
der Gingles, courts should look “primarily” to actual votes).  
 21 See, for example, Blacksher and Menefee, 34 Hastings L J at 59 (cited in note 11) 
(“Whether a racial group is politically cohesive depends on its demonstrated propensity 
to vote as a bloc for candidates or issues popularly recognized as being affiliated with the 
group’s particularized interests.”). The Gingles Court noted that some unusual elections 
characterized by “special circumstances” may be less informative. Gingles, 478 US at 51, 54. 
 22 See, for example, Gingles, 478 US at 52–53 & n 20 (describing statistical tech-
niques used by the plaintiffs’ expert witness to estimate the extent of racial bloc voting 
based on “data from 53 General Assembly primary and general elections” as “standard in 
the literature for the analysis of racially polarized voting”). 
 23 See Part III.B. 
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courts to ignore: “the political stories behind the election re-
turns.”24 Thirty years of racial-polarization law in the lower courts 
bear witness to this problem, even as commentators continue to 
describe the Gingles framework as objective and constraining.25 
Moreover, so long as polarization findings continue to be 
based on “voting preferences expressed in actual elections,”26 
those preferences must be estimated, and the estimation of can-
didates’ vote shares by racial group from ballots cast in actual 
elections depends on strong assumptions about political homo-
geneity within racial groups across geographic areas.27 These as-
sumptions are close kin to those the Supreme Court disavowed 
in the recent case of League of United Latin American Citizens v 
Perry28 (“LULAC”). 
* * * 
What follows for vote dilution law? The most important im-
plications concern the Supreme Court’s ongoing campaign to 
bolster its manageability and prevent § 2 from “infus[ing] race 
into virtually every redistricting.”29 The current strategy of the 
Court—or at least of a decisive plurality of the justices—is to 
circumscribe the geographic reach of § 2 through limiting, 
bright-line constructions of the Gingles conditions.30 In Bartlett v 
Strickland,31 the controlling opinion held that vote dilution 
claims may be brought only by plaintiffs whose racial group 
 
 24 Blacksher and Menefee, 34 Hastings L J at 53 (cited in note 11). For an example 
of the Court’s aversion to such inquiries, see Bartlett v Strickland, 556 US 1, 17–18 
(2009) (Kennedy) (plurality) (cautioning against judicial reliance on “highly political 
judgments” in racial vote dilution cases). 
 25 See Part II.B. 
 26 Gomez, 863 F2d at 1415. 
 27 See Part III.C. 
 28 548 US 399 (2006). See also id at 433, quoting Johnson, 515 US at 920 (noting 
that when evaluating a compactness claim under § 2, the court should ensure that a 
state has not “assum[ed] from a group of voters’ race that they think alike, share the 
same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls”) (quotation 
marks omitted). 
 29 Strickland, 556 US at 21 (Kennedy) (plurality), quoting LULAC, 548 US at 446 
(Kennedy) (plurality). 
 30 See Strickland, 556 US at 17–18 (Kennedy) (plurality) (holding that plaintiffs 
cannot bring a vote dilution claim unless voters of their racial or ethnic group would 
compose a literal, numeric majority of a proposed remedial district); LULAC, 548 US at 
445–46 (Kennedy) (plurality) (foreclosing “influence” claims under § 2). 
 31 556 US 1 (2009). 
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would compose a literal, numeric majority of the voting-age pop-
ulation in a compact remedial district.32 
Strickland also encourages the establishment of bright-line 
rules for the preference-polarization component of the Gingles 
test. The plurality ventured in dicta that claims should probably 
fail as a matter of law if white voters typically “cross over” and 
support minority-preferred candidates at levels exceeding some 
numeric threshold of legal significance, perhaps 20 percent.33 At 
oral argument, five justices voiced support for this idea, suggest-
ing cutoffs ranging from 15 percent to 40 percent.34 Presumably 
a vote dilution claim would also fail if minority voters defected 
from minority-preferred candidates at similar rates. “Legally 
significant” preference polarization would exist only if, say, at 
least 60 percent (or 70 percent, or 80 percent) of plaintiff-race 
voters typically voted for the minority-preferred candidate and 
at least 60 percent (or 70 percent, or 80 percent) of other voters 
typically supported the opposing candidate. Though the lower 
courts have so far declined invitations to create such vote-share 
cutoffs,35 leading academic commentators regard their establish-
ment as a natural next step in the evolution of vote dilution law.36 
Our analysis casts serious doubt on the vote-share-cutoff 
idea, and further suggests that if appellate courts do adopt cut-
offs, this will induce fact finders to delve ever more deeply into 
“the political stories behind the election returns,” or else to rely 
even more heavily on strong assumptions, some of which are 
“racial” in nature.37 As such, the establishment of vote-share 
cutoffs would, in important respects, hinder rather than advance 
the Supreme Court’s manageability and constitutional objectives 
for the racial-polarization test. 
 
 32 Id at 17 (Kennedy) (plurality) (justifying this requirement on manageability grounds). 
 33 Id at 16 (Kennedy) (plurality) (“We are skeptical that the bloc-voting test could 
be satisfied here, for example, where minority voters in District 18 cannot elect their 
candidate of choice without support from almost 20 percent of white voters.”). 
 34 Transcript of Oral Argument, Bartlett v Strickland, Docket No 07-689, *7–12 (US 
Oct 14, 2008) (available on Westlaw at 2008 WL 4565748) (“Strickland Oral Argument”). 
 35 See Part II.B. 
 36 See, for example, Crayton, 64 Rutgers L Rev at 1016 (cited in note 17) (urging 
courts to “establish[ ] a straightforward threshold for bloc voting”); Richard H. Pildes, Is 
Voting-Rights Law Now at War with Itself? Social Science and Voting Rights in the 
2000s, 80 NC L Rev 1517, 1563 (2002) (observing that “[t]he Supreme Court has not yet 
had to specify what precise level[ ] of white support for minority-preferred candidates 
defines the boundary between polarized and nonpolarized voting” and thus implying that 
the Supreme Court will at some point have to specify a cutoff). 
 37 See Parts III.B.3, III.C. 
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But what is the alternative? One option is for courts to in-
vite preference-polarization showings based on survey data ra-
ther than on votes. Surveys can be designed to yield comparable 
information across jurisdictions, and survey data can be ana-
lyzed without imposing strong assumptions about homogeneity 
within racial groups.38 
Alternatively, the Supreme Court could simply drop the 
preference-polarization requirement. Claims could instead be 
screened with a test focused on minority political incorporation, 
or perhaps with a test that probed for indirect evidence of inten-
tionally discriminatory districting. A court adopting the former 
approach might ask whether there is active two-party competi-
tion for control of the legislative body and active recruitment of 
minority-race candidates, or the court might focus on whether 
minority-race candidates have in fact been elected. A court more 
concerned with discriminatory intent by conventional state ac-
tors might ask, as Judge Frank Easterbrook recently proposed, 
whether there are fewer majority-minority districts than would 
likely have been drawn by an automated redistricting algorithm.39 
We proceed as follows. Part I traces the emergence of and 
justifications for the judicial inquiry into racially polarized vot-
ing. Part II examines judicial practice on the ground. Relying on 
law-student coding of a large random sample of district court li-
ability rulings, Part II provides the most comprehensive analy-
sis to date of judicial implementation of the polarization test. 
Part III explains the fundamental difficulties with tying 
vote dilution adjudication to racially polarized voting as conven-
tionally measured: the conflicting implications of various theories 
of vote dilution for the polarization test, the highly contingent 
relationship between racial polarization in vote shares and ra-
cial polarization in latent political preferences (which we illus-
trate with data from a survey experiment), and the need for racial-
homogeneity assumptions to estimate vote shares by racial 
 
 38 See Part IV. 
 39 In Gonzalez v City of Aurora, Illinois, 535 F3d 594 (7th Cir 2008), Easterbrook sug-
gested that this would be a good way to “implement a pure effects test.” Id at 600. It also 
provides indirect evidence of discriminatory intent. (A note on terminology: a “majority-
minority district” is one in which a racial minority composes a political majority—for ex-
ample, a majority of the voting-age citizenry—and has the opportunity to elect candidates 
that it prefers. Judges sometimes use the term “minority opportunity district” instead. See, 
for example, LULAC, 548 US at 496–97 (Roberts concurring in part, concurring in the 
judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (treating “minority opportunity district” and 
“Latino-majority district” as synonymous terms).) 
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group from aggregate data. Rather than setting up straw men, 
we consider how best to use vote-share estimates—given the 
contingent relationship between preferences and votes—and 
then explore the limitations of these strategies. 
Finally, in Part IV, we touch on possible ways out of the 
current dilemma.40 Part IV is brief because this is mainly a 
foundation-laying article. We are working on empirical projects 
to develop alternative, survey-based estimates of preference po-
larization,41 but, given space limitations, we cannot get into the 
details here. This Article will have achieved enough if it helps 
courts, litigators, and law professors to understand the limits of 
the racial-polarization inquiry under current conditions and if it 
forestalls the establishment of numeric vote-share cutoffs under 
Gingles. 
I.  THE PURPOSE OF THE RACIAL-POLARIZATION TEST 
To ground our argument, this Part briefly reviews the evolu-
tion of the Gingles framework, focusing on three dominant re-
frains in jurists’ and commentators’ thinking about the threshold 
inquiry into polarized voting: manageability, normative diagnosis, 
and the need to limit reliance on strong racial assumptions. 
A. Origins 
The Supreme Court recognized racial vote dilution claims 
under the Equal Protection Clause in 1971.42 A free-form juris-
prudence soon developed in the lower courts, with judges mak-
ing “intensely local appraisal[s]” of the “totality of the circum-
stances” bearing on minority political opportunity and then 
simply pronouncing that the challenged electoral systems did or 
 
 40 The critique in this Article is internal to racial vote dilution law, in that we adopt 
the courts’ premises about what the Gingles test is supposed to achieve. We note in pass-
ing, however, that broadly similar prescriptions also emerge from an external critique of 
the legal doctrine under § 2. See generally Christopher S. Elmendorf and Douglas M. 
Spencer, Administering Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act after Shelby County, 115 Colum 
L Rev 2143 (2015) (arguing that new evidentiary presumptions—designed to reduce the 
cost and increase the predictability of litigation under § 2 and implemented with survey 
data—would help § 2 to fill the gap left by the demise of the VRA’s preclearance regime). 
 41 See generally Marisa A. Abrajano, Christopher S. Elmendorf, and Kevin M. 
Quinn, Using Experiments to Estimate Racially Polarized Voting (UC Davis Legal Stud-
ies Research Paper Series, Feb 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/J44U-DRFS. See also 
Elmendorf and Spencer, 115 Colum L Rev at 2148–49 (cited in note 40). 
 42 See Whitcomb v Chavis, 403 US 124, 144 (1971) (noting the possibility that a 
plaintiff could prove that “multi-member districts unconstitutionally operate to dilute or 
cancel the voting strength of racial or political elements”). 
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did not dilute minority voting power.43 Nearly all of the cases 
concerned at-large elections.44 Appraising this first decade of ra-
cial vote dilution law, James Blacksher and Larry Menefee wrote: 
Most of the cases concluding . . . that at-large [elections] 
were constitutional cannot be distinguished analytically 
from those reaching a contrary result on any basis other 
than the varying personal political views of the trial and 
appellate judges who decided them. Some capriciousness is 
an inherent risk of a standard calling for an “intensely local 
appraisal” of the “totality of circumstances” of each case.45 
This critique led Blacksher and Menefee to propose the 
racial-polarization test. In lieu of open-ended balancing, courts 
would simply determine (1) whether the minority community 
was populous and geographically concentrated enough to com-
pose a majority of an ordinary single-member district, 
(2) whether the minority community was politically cohesive, 
and (3) whether the majority community voted sufficiently as a 
bloc to usually defeat minority-preferred candidates under the 
status quo electoral system.46 “In terms of certainty and con-
sistency,” Blacksher and Menefee asserted, this inquiry “prom-
ises to be nearly as manageable as the population equality 
rule”47 of Reynolds v Sims,48 in which the Court held that elec-
toral districts must be “as nearly of equal population as is prac-
ticable.”49 Key to their manageability claim was that “[t]he prob-
lem [of vote dilution would be] observed solely on the basis of 
voting patterns; there is no need to inquire into the political sto-
ries behind the election returns.”50 
Blacksher and Menefee’s timing was propitious. In 1980, the 
Supreme Court rejected the constitutional vote dilution juris-
prudence of the 1970s.51 Congress responded by amending § 2 of 
 
 43 Blacksher and Menefee, 34 Hastings L J at 23 (cited in note 11), quoting White v 
Regester, 412 US 755, 769 (1973). 
 44 See Blacksher and Menefee, 34 Hastings L J at 23 & n 170 (cited in note 11) (col-
lecting cases). 
 45 Id at 43 (citations omitted). 
 46 See id at 50–64. 
 47 Id at 57. 
 48 377 US 533 (1964). 
 49 Id at 577. 
 50 Blacksher and Menefee, 34 Hastings L J at 53 (cited in note 11) (emphasis added). 
 51 See City of Mobile, Alabama v Bolden, 446 US 55, 70–74 (1980) (rejecting the lower 
courts’ reliance on a standard that allowed a plaintiff to demonstrate that a municipality 
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the VRA, creating a new “results test.”52 The amended § 2 pro-
hibits electoral structures that “result[ ]” in members of a class 
of citizens defined by race or color “hav[ing] less opportunity 
than other members of the electorate to participate in the politi-
cal process and to elect representatives of their choice.”53 No-
where does the statute or its legislative history provide a clear 
statement of what it means for a racial minority to have unequal 
political opportunity.54 All the enacting Congress bequeathed to 
the courts was a statutory directive to consider the “totality of 
circumstances”55 and a committee report reciting a nonexhaus-
tive list of factors to be weighed (gleaned from the constitutional 
vote dilution jurisprudence of the 1970s).56 
When amended § 2 first reached the Supreme Court in the 
1986 case Gingles, Justice William Brennan, writing for a five-
justice majority, sidelined this “totality of the circumstances” 
analysis in favor of Blacksher and Menefee’s more streamlined 
inquiry into polarized voting.57 It is now well settled that vote di-
lution plaintiffs must establish the so-called Gingles conditions 
at the outset of their case.58 Specifically, plaintiffs must show: 
First, [that] the minority group . . . is sufficiently large and 
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-
member district. . . . Second, [that] the minority group . . . is 
politically cohesive. . . . [And third,] that the white majority 
votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it—in the absence of 
special circumstances, such as the minority candidate 
 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment by pointing to discriminatory effects without addi-
tional evidence of discriminatory purpose). 
 52 Thomas M. Boyd and Stephen J. Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting 
Rights Act: A Legislative History, 40 Wash & Lee L Rev 1347, 1398 (1983); S Rep No 97-
417 at 2 (cited in note 3) (explaining that the amendment “restores the legal standards, 
based on the controlling Supreme Court precedents, which applied in voting discrimina-
tion claims prior to the litigation involved in Mobile v. Bolden”). 
 53 52 USC § 10301. 
 54 For the legislative history of § 2, see generally Boyd and Markman, 40 Wash & 
Lee L Rev 1347 (cited in note 52). 
 55 52 USC § 10301(b). 
 56 S Rep No 97-417 at 28–29 (cited in note 3) (listing the “[t]ypical factors” that a 
plaintiff could show to establish a violation). 
 57 Gingles, 478 US at 48–51, citing generally Blacksher and Menefee, 34 Hastings L 
J 1 (cited in note 11). 
 58 See LULAC, 548 US at 425–26 (referring to the three Gingles factors as “thresh-
old conditions for establishing a § 2 violation”). 
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running unopposed—usually to defeat the minority’s pre-
ferred candidate.59 
B. Evolving Conceptions of the Gingles Test 
The Gingles Court left some doubt whether satisfaction of 
the Gingles conditions actually establishes that plaintiffs lack 
equal political opportunity within the meaning of § 2, or simply 
that a lack of opportunity (if proved) could be remedied. Put dif-
ferently, is the Gingles test a liability standard or a test for po-
tential remedies?60 
Brennan clearly saw it as a liability standard,61 and many 
lower courts initially adopted this interpretation.62 This practice 
cried out for justification because, as Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor explained in her concurrence, neither the text nor the 
legislative history of § 2 offered much support for the plurality’s 
liability standard.63 
Commentators and judges defended the new approach on 
pragmatic and normative grounds. Echoing Blacksher and 
 
 59 Gingles, 478 US at 50–51 (citation omitted). 
 60 For an example of the ambiguity in Gingles, compare id at 50 (noting that the 
Gingles prongs are “necessary preconditions” and thereby suggesting that additional 
conditions must also be established), with id at 48 n 15 (noting that § 2 factors other 
than racial polarization as demonstrated by a satisfaction of the Gingles prongs are 
“supportive of, but not essential to, a minority voter’s claim”). 
 61 As Brennan wrote,  
[T]he most important Senate Report factors bearing on § 2 challenges to mul-
timember districts are the “extent to which minority group members have been 
elected to public office in the jurisdiction” and the “extent to which voting in 
the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized.” . . . 
[O]ther factors . . . [may be] supportive of, but [are] not essential to, a minority 
voter’s claim. 
Id at 48 n 15. This and other passages in the Gingles plurality opinion imply that the 
“totality of the circumstances” referenced in the text of § 2 and enumerated in its legisla-
tive history is essentially irrelevant to vote dilution claims—except, perhaps, if it un-
dermines the initial inference of racial polarization. 
 62 See Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transfor-
mation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 Mich L Rev 1833, 1853 & n 100 (1992); Adam B. 
Cox and Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of Voting Rights Ju-
risprudence, 75 U Chi L Rev 1493, 1530–35 (2008) (showing that, from 1986 to 1994, 
Democratic judges nearly always voted for liability conditional on the Gingles conditions be-
ing met, whereas Republican judges voted for liability conditional on Gingles in only about 
half of the cases during this period). For a clear and forceful articulation of the liability-
standard gloss on Gingles, see Solomon v Liberty County, Florida, 899 F2d 1012, 1013 
(11th Cir 1990) (en banc) (Kravitch concurring). 
 63 See Gingles, 478 US at 94–100 (O’Connor concurring in the judgment) (criticizing 
the controlling opinion for producing a rule that “come[s] closer to an absolute require-
ment of proportional representation than Congress intended”). 
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Menefee, they argued that the formulaic Gingles standard was 
needed to make politically sensitive vote dilution cases manage-
able.64 Professors Lani Guinier and Samuel Issacharoff, for ex-
ample, emphasized that the easy-to-apply Gingles standard ob-
viated any need for judges to assess governmental 
responsiveness to the “particularized needs” of the minority com-
munity, a quintessentially political issue that was prominent in 
the constitutional vote dilution jurisprudence of the 1970s.65 
Normative defenses of the Gingles standard were tied to the 
concept of polarized voting, which was believed to signify some-
thing important about political equality.66 Depending on the 
commentator or the moment, “polarized voting” was treated as a 
reliable indicator of minority exclusion from the normal push 
 
 64 For academic accounts of Gingles’s emphasis on manageability, see, for example, 
Nathaniel Persily, The Law of the Census: How to Count, What to Count, Whom to Count, 
and Where to Count Them, 32 Cardozo L Rev 755, 780 (2011) (noting the Court’s “prefer-
ence for manageable rules in this context”); Pildes, 80 NC L Rev at 1549–50 & n 93 (cited 
in note 36); Issacharoff, 90 Mich L Rev at 1859–71 (cited in note 62); Lani Guinier, The 
Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 
89 Mich L Rev 1077, 1096–1101 (1991); Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The 
Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 Harv CR–CL L 
Rev 173, 177–79 (1989). For examples of judicial opinions justifying Gingles on manage-
ability grounds, see, for example, Meza v Galvin, 322 F Supp 2d 52, 57–58 (D Mass 2004) 
(three-judge panel) (reasoning that the Gingles conditions must have “some clarity and 
prescriptiveness,” lest they themselves collapse into a totality-of-the-circumstances 
judgment call); Rodriguez v Pataki, 308 F Supp 2d 346, 379 (SDNY 2004) (three-judge 
panel); Hall v Virginia, 276 F Supp 2d 528, 538 (ED Va 2003) (disallowing influence-
district claims because they “would substitute the Federal Courts’ subjective estimate of 
minority voter influence . . . for the well established and objective rule requiring a majority-
minority district”); Valdespino v Alamo Heights Independent School District, 168 F3d 
848, 852 (5th Cir 1999); Hastert v State Board of Elections, 777 F Supp 634, 654 (ND Ill 
1991) (three-judge panel) (“[A]n unrestricted breach of the Gingles single-district majority 
precondition will likely open a Pandora’s box of marginal Voting Rights Act claims by 
minority groups of all sizes.”); McNeil v Springfield Park District, 851 F2d 937, 942–43 
(7th Cir 1988); McGhee v Granville County, North Carolina, 860 F2d 110, 116–17 (4th 
Cir 1988) (discussing how Gingles established reasonable bounds on potentially un-
bounded vote dilution jurisprudence). 
 65 Issacharoff, 90 Mich L Rev at 1867–70 (cited in note 62). See also Guinier, 89 
Mich L Rev at 1096 (cited in note 64). 
 66 See, for example, Issacharoff, 90 Mich L Rev at 1871–73 (cited in note 62) (stating 
that polarized voting signifies a breakdown in normal pluralist politics); id at 1879 (stating 
that polarized voting signals “fundamental racial antipathy”); Guinier, 89 Mich L Rev at 
1096–97 (cited in note 64) (stating that polarized voting signifies a breakdown in coalitional 
politics); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Constitution in Context: The Continuing Significance 
of Racism, 63 U Colo L Rev 325, 359–60 (1992) (“[R]acial bloc voting and racial appeals in 
the campaign process . . . provide the best evidence of private prejudice.”). 
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and pull of pluralist politics, or of intentional race discrimina-
tion against minority candidates by white voters and elites.67 
The Supreme Court’s 1994 decision in Johnson v De Grandy68 
invigorated the alternative, “potential remedy” reading of Gin-
gles.69 Justice David Souter, writing for the Court, reversed and 
criticized a lower court that had “misjudged the relative im-
portance of the Gingles factors.”70 Many judges understood De 
Grandy as a signal to revitalize the totality-of-the-circumstances 
rubric of 1970s vote dilution law,71 and as Professor Adam Cox 
and Dean Thomas Miles have shown, the relationship between 
the satisfaction of the Gingles conditions and a finding of liabil-
ity weakened in the De Grandy era.72 
Even so, some lower courts continued to say that “cases will 
be rare” in which the Gingles conditions were met but liability not 
found.73 These courts evidently believed that the Gingles condi-
tions were at least somewhat diagnostic of racial vote dilution. 
 
 67 See Aleinikoff, 63 U Colo L Rev at 358 (cited in note 66) (“[I]t is private prejudice 
. . . that is responsible for the dilution of black voting power. . . . It is the bigotry of at 
least a portion of the majority’s voting preferences that makes the results produced by 
the electoral structures unfair.”); Guinier, 89 Mich L Rev at 1102 (cited in note 64) (not-
ing that if polarized voting is a result of prejudice, creating majority-minority districts 
may not solve the problem because minority officials elected to represent minority voters 
will be subject to discrimination in the legislative process); Issacharoff, 90 Mich L Rev at 
1879 (cited in note 62) (“The persistence and extremity of the polarized voting practices 
in community after community, despite substantial numbers of middle-class blacks and 
poor whites indicates that, beyond the divergent socioeconomic interests, there must also 
be a more fundamental racial antipathy at work as well.”). 
 68 512 US 997 (1994). 
 69 Id at 1013 (noting that, “[a]s facts beyond the ambit of the three Gingles factors 
loom correspondingly larger, factfinders cannot rest uncritically on assumptions about 
the force of the Gingles factors in pointing to dilution”). The potential-remedy theory pos-
its that unless minority voters in a defined geographic area have similar preferences to 
one another (the second Gingles prong), are currently unable to elect the candidates they 
prefer (the third Gingles prong), and would become able to elect those candidates in the 
remedial district(s) they propose (the first Gingles prong), their vote dilution claim is 
hopeless. Nothing a court could order would remedy the alleged dilution. (The theory as-
sumes that courts can issue only single-member district remedies.) For a recent, crisp 
statement of the theory, see LULAC, 548 US at 495–97 (Roberts concurring in part, con-
curring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
 70 De Grandy, 512 US at 1013–14, 1018 (concluding that such “[a]n inflexible rule 
would run counter to the textual command of § 2, that the presence or absence of a viola-
tion be assessed ‘based on the totality of circumstances’”). 
 71 See, for example, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v 
Fordice, 252 F3d 361, 373–74 (5th Cir 2001) (relying on De Grandy to reject the plain-
tiffs’ presumptive-liability gloss on the Gingles factors). 
 72 Cox and Miles, 75 U Chi L Rev at 1537–38 & n 102 (cited in note 62). 
 73 Uno v City of Holyoke, 72 F3d 973, 983 (1st Cir 1995) (“We predict that cases will 
be rare in which plaintiffs establish the Gingles preconditions yet fail on a section 2 
claim because other facts undermine the original inference.”). We had law students code 
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Souter’s potential-remedy theory of Gingles took a blow in 
Strickland, the Supreme Court’s most recent statement about 
the Gingles framework.74 The question in Strickland was wheth-
er the first prong of Gingles is to be read formally (such that 
plaintiffs must compose a literal, numeric majority of voting-age 
citizens in the proposed remedial district) or functionally (to al-
low claims by minority voters who, though composing a numeric 
minority of the remedial district, would be able to control it in 
coalition with sympathetic white voters).75 Justice Anthony 
Kennedy, writing for the Strickland plurality, adopted the for-
mal approach.76 
In dissent, Souter bemoaned that states could now comply 
with § 2 only by segregating minority voters into majority-
minority districts, rather than by drawing districts to empower 
cross racial coalitions.77 Kennedy replied that Souter fundamen-
tally misunderstood the plurality opinion.78 Certainly a state 
could comply with § 2 by creating crossover districts in lieu of 
majority-minority districts.79 After Strickland, crossover dis-
tricts voluntarily adopted by a state may forestall § 2 liability ex 
ante or remedy liability ex post, yet they cannot satisfy the first 
prong of Gingles. Thus does Strickland sever Gingles from po-
tential remedies. 
What then is the point of the Gingles-Strickland majority-
minority requirement? Per Kennedy, it is not to hem in the 
states’ compliance efforts, but simply: (1) to limit the reach of 
§ 2, lest it “unnecessarily infuse race into virtually every redis-
tricting, raising serious constitutional questions”;80 and (2) to re-
duce the number of cases in which courts end up in the “untena-
ble position of predicting many political variables and tying 
 
a random sample of § 2 district court opinions (see Appendix B for details), and our very 
rough point estimates suggest that the proportion of cases in which the district court in-
cludes language to this effect or otherwise indicates that the Gingles factors give rise to a 
presumption of liability is actually larger in the post–De Grandy period than in the Gin-
gles to De Grandy period. See note 89. (Our sample size is small, however, and the differ-
ence is not statistically significant.) 
 74 See generally Strickland, 556 US 1. 
 75 Id at 12 (Kennedy) (plurality). 
 76 Id at 14–23 (Kennedy) (plurality). 
 77 Id at 40–44 (Souter dissenting). 
 78 Strickland, 556 US at 23–24 (Kennedy) (plurality). 
 79 See id (Kennedy) (plurality). 
 80 Id at 21–22 (Kennedy) (plurality), quoting LULAC, 548 US at 446 (Kennedy) 
(plurality). 
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them to race-based assumptions,”81 or otherwise making “highly 
political judgments.”82 
The notion that the Gingles conditions should be used to 
limit the geographic reach of § 2 is also reflected in the Strick-
land plurality’s discussion of white bloc voting. Kennedy chided 
the state for conceding white bloc voting, expressing “skep-
tic[ism]” that this condition could be satisfied as to districts 
where 20 percent of white voters support minority-preferred 
candidates.83 Though Kennedy wrote for only three justices, it 
appears from oral argument that at least five justices were open 
to the idea of numeric cutoffs for group cohesion.84 Suggested 
cutoffs ranged from 15 percent to 40 percent crossover voting, or, 
equivalently, 60 percent to 85 percent of whites voting against 
the minority-preferred candidate.85 The intuition here is that 
courts ought not to get involved in vote dilution cases unless 
preference polarization as revealed by votes is extreme. Where 
the preference divergence is only moderate, dilution problems 
will generally be less severe, both because representatives elect-
ed without decisive minority support are likely to be less horri-
ble (from the point of view of minority voters) than in jurisdic-
tions where preference polarization is severe and because there 
is some chance that successful biracial or multiracial coalitions 
will form.86 
If the Gingles test is to be used to curtail vote dilution litiga-
tion, as Strickland suggests, then the test must be normatively 
diagnostic. It would be arbitrary and unlawful for the Court to 
foreclose consideration of the liability standard prescribed by 
statute without reference to whether that standard is likely to 
 
 81 Strickland, 556 US at 17 (Kennedy) (plurality) (emphasis added). 
 82 Id (Kennedy) (plurality), quoting Holder v Hall, 512 US 874, 894 (1994) (Thomas 
concurring in the judgment). 
 83 Strickland, 556 US at 16 (Kennedy) (plurality). 
 84 Strickland Oral Argument at *7–12 (cited in note 34). See also Hall, 512 US at 
904 (Thomas concurring in the judgment) (objecting that “[t]here is no set standard de-
fining how strong the correlation [between voter race and vote choice] must be” to pass 
the Gingles test). 
 85 Strickland Oral Argument at *7–12 (cited in note 34). See also Abrams v John-
son, 521 US 74, 92 (1997) (noting average white crossover rates of 22 to 38 percent and 
black crossover rates of 20 to 23 percent, and stating that this supported the district 
court’s finding of no “chronic bloc voting”). 
 86 See Pildes, 80 NC L Rev at 1563–64 (cited in note 36) (“The political dynamics of 
influence are likely to be significantly different in areas where black voters and one-third 
of whites vote for black candidates, as compared to areas where 90% of whites consist-
ently vote against such candidates.”). 
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be satisfied.87 Kennedy would not disagree. The Gingles condi-
tions, he wrote in Strickland, are tools “to help courts determine 
which claims could meet the totality-of-the-circumstances 
standard for a § 2 violation.”88 
To summarize, in the post-Strickland world, the Gingles test 
must be objective and clear-cut, and the test must also be rea-
sonably well calibrated to filter strong from weak claims—and 
reasonably free of strong racial assumptions. It should be noted 
that although this conception of the Gingles test was crystallized 
in Strickland, the crystallization was hardly revolutionary. 
Many judicial opinions in the years between Gingles and Strick-
land are premised on the idea that the Gingles test is or should 
be clear-cut, easy to administer, and normatively diagnostic.89 
Similarly, Strickland’s notion that the VRA should be interpret-
ed so as to minimize reliance on race-based assumptions has an 
ample lineage, dating to the early 1990s.90 Indeed, just a few 
 
 87 One might think that it is arbitrary and unlawful for the Supreme Court to set 
up any gatekeeping condition not provided for by statute. But insofar as the VRA is best 
understood as a common-law statute, see Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of 
Section 2: Of Biased Votes, Unconstitutional Elections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 U 
Pa L Rev 377, 448–55 (2012), the establishment of gatekeeping conditions is probably 
within the scope of authority delegated to the courts. See id at 411–12 (arguing that, in 
passing § 2, Congress intended for courts to identify “orienting norms” and to develop 
“strong presumptions to guide [the totality-of-the-circumstances] inquiry”). 
 88 Strickland, 556 US at 21 (Kennedy) (plurality). 
 89 For examples of judicial opinions emphasizing manageability, see note 64. Re-
garding normative diagnosis, we had law students code a stratified random sample of 
district court opinions for a number of attributes, including whether the court indicated 
that the Gingles conditions create a presumption of liability or are strongly indicative of 
liability—for example, by stating that “cases will be rare in which plaintiffs establish the 
Gingles preconditions yet fail on a section 2 claim because other facts undermine the 
original inference [of vote dilution].” Uno, 72 F3d at 983. For further details, see Appen-
dix B. Interestingly, the proportion of cases in which the district court said the Gingles 
conditions are strongly diagnostic of liability seems to be increasing over time, from 
roughly 11 percent in the Gingles to De Grandy period, to about 16 percent in the De 
Grandy to Strickland period, to about 35 percent in the post-Strickland period. (Because 
our sample is small and because the coding was imperfect, these point estimates are very 
rough.) On the other hand, there is strong evidence that certain judges (those appointed 
by Democrats) behaved as if the Gingles test were tantamount to a liability standard in 
the Gingles to De Grandy period, but not after De Grandy. See Part II.A. 
 90 Fifteen years previously, in Holder v Hall, 512 US 874 (1994), Justice Clarence 
Thomas urged his colleagues to abandon the field of racial vote dilution law because, as 
he saw it, that body of law rests on the “pernicious . . . premise” that “members of racial 
and ethnic groups must all think alike on important matters of public policy.” Id at 903 
(Thomas concurring in the judgment). Though Gingles requires plaintiffs to demonstrate 
political cohesion, Thomas posited that this demand was more nominal than real: “[T]he 
standards we have employed for determining political cohesion have proved so insub-
stantial” that, in practice, the “requirement of proof of political cohesiveness . . . has 
proved little different from a working assumption that racial groups can be conceived of 
 604  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:587 
   
years before Strickland, the Supreme Court reversed a lower court 
that had, in Kennedy’s view, improperly assumed political com-
monality among voters who shared the same ethnicity but were 
geographically and socioeconomically remote from one another.91 
II.  JUDICIAL PRACTICE IN THE LOWER COURTS 
As the evolution from Gingles to De Grandy and then Strick-
land suggests, the Supreme Court justices have not been of one 
mind about the extent to which the Gingles factors are diagnos-
tic of liability. One would expect to find similar equivocation in 
the lower courts. 
By contrast, the notion that the Gingles conditions serve an 
essential manageability function has long been standard wisdom 
among courts and academics alike.92 Equally uncontroversial is 
the proposition that courts should avoid making racially essen-
tialist assumptions.93 The Equal Protection Clause generally 
prohibits state actors from relying on assumptions about the 
preferences, abilities, or behaviors of members of a class defined 
by race or ethnicity, even if the assumptions have some ground-
ing in reality.94 
But as this Part explains, the lower courts have not devel-
oped a crisp, objective test for racially polarized voting, let alone 
one that can be applied without recourse to strong racial as-
sumptions. The pattern of judicial votes in vote dilution cases 
 
largely as political interest groups.” Id at 903–05 (Thomas concurring in the judgment). 
Only Justice Antonin Scalia joined Thomas’s opinion in Hall, but in the years since, a 
number of jurists have expressed similar concerns. See Part II.B.3.a (showing that in the 
lower courts, this issue often arises when determining who counts as a “minority candi-
date of choice,” a question that must be answered in determining whether white bloc vot-
ing is “legally significant”). 
 91 See LULAC, 548 US at 433–35. 
 92 The federal reports are littered with statements justifying Gingles or some gloss 
on Gingles as necessary to “rein[ ] in the almost unbridled discretion that section 2 gives 
the courts.” McNeil v Springfield Park District, 851 F2d 937, 942 (7th Cir 1988). Without 
such reining in, vote dilution would become “an open-ended [concept] subject to no prin-
cipled means of application.” McGhee v Granville County, North Carolina, 860 F2d 110, 
116 (4th Cir 1988). And for many courts, Gingles ensures that the federal courts do not 
end up deciding vote dilution cases on the basis of “highly political judgments.” Strick-
land, 556 US at 17 (Kennedy) (plurality). Similarly, legal commentators from Blacksher 
and Menefee to the present have understood the Gingles conditions as clear-cut factors 
ascertained on the basis of objective demographic data and vote counts. See note 64. 
 93 See, for example, Miller v Johnson, 515 US 900, 911–12 (1995). 
 94 See, for example, Johnson v California, 543 US 499, 502–03, 515 (2005) (apply-
ing strict scrutiny to California’s practice of initially segregating inmates by race during 
a sixty-day evaluation period, notwithstanding undisputed record evidence concerning 
violent prison gangs organized along racial lines). 
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does not bear out the hypothesis that judges are substantially 
constrained by the Gingles framework, and a close look at the doc-
trine suggests that judges have struggled to reconcile the desire 
for an objective test with the desire to avoid racial assumptions. 
A. Judicial Votes 
Reflecting and reinforcing conventional wisdom about the 
rule-like, constraining nature of the Gingles test, an influential 
paper by Professor Cox and Dean Miles presents judicial voting at 
the Gingles and totality-of-the-circumstances stages of § 2 cases 
as a test of the hypothesis that doctrinal “rules” constrain judges 
more than “standards.”95 Cox and Miles show that Democratic and 
Republican judges vote to find the Gingles conditions satisfied at 
roughly the same rates.96 However, in the pre-1994 period, Demo-
cratic judges were about 45 percentage points more likely than 
Republican judges to vote for liability conditional on passing the 
Gingles test.97 In the post-1994 period, the Democratic/Republican 
gap in liability votes “disappeared.”98 Cox and Miles argue that a 
changing mix of cases gave Democratic judges partisan incen-
tives to vote against liability in the post-1994 period.99 These 
judges adjusted their behavior at the unconstrained second 
stage of vote dilution cases (the totality-of-the-circumstances 
stage) but not at the rule-like Gingles stage.100 
Cox and Miles’s Gingles-constraint hypothesis is under-
mined, however, by two very important results that appear in 
their tables but are barely mentioned in the text of their article. 
White and African American judges diverge more from one an-
other when voting on the Gingles test than when voting for or 
against liability conditional on the Gingles test being met.101 
 
 95 Cox and Miles, 75 U Chi L Rev at 1506–15 (cited in note 62) (hypothesizing that 
the rule-like Gingles prongs constrain judges more than the standard-like totality-of-the-
circumstances inquiry). 
 96 Id at 1534–35. 
 97 Id at 1523. 
 98 Id at 1525. 
 99 Cox and Miles, 75 U Chi L Rev at 1511–12, 1535 (cited in note 62). 
 100 See id at 1532 (showing that there was no statistically significant change in the 
likelihood of judges finding the Gingles factors met when they were applied in the post-
1994 period). 
 101 Compare id (showing in table 4 that, in the baseline specification, African Ameri-
can judges were 25.1 percent more likely than white judges to vote for finding the Gin-
gles factors met conditional on applying them), with id at 1534 (showing in table 5 that, 
in the baseline specification, African American judges were 17.7 percent more likely than 
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Similarly, the effect of an African American copanelist on voting 
by other judges is larger at the Gingles stage than at the totality-
of-the-circumstances stage.102 (It is not as if black judges are 
uniquely unconstrained by Gingles.) These results suggest that 
the Gingles “rules” are, if anything, less constraining than the 
totality-of-the-circumstances “standard” for liability.103 
Cox and Miles also downplay a very plausible legal explana-
tion for the huge pre-1994 difference in Democratic and Republi-
can votes for liability, conditional on the Gingles factors being 
met.104 During this period, it was open to lower courts to adopt 
either the liability-standard interpretation of Gingles or the 
potential-remedy interpretation.105 The pattern uncovered by 
Cox and Miles would occur if Democratic judges initially adopted 
the liability-standard approach (in line with Justice Brennan’s 
plurality opinion) and if Republicans went for the potential-
remedy gloss (in keeping with Justice O’Connor’s concurrence). 
In 1994, the Supreme Court in De Grandy reversed a district 
court for treating Gingles as a liability standard.106 Cox and 
Miles’s demonstration of a marked post-1994 change in liability-
stage voting by Democratic judges may reflect nothing more 
 
white judges to vote for finding liability under § 2 conditional on the Gingles factors be-
ing met). 
 102 Compare id at 1532 (showing in table 4 that, in the baseline specification, judges 
with an additional African American judge on their panels were 32.1 percent more likely 
to vote for finding that the Gingles factors were met conditional on applying them), with 
id at 1534 (showing in table 5 that, in the baseline specification, judges with an addi-
tional African American judge on their panels were 24.4 percent more likely to vote for 
finding liability conditional on the Gingles factors being met). 
 103 Though the point estimates suggest that the direct and panel effects of judge 
race are larger at the Gingles stage than at the totality-of-the-circumstances stage, the 
difference between the point estimates may not be statistically significant. It should be 
noted too that Cox and Miles’s analysis depends on the questionable premise that there 
is no intrinsic difference apart from the legal standard in the decisions judges are asked 
to make at the Gingles and totality-of-the-circumstances stages of a § 2 case. Cox and 
Miles, 75 U Chi L Rev at 1513–15 (cited in note 62). Unless one buys this equivalence 
idea, it does not make sense to treat differences in the correlation between judge race or 
ideology and judge votes at the two stages as an “effect” of the legal standard. 
 104 The legal explanation developed in this paragraph is obliquely referenced in a 
footnote in Cox and Miles’s article. Id at 1538 n 102: 
This transformation also suggests that the Supreme Court’s decision in John-
son v De Grandy, 512 US 997 (1994), may be more consequential than is often 
recognized. . . . In light of our evidence, [ ] one might read the Court’s decision 
in De Grandy as . . . a signal to lower courts about the declining importance of 
the preconditions. 
 105 See Part I.B. 
 106 See text accompanying notes 69–72. 
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than De Grandy’s rejection of the liability-standard reading of 
Gingles. 
B. Doctrine and Practice 
Cox and Miles’s results regarding the direct and panel ef-
fects of judge race are surprising if one believes the Gingles con-
ditions to be rule-like. But as this Section explains, the applica-
ble law leaves judges with broad discretion under the second 
and third Gingles prongs. 
The nuts and bolts of the racial-polarization test represent 
something of a black box. The Supreme Court has said little 
about them since Gingles, and the leading casebooks treat the 
matter briefly or not at all.107 To get a handle on judicial prac-
tice, one of us (Elmendorf) read dozens of prominent court of ap-
peals opinions. Then, to obtain a clearer sense of the law as it is 
experienced and applied by fact finders, we asked law students 
to code a random sample of opinions issued by district courts fol-
lowing bench trials in racial vote dilution cases. Stratified by 
time period, our sample includes twenty-five cases from the 
Gingles to De Grandy period, twenty-seven from the De Grandy 
to Strickland period, and the universe of all seventeen available 
district court opinions following bench trials in the post-
Strickland period. Appendix B explains the details of our sam-
pling and coding protocol. 
Our aim in this Section is to present an evenhanded and 
succinct summary of doctrine and practice under Gingles. (In the 
interest of readability, we relegate most quantitative summaries 
of student codings to footnotes.) Three themes emerge from our 
review. First, most courts have been reluctant to establish 
bright-line rules about central questions such as the levels of 
voting cohesion needed to establish “legally significant” prefer-
ence polarization, the identification of “minority candidates of 
choice,” and what constitutes “usual defeat” of such candidates. 
Second, judges disagree about many fundamental matters, in-
cluding the legally relevant dimension of political preferences; 
whether the voting-power (“usual defeat”) component of the Gin-
gles test should be understood in terms of observed outcomes, or 
instead in terms of opportunities that exist in principle; the 
 
 107 The best casebook treatment of the subject is Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela S. Karlan, 
and Richard H. Pildes, The Law of Democracy: Legal Structure of the Political Process 
702–05, 711–20 (Foundation 4th ed 2012). 
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weight to be given to polarization evidence from primary as op-
posed to general elections; the proper geographic scale of the 
analysis; and which candidates qualify as “minority candidates 
of choice.” Third, the courts seem torn between relatively simple, 
mechanical polarization inquiries, which often depend on race-
based assumptions, and more-nuanced approaches, which entail 
considerable attention to the very thing Blacksher and Menefee 
expected judges to ignore: “the political stories behind the elec-
tion returns.”108 
This Section might be seen as ammunition for the Strick-
land Court’s campaign to establish restrictive vote-share cutoffs 
for minority cohesion and white bloc voting, or as a demonstra-
tion of the need for categorical rules about which elections to in-
clude in or exclude from the polarization analysis. But those are 
not the right lessons. The lower courts have not been indifferent 
to manageability norms or to norms against race-based assump-
tions. Rather, as we explain in Part III, their failure to settle on 
clear, prescriptive rules at the Gingles stage (free of race-based 
assumptions) simply reflects the impossibility of this assign-
ment, given ongoing normative disagreements about the mean-
ing of racial vote dilution and the convention of basing racial-
polarization findings on votes cast in actual elections. 
1. Preliminaries: the privileged status of election data. 
If there is any well-settled convention under the second and 
third prongs of Gingles, it is this: “[T]he issue of political cohe-
siveness [shall] be judged primarily on the basis of the voting 
preferences expressed in actual elections.”109 Defendants have oc-
casionally tried to rebut vote-share evidence with survey or other 
data, but these efforts have universally failed.110 Anecdotal testi-
mony is sometimes offered to reinforce or illuminate the voting 
 
 108 Blacksher and Menefee, 34 Hastings L J at 53 (cited in note 11). 
 109 Gomez v City of Watsonville, 863 F2d 1407, 1415 (9th Cir 1988). The courts have 
consistently rejected efforts to rebut vote-share evidence of polarization with survey or 
other data on the political preferences and interests of racial communities. 
 110 See, for example, id at 1416 (describing the Fifth Circuit’s rejection of survey ev-
idence because surveys showing that African Americans and Hispanics had different po-
litical interests provided no evidence of actual voting behavior); United States v Blaine 
County, Montana, 363 F3d 897, 910 (9th Cir 2004) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ arguments 
that the district court erred in failing to consider data on low voter turnout or the lack of 
additional nonelectoral evidence that the plaintiffs had “distinct political concerns”). In 
none of the sixty-nine cases in our sample did the court determine that vote-share evi-
dence tending to support a finding of minority cohesion or white bloc voting was out-
weighed or rebutted by anecdotal or survey evidence indicating a lack of cohesion.  
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data, but estimates of candidates’ vote shares by racial group in 
usual elections have been the center of attention since Gingles.111 
The “usual” caveat is important: the Gingles Court recog-
nized that voting patterns in certain elections may be anoma-
lous because of special circumstances, such as the presence of an 
exceptionally strong incumbent or the lack of a challenger.112 But 
the Court (like Blacksher and Menefee) apparently assumed 
that once these anomalous elections are excluded, everything a 
judge needs to learn about minority cohesion and white bloc vot-
ing can be learned from typical white and minority vote shares 
in other elections.113 
2. Preference polarization. 
Courts typically assess the legal significance of preference 
polarization in two steps, asking first whether the minority 
community is politically cohesive (the second prong of Gingles) 
and then whether the white majority votes as a bloc against the 
minority (the third prong).114 
 
 111 In 87 percent of the cases in our sample in which the court adjudicated a dispute 
over the second prong of Gingles, the coder judged the court to have relied “exclusively” 
or “primarily” on voting data when making findings about minority cohesion. For the third 
prong, the court relied exclusively or primarily on voting data in 90 percent of the cases. 
 112 Gingles, 478 US at 51, 54, 57 (listing examples of special circumstances that, if 
combined with a minority-preferred candidate’s victory, would not provide clear or con-
clusive evidence against polarized voting). 
 113 See id at 56 (“A showing that a significant number of minority group members 
usually vote for the same candidates is one way of proving the political cohesiveness nec-
essary to a vote dilution claim.”); id at 57 (“[I]n a district where elections are shown usu-
ally to be polarized, the fact that racially polarized voting is not present in one or a few 
individual elections does not necessarily negate the conclusion that the district experi-
ences legally significant bloc voting.”). 
 Blacksher and Menefee did recognize that voting patterns may not be probative of 
underlying polarization unless one of the candidates is “publicly identified with the in-
terests of”  the minority community. Blacksher and Menefee, 34 Hastings L J at 51 (cited 
in note 11) (emphasis omitted). However, they believed that such candidates could be 
identified by courts objectively, on the basis of their minority vote share. Id at 59 (“Re-
ceipt of the racial minority’s bloc support would be the best, and necessary, indication 
that a candidate is identified with the minority’s particular interests.”). 
 114 See, for example, Gomez, 863 F2d at 1414–17 (analyzing the “[p]olitical 
[c]ohesiveness of Hispanics” and then subsequently and separately analyzing racial bloc 
voting among majority voters). The controlling opinion in Gingles arguably suggests that 
both of these questions should be treated as part of the second-prong inquiry, with the 
third prong reserved for the question whether minority-preferred candidates are usually 
defeated. Gingles, 478 US at 51 (equating minority cohesion with the existence of “dis-
tinctive minority group interests”) (emphasis added). But this is only a stylistic point; 
nothing turns on whether white preferences are considered under the auspices of the 
second prong or the third. 
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a) Minority preferences.  In a widely noted book published 
in 1992, Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley, and Richard Niemi 
asserted that Gingles had settled the question of how to prove 
minority cohesion.115 Evidence of a statistically significant corre-
lation between voter race and vote choice was both necessary 
and sufficient to establish minority cohesion.116 But it is of 
course true that statistical significance does not imply substan-
tive importance, and notwithstanding Grofman, Handley, and 
Niemi’s interpretation of Gingles, courts frequently ask whether 
minorities vote by large or “landslide” margins for minority-
preferred candidates.117 
The landslide approach was urged by expert witness Profes-
sor Allan Lichtman and prominent litigator J. Gerald Hebert in 
a 1993 article.118 They proposed that if 60 percent or more of mi-
nority voters typically vote for the minority candidate in bira-
cial, two-candidate elections, minority cohesion should be pre-
sumed as a matter of law.119 If minority in-group voting falls 
below 60 percent, then courts should consider whether “local 
conditions” (such as a lack of “viable” minority candidates) 
might explain the apparent lack of cohesion.120 
Judicial practice comports with Lichtman and Hebert’s sug-
gestion in one important respect: findings about minority cohe-
sion—or its absence—are almost universally based on rates of 
coethnic voting by plaintiff-race citizens in elections contested by 
 
 115 Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley, and Richard G. Niemi, Minority Representation 
and the Quest for Voting Equality 83–84 (Cambridge 1992).  
 116 See id. Grofman, Handley, and Niemi do note that in a small number of post-
Gingles decisions, lower courts looked beyond voting patterns. Id at 67–69. However, 
based on their discussion of Gingles, they appear to view those decisions as misreadings 
of Gingles. Id at 83–84. 
 117 See, for example, Barnett v City of Chicago, 141 F3d 699, 702 (7th Cir 1998) (not-
ing that when “voting is ‘polarized,’ in the sense that members of various racial or ethnic 
groups have a strong preference for a candidate that belongs to their group,” courts must 
conduct a “more searching inquiry”) (emphasis added). In roughly 67 percent of the cases 
in our sample in which minority cohesion was disputed and the court reached the issue, 
the coder reported that the district court regarded the typical level of voting cohesion in 
the minority community as a matter of legal significance under the second prong. (In 
most of the remaining cases, it was not apparent to the coder whether the court regarded 
the typical level of minority voting cohesion as relevant under this prong.) By contrast, 
the difference between minority and white voting levels was regarded as a second-prong 
issue in only about 42 percent of the cases; similarly, statistical significance was treated 
by the court as a matter of legal significance in about 46 percent of the cases.  
 118 Allan J. Lichtman and J. Gerald Hebert, A General Theory of Vote Dilution, 6 La 
Raza L J 1, 5 (1993). 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id at 6.  
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plaintiff-race candidates. There were thirty-nine cases in our 
sample in which minority cohesion was disputed at trial and the 
court reached the issue. In all but one of these thirty-nine cases, 
the court grounded its determination exclusively or primarily on 
data from elections with a minority-race candidate.121 
Though judges ruling on minority cohesion often emphasize 
the percentage of minority voters who supported minority-race 
candidates,122 the lower courts have been very reluctant to estab-
lish quantitative cutoffs for what is, or is not, legally significant 
minority cohesion. (This is despite Justice Thomas’s early warn-
ing in Holder v Hall123 that the establishment of cutoffs would 
mitigate some of the problems with racial vote dilution law.)124 A 
few courts have deemed in-group voting rates of 60 percent to 70 
percent presumptively cohesive.125 Yet of the thirty-nine perti-
nent cases in our sample, there appears to be only a single in-
stance in which a court even gestured toward a minimum level 
of voting cohesion, or toward a minimum gap between minority 
and white vote shares, that would be required to satisfy the sec-
ond prong of Gingles.126 
 
 121 The sole exception was African-American Voting Rights Legal Defense Fund, Inc 
v Missouri, 994 F Supp 1105 (ED Mo 1997), a case in which there was no evidence of ra-
cial polarization in any endogenous election. Moreover, this “exception” was arguably 
miscoded, because a key passage in the court’s opinion suggests that the court under-
stood “political cohesion” within the meaning of Gingles as coalescence behind same-race 
candidates and against other-race candidates. Id at 1124 (“[I]t cannot be concluded from 
the data that African–Americans as a group have attempted to oust non-African-
Americans, or that non-African-Americans as a group have attempted to oust African–
Americans, from the bench.”). 
 Note also that cases coded as “exclusively” using data from elections with a plaintiff-
race candidate (under the second prong of Gingles) are roughly three times as common as 
cases coded as “primarily” using such data—that is, cases in which courts also considered 
data from elections without plaintiff-race candidates when ruling on minority cohesion. 
 122 See note 117 and accompanying text. 
 123 512 US 874 (1994). 
 124 Id at 904 (Thomas concurring the judgment). 
 125 See, for example, Shirt v Hazeltine, 336 F Supp 2d 976, 999, 1016–17 (D SD 
2004) (“Factoring in the margin of error and the arbitrary nature of setting a specific 
point, the court holds that cohesion exists at levels above 60 percent and may exist, albe-
it more weakly, at lower levels.”); Johnson v Hamrick, 155 F Supp 2d 1355, 1370 (ND Ga 
2001) (stating that minority bloc voting above 70 percent establishes cohesion as a mat-
ter of law, while finding cohesion based on the fact that the minority group sometimes 
but not always voted that cohesively). 
 126 This claim is based on our review of students’ coding of the G2R.Rules.Nar and 
G2R.Standards.Nar fields. A codebook defining these fields is available at 
http://lawreview.uchicago.edu/page/elmendorf-quinn-abrajano. For the exception, see Mal-
lory v Ohio, 38 F Supp 2d 525, 550 (SD Ohio 1997) (rejecting a vote dilution claim be-
cause the “‘average degree of racial bloc voting’ [in the instant case did] not begin to ap-
proach the 70–plus percent degree of racial bloc voting discussed by Judge Boggs in 
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Considered in view of manageability concerns and the Su-
preme Court’s injunction against race-based assumptions, the 
lower courts’ handling of the second (minority cohesion) prong of 
Gingles invites two objections. First and most obviously, the 
courts have not set numeric cohesion cutoffs, as Strickland sug-
gests that they should.127 Second, the de facto definition of “mi-
nority political cohesion” as “consistent voting by large margins 
for coethnic candidates” rests heavily on racial assumptions. It 
presumes that minority voters who share the same political 
views will manifest their commonality by obdurately supporting 
candidates of their own race, essentially ignoring the issue posi-
tions and the strengths and weaknesses of each minority candi-
date.128 It also presupposes that, so far as minority voters are 
concerned, the candidates who face off against plaintiff-race can-
didates are just an undifferentiated mass, one no better than the 
next.129 Whereas the law generally favors race blindness, the con-
ventions that guide judicial fact-finding about minority political 
 
Clarke v. City of Cincinnati . . . as being typical of legally significant racial bloc voting”) 
(emphasis omitted). By contrast, in a number of cases in our sample, judges expressly 
rejected arguments for bright-line rules under the second prong of Gingles. See, for ex-
ample, Fabela v City of Farmers Branch, Texas, 2012 WL 3135545, *30–34 (ND Tex) 
(weighing point estimates and confidence intervals in lieu of cutoffs); Large v Fremont 
County, Wyoming, 709 F Supp 2d 1176, 1215 (D Wyo 2010) (following the Eighth and 
Ninth Circuits in rejecting the 60 percent voting-cohesion requirement under the second 
prong of Gingles and noting that the “[d]efendants were unable to point to a single case” 
adopting this requirement); United States v Village of Port Chester, 704 F Supp 2d 411, 
427 (SDNY 2010) (rejecting “bright-line threshold[s],” including the 60 percent rule pro-
posed by the defendants); United States v City of Euclid, 580 F Supp 2d 584, 596 & n 15 
(ND Ohio 2008) (“There are no bright line absolutes to which this Court must adhere in 
assessing the question of whether racial bloc voting existed in Euclid.”); Buchanan v City 
of Jackson, Tennessee, 683 F Supp 1515, 1527 (WD Tenn 1988) (rejecting the defendants’ 
proposal to hold as a matter of law that racial polarization exists if and only if the sum of 
the percentage of black voters voting for black candidates plus the percentage of white 
voters voting for white candidates exceeds 160 percent in biracial matchups).  
 Reading cases beyond our sample, we found two opinions that do appear to endorse 
60 percent minority cohesion as a minimum threshold for legally significant group cohe-
sion. See Marylanders for Fair Representation, Inc v Schaefer, 849 F Supp 1022, 1056 (D 
Md 1994) (three-judge panel); Cane v Worcester County, Maryland, 840 F Supp 1081, 
1088 n 5 (D Md 1994). See also Rodriguez v Pataki, 308 F Supp 2d 346, 388 (SDNY 2004) 
(three-judge panel) (noting that the plaintiffs’ expert applied the 60 percent rule in his 
polarization analysis).  
 127 See notes 83–86 and accompanying text. 
 128 See Part III.B (explaining that the observed level of polarized voting depends on 
candidate positions and other attributes). 
 129 See Part III.B. 
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cohesion effectively assume that voters—if cohesive—see only 
race when choosing among candidates.130 
b) White preferences.  The plurality opinion in Gingles 
stated that white bloc voting is “legally significant” if “whites 
vote sufficiently as a bloc usually to defeat the minority’s pre-
ferred candidates.”131 Read literally, this implies that white pref-
erences do not have to be estimated. Rather, after determining 
that a minority community is cohesive, the court simply has to es-
tablish which candidates count as “minority preferred” (that is, 
“minority candidates of choice”) and see whether they won or lost. 
In point of fact, however, expert witnesses report and courts 
make findings on the share of the white vote that went to minority-
preferred candidates.132 This coheres with the sentiment that the 
justices expressed in Strickland—to wit, that substantial levels 
of white crossover voting may defeat a vote dilution claim, even 
if the white voters do not cross over in sufficient numbers to 
usually elect the minority’s candidate of choice.133 (Another way 
to put this: preference polarization must be fairly severe for a 
claim to pass through the Gingles sieve.) 
However, in none of the fifty-nine cases in our sample in 
which the district court passed on a dispute about white bloc 
voting did the court state or follow a bright-line rule about levels 
of white crossover voting that would defeat a vote dilution claim 
 
 130 To be clear, it is not our view that measuring minority and white cohesion in 
terms of preferences for coethnic candidates is necessarily misguided. Under certain 
conditions (for example, if voters have no other information about a candidate’s policy 
positions or political values), differences in the “treatment effect” of apparent candidate 
race on support for the candidate among groups of voters defined by race is probably a 
very good indicator of whether there are big intergroup differences in political prefer-
ences. But when voters know a lot about the candidates, and the candidates vary in their 
policy positions and other attributes, the equation of minority cohesion with “consistent 
voting by large margins for coethnic candidates” becomes problematic (and the problem 
is worse yet if there are incentives for strategic voting). See Part III.B. 
 131 Gingles, 478 US at 56. 
 132 We had our law-student coders assess whether the opinion in question treated var-
ious factors as intrinsically relevant to the third-prong determination (as opposed to being 
relevant only derivatively, insofar as the factor results in the usual defeat of minority-
preferred candidates). Though “usual defeat” of minority-preferred candidates was most 
commonly cited as relevant (74 percent of the cases), the level of white bloc voting was 
deemed to be of independent legal significance in 41 percent of the cases, and evidence of 
disparate treatment of minority candidates by white voters (or its absence) figured into 
the analysis in 19 percent of the cases. 
 133 See notes 83–86 and accompanying text. A few lower courts have said that if 
whites do not vote by very large margins against minority candidates of choice, then 
white bloc voting does not deny the minority community the “opportunity to elect,” be-
cause with higher minority turnout or greater minority cohesion, the minority-preferred 
candidates would prevail. See notes 168–71 and accompanying text. 
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as a matter of law.134 Further reading turned up a few such cases 
beyond our sample,135 but the vast majority of courts have re-
fused invitations to set, as a matter of law, quantitative thresh-
olds that preclude (or require) a finding of legally significant 
white bloc voting.136 
Some courts have sought to distinguish legally significant 
from legally inconsequential white preferences by asking not 
simply whether white and minority voters want different things 
in the political arena but whether race causes the preference di-
vergence.137 These courts have been imprecise in explaining the 
causation requirement, sometimes talking about the effect of 
candidate race on vote choice and in other cases suggesting that 
the requirement might be about the “effect” of voter race on the 
voter’s choice of candidates.138 In the First and Fifth Circuits, 
 
 134 To be clear, these fifty-nine cases are the cases in our sample in which (1) the 
parties disputed whether the third prong of Gingles was satisfied, and (2) the district 
court reached this question. 
 135 See, for example, Session v Perry, 298 F Supp 2d 451, 484 (ED Tex 2004) (three-
judge panel) (suggesting, based on an arguable misreading of Abrams v Johnson, 521 US 
74 (1997), that 30 percent white crossover voting would preclude a finding of racial polar-
ization); Old Person v Cooney, 230 F3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir 2000) (noting that the district 
court had “considered white bloc voting to be probative only if the white-preferred candi-
date won with a minimum of 60% of the white vote” and assuming without deciding that 
this was correct). See also Meza v Galvin, 322 F Supp 2d 52, 66–67 (D Mass 2004) (three-
judge panel) (deeming evidence of white bloc voting “equivocal,” given that 28.1 to 42.6 
percent of whites supported minority-preferred candidates); Rodriguez, 308 F Supp 2d at 
388, 390 (relying on the plaintiff ’s definition of “white bloc voting” as 60 percent white 
support for same candidate); note 126 and accompanying text (addressing vote-share 
cutoffs under the second prong of Gingles).  
 136 For examples from our data set, see note 126 (citing cases that reject bright-line 
rules under the second and third prongs of Gingles). See also D. James Greiner, Re-
solidifying Racial Bloc Voting: Empirics and Legal Doctrine in the Melting Pot, 86 Ind L 
J 447, 456 (2011) (“Lower courts mostly interpreted Justice Brennan’s opinion in Gingles 
as foreclosing reliance on . . . numerically defined threshold[s] or rule[s] of thumb [to de-
limit legally significant white bloc voting].”).  
 137 See Ellen Katz, et al, Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings 
under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act since 1982; Final Report of the Voting Rights Ini-
tiative, University of Michigan Law School, 39 U Mich J L Ref 643, 670–72 & n 138 
(2006) (discussing the causation theory and collecting cases); D. James Greiner, Causal 
Inference in Civil Rights Litigation, 122 Harv L Rev 533, 590–97 (2008). See also Gin-
gles, 478 US at 100 (O’Connor concurring in the judgment) (arguing in favor of a causa-
tion analysis in § 2 litigation). 
 138 See Greiner, 122 Harv L Rev at 590–92 (cited in note 137). The former interpre-
tation is probably the better reading of the causation requirement, both because it draws 
support from a key concurrence in Gingles and because, as Professor D. James Greiner 
and other methodologists have emphasized, the causal effect of voter race on vote choice 
is unknowable. See, for example, D. James Greiner and Donald B. Rubin, Causal Effects of 
Perceived Immutable Characteristics, 93 Rev Econ & Stat 775, 775–77 (2011) (explaining 
that while the causal effect of a “decider’s” race on a decision cannot be studied because the 
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causation must be shown;139 elsewhere, it is only one considera-
tion among many to be weighed, either as part of the Gingles 
analysis140 or at the totality-of-the-circumstances stage.141 Even 
where it is a formal requirement, however, the causation test 
appears to do little to constrain judicial discretion.142 
c) What is a usual (probative) election?  As we noted 
above, the Supreme Court in Gingles distinguished “usual” elec-
tions from those with “special circumstances,”143 positing that in 
some atypical cases, racial-group vote shares may not reflect 
underlying political differences or provide an accurate picture of 
minority voting power. Given manageability concerns, one might 
expect the courts to have categorically excluded evidence from 
elections with “special circumstances” and to have defined the 
class of special-circumstances elections with reference to dis-
crete, objective characteristics.144 
 
decider’s race cannot be manipulated, the causal effect of the decider’s perception of 
someone else’s race on the decision can be studied because the apparent race of a choice 
object is subject to manipulation). 
 139 See Uno v City of Holyoke, 72 F3d 973, 981–83 (1st Cir 1995) (“[E]ven under the 
1982 amendment, a lack of electoral success unrelated to race is not a proxy for a lack of 
opportunity to succeed.”); League of United Latin American Citizens, Council No 4434 v 
Clements, 999 F2d 831, 850–63 (5th Cir 1993) (en banc). See also City of Euclid, 580 F 
Supp 2d at 597 (explaining that evidence that white bloc voting against minority candi-
dates increases in races between white and minority candidates offers stronger support 
that the plaintiffs have met the third Gingles prong); Mallory, 38 F Supp 2d at 550 (em-
phasizing that minority Democrats did about equally well as or even better than white 
Democrats); Reed v Town of Babylon, 914 F Supp 843, 877, 883 (EDNY 1996) (adopting a 
causation requirement and deeming evidence of white bloc voting legally insignificant 
because “white voters supported minority candidates slated by a political party at levels 
at least equal to the support enjoyed by the white candidates of that party”).  
 140 In about 19 percent of the cases in our data set in which the district court ruled 
on the third Gingles prong, the court treated evidence of disparate treatment (or its ab-
sence) as relevant to analysis of the third prong from Gingles. 
 141 See, for example, United States v Charleston County, South Carolina, 365 F3d 
341, 348–49 (4th Cir 2004) (noting that although under Gingles’s third prong, “[l]egally 
significant white bloc voting [ ] refers to the frequency with which, and not the reason 
why, whites vote cohesively for candidates who are not backed by minority voters,” and 
that “the reason for polarized voting is a critical factor in the totality analysis”) (quota-
tion marks omitted). 
 142 Most courts have said that the defendant bears the burden of showing that the 
racially correlated voting patterns are not caused by race. See Greiner, 86 Ind L J at 
458–60 (cited in note 136). Yet there are no established methods for defendants to make 
this showing. 
 143 See note 112 and accompanying text. 
 144 See notes 112–13 and accompanying text. 
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But instead of firm rules, most courts have opted for loose 
guidelines tied to what the courts sometimes call “probativeness.”145 
For example, interracial elections are generally regarded as 
more probative than monoracial elections,146 and elections to the 
governmental body at issue in the case (“endogenous” elections) 
are customarily given more weight than elections to other gov-
ernmental bodies (“exogenous” elections).147 
Within this rubric, the courts continue to disagree about 
some very basic matters. For example, should primary elections 
be included in the analysis?148 If so, should they receive more or 
less weight than general elections? Most courts include primary 
elections149 and sometimes give them particular emphasis, on the 
theory that voting patterns in such elections are uncontaminated 
by partisan cues and therefore are more truly reflective of racial 
polarization in the community.150 On the other hand, primary 
 
 145 See, for example, Shirt, 336 F Supp 2d at 996 (noting that interracial elections, 
endogenous elections—that is, “contests within the jurisdiction and for the particular 
office that is at issue”—and recent elections are “more probative of unequal electoral op-
portunity” than other elections); Ruiz v City of Santa Maria, 160 F3d 543, 552–54 (9th 
Cir 1998) (holding that the characteristics of an election, including the voting format and 
races of the candidates, influence how probative the results are and how much weight 
courts should give them in analyzing Gingles’s third prong). We had law-student coders 
summarize any “rules” or “standards” applied by district courts in the sample of opin-
ions. While the student coders had some difficulty distinguishing between rules and 
standards, it appears from our review of their descriptions of the rules or standards ap-
plied by the courts that most courts made fairly subjective judgments about how much 
weight to give to the evidence from different elections. 
 146 See, for example, Shirt, 336 F Supp 2d at 996. This was so in 90 percent of the 
twenty-one cases in our sample in which the district court addressed this issue. 
 147 See, for example, id. This was so in 89 percent of the twenty-eight cases in our 
sample in which the district court addressed this issue. 
 148 Curiously, this issue seems not to have been addressed in most of the cases in 
our sample. Student coders reported it as “not addressed” in forty-four cases and as “ad-
dressed” in only five cases. The low number may reflect coding errors, however, as the 
name we gave to the corresponding field in the codebook did not include the word “pri-
mary,” perhaps confusing some of the coders. Other commentators well versed in the 
case law regard the weight to be given to evidence from primary elections as a major is-
sue. See, for example, Katz, et al, 39 U Mich J L Ref at 668 (cited in note 137). 
 149 See id at 668–70. 
 150 See, for example, Black Political Task Force v Galvin, 300 F Supp 2d 291, 305–06 
(D Mass 2004) (three-judge panel) (“The relationship between race and party politics is a 
complicated matter and the removal of partisanship from the equation [by looking to 
primary elections] helps to isolate race for purposes of a vote dilution inquiry.”); Sanchez 
v Colorado, 97 F3d 1303, 1317 n 25 (10th Cir 1996); Bradford County NAACP v City of 
Starke, 712 F Supp 1523, 1534 (MD Fla 1989) (stating that primaries are “precisely the 
elections in which one would expect to find blacks and whites more often disagreeing on 
their candidate of choice”); League of United Latin American Citizens, Council No 4434, 
999 F2d at 883–84; Session, 298 F Supp 2d at 478; Shirt, 336 F Supp 2d at 1008–09. See 
also National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Inc v City of Niagara 
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elections are usually low-turnout affairs, and judges have been 
wary of inferring polarization from low-turnout elections, rea-
soning that in such contests the electorate may be unrepresenta-
tive of the entire political community.151 Other judges downplay 
primary election voting patterns because of the Supreme Court’s 
statement that “minority voters are not immune from the obliga-
tion to pull, haul, and trade to find common political ground.”152 
The thinking here is that a candidate who splits the minority vote 
in a primary still ought to qualify as a candidate of choice if she 
can muster support from a broad coalition of white and minority 
voters in the general election.153 In short, not only are there no 
clear rules for excluding or weighting primary election data, but 
there is not even a consensus about whether polarization findings 
 
Falls, New York, 65 F3d 1002, 1017–19 (2d Cir 1995) (indicating that the success of the 
candidate backed by minority voters in a general election is not probative of the minori-
ty’s opportunity to elect if the same candidate did not garner strong minority support in 
the primary).  
 151 See, for example, United States v Alamosa County, Colorado, 306 F Supp 2d 
1016, 1033 (D Colo 2004) (“[T]he Court finds general elections to be more probative be-
cause they involve all voters in the county.”). 
 152 De Grandy, 512 US at 1020. For an example of a court directly relying on this 
statement to downplay primary election voting patterns, see Texas v United States, 887 
F Supp 2d 133, 175 (DDC 2012) (three-judge panel). 
 153 See, for example, Texas, 887 F Supp 2d at 175 (“[R]equiring cohesion in the pri-
mary election distorts the role of the primary. Although minority groups sometimes coa-
lesce around a candidate at that point in time, minority voters, like any other voters, use 
the primary to help develop their preferences.”); Large, 709 F Supp 2d at 1201–02 (dis-
counting a lack of cohesion in the primary given “obvious[ ]” cohesion in the general elec-
tion); Lewis v Alamance County, North Carolina, 99 F3d 600, 615 (4th Cir 1996):  
[T]he proposition that success of a minority-preferred candidate in a general 
election is entitled to less weight when a candidate with far greater minority 
support was defeated in the primary . . . is grounded in the belief that minority 
voters essentially take their marbles and go home whenever the candidate 
whom they prefer most in the primary does not prevail, a belief about minority 
voters that we do not share.  
(quotation marks and brackets omitted). See also Corbett v Sullivan, 202 F Supp 2d 972, 
984 (ED Mo 2002) (deeming African Americans cohesive because they usually vote for 
Democrats, without considering how African Americans vote in Democratic primaries); 
Askew v City of Rome, 127 F3d 1355, 1378 (11th Cir 1997) (“Black preferred candidates 
[ ] are not only those who are perfectly ideologically in tune with the prevailing political 
sentiment in the black community. To so hold would . . . raise the possibility that none of 
Rome’s current black officials were truly black preferred because they are too moder-
ate.”); Rural West Tennessee African-American Affairs Council, Inc v McWherter, 877 F 
Supp 1096, 1100–07 (WD Tenn 1995) (three-judge panel) (addressing the place of “influ-
ence districts” in evaluation of minority political opportunity). 
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from primary elections should be up-weighted or down-weighted 
relative to findings from general elections.154 
The fluidity of the special-circumstances doctrine and the 
probativeness rubric also leaves fact finders with broad leeway 
to heed (or ignore) “the political stories behind the election re-
turns.”155 Judges have discounted voting patterns in particular 
elections because of such “story-based” determinations as: 
 The minority candidate was “an attractive, well-known 
incumbent whose appeal cut across racial lines.”156 
 The minority candidate was “weak.”157 
 The appearance of cohesive voting could have been due to 
a “friends and neighbors” effect—that is, voters support-
ed a candidate because he was the hometown guy, rather 
than because of meaningful political commonality within 
a racial group.158 
 Weak minority turnout suggested disinterest in the 
election.159 
 The election concerned a ballot measure that was not shown 
to be of particular interest to the minority community.160 
 
 154 A judge might also reasonably decide to downplay polarization evidence from 
primary elections (particularly same-race primary elections) because voters tend to be 
less informed about primary election than general election candidates. See Christopher 
S. Elmendorf and David Schleicher, Informing Consent: Voter Ignorance, Political Par-
ties, and Election Law, 2013 U Ill L Rev 363, 388–90. 
 155 Blacksher and Menefee, 34 Hastings L J at 53 (cited in note 11). 
 156 Black Political Task Force, 300 F Supp 2d at 309. But see Clarke v City of Cin-
cinnati, 40 F3d 807, 813 (6th Cir 1994) (“To qualify as a ‘special’ circumstance, [ ] incum-
bency must play an unusually important role in the election at issue.”). 
 157 Meza, 322 F Supp 2d at 67. See also Perez v Pasadena Independent School Dis-
trict, 958 F Supp 1196, 1222 (SD Tex 1997) (noting that when analyzing racial polariza-
tion, courts should distinguish “between serious and non-serious candidates,” a distinc-
tion “not based solely on the absolute numbers of votes received”); Cane, 840 F Supp at 
1088 (ignoring an election in which, per lay testimony, the minority candidate “did not 
attempt to win”); Clark v Edwards, 725 F Supp 285, 297–98 (MD La 1988) (discounting 
evidence from an election with two low-profile black candidates). 
 158 Session, 298 F Supp 2d at 484–85. 
 159 See Rodriguez, 308 F Supp 2d at 392 n 59 (noting that low minority turnout in 
an exogenous election made the voting patterns in that election less probative); Jenkins v 
Red Clay Consolidated School District Board of Education, 4 F3d 1103, 1119–21 & 
nn 15–16 (3d Cir 1993). 
 160 See Shirt, 336 F Supp 2d at 1016 (“Defendants have provided no evidence to sug-
gest that these ballot issues touched on issues of heightened concern to the Indian com-
munity. Thus, the court need not consider this evidence.”). 
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 The minority candidate was backed by a local, predomi-
nantly white political faction.161 
 The minority candidate was “an ex-pro athlete.”162 
 The election postdated the filing of the lawsuit, and white 
elites may have organized to elect a minimally acceptable 
minority candidate in the hopes of defeating the lawsuit.163 
Notably, no court outside of the Fourth Circuit requires 
plaintiffs to estimate racial voting patterns in all or a repre-
sentative sample of elections in the relevant time period.164 What 
counts as an “unusual” election is therefore in the eye of the be-
holder and is not determined with reference to the normal range 
of variation in local elections. 
3. Voting power (lack of opportunity to elect). 
Recall that under Gingles, plaintiffs must establish both 
that the distribution of political preferences is legally significant 
(“preference polarization,” in our terminology) and that the mi-
nority community lacks the opportunity to elect its preferred 
candidates (“voting power”).165 
The vast majority of courts have addressed the voting-power 
question by, in essence, trying to predict the future win rates of 
minority candidates of choice.166 Generally this prediction is im-
plicit, grounded on past experience. The court first determines 
which of the elections for which data were presented to the court 
 
 161 See Collins v City of Norfolk, Virginia, 883 F2d 1232, 1241–42 (4th Cir 1989) 
(discounting an election in which the mayor supported a second black candidate); 
Sanchez, 97 F3d at 1321–22 (discussing the possibility of discounting elections in which 
the alleged minority-supported candidate did not actually have minority support); Jen-
kins, 4 F3d at 1129 (same). 
 162 Gunn v Chickasaw County, 1997 WL 33426761, *4 (ND Miss).  
 163 See id; Fabela, 2012 WL 3135545 at *11–12. 
 164 See Lewis, 99 F3d at 608 (“We therefore hold that . . . a district court must con-
sider, at a minimum, a representative cross-section of elections, and not merely those in 
which a minority candidate appeared on the ballot.”). The First Circuit has also hinted at 
a representative sampling requirement, but it is unclear whether the First Circuit meant 
to require a sample of all elections or only of those elections contested by a minority-race 
candidate. See Uno, 72 F3d at 985 (stating that “all elections in the relevant time frame 
(or, at least, a representative sampling of them) must be studied,” but also defining “le-
gally significant” racial polarization in terms of the defeat rate of minority candidates). 
 165 See text accompanying notes 4–6, 59. 
 166 This approach was used in about 78 percent of the cases in our sample of district 
court opinions (subsetted to cases in which the third prong of Gingles was disputed and 
the district court reached the issue). 
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were contested by the minority community’s candidates of 
choice; it then gauges the probativeness of each of these elec-
tions, taking account of any special circumstances; and it con-
cludes with a gestalt judgment about whether the actual or antic-
ipated win rate is low enough to satisfy the third prong of 
Gingles.167 
A few courts have resisted this approach, however, arguing 
that the success rate of minority candidates of choice is less im-
portant than whether those candidates could be elected if voting-
eligible minority citizens registered, turned out at high rates, 
and voted very cohesively for the minority-preferred candidate.168 
These courts sometimes reference the Supreme Court’s decision in 
De Grandy, which emphasizes that § 2 guarantees equality of op-
portunity for minority voters, not success for minority-preferred 
candidates.169 Some courts have implemented this opportunity-
not-outcomes approach in a fact-intensive manner, trying to 
 
 167 See, for example, Old Person, 230 F3d at 1122 (“[T]he process requires the court 
(1) to determine the candidate preferred by Indian voters; and (2) to determine whether 
whites voted as a bloc to defeat the Indian-preferred candidate.”); Jenkins v Manning, 
116 F3d 685, 691 (3d Cir 1997) (describing the court’s three-part inquiry under Gingles’s 
second and third prongs); Sanchez, 97 F3d at 1320, quoting Collins, 883 F2d at 1237 
(“‘Ascertaining whether legally significant white bloc voting exists begins with the iden-
tification of the minority members’ “preferred candidates” or “representatives of their 
choice.”’ . . . Only then can the district court determine whether whites vote sufficiently 
as a bloc usually to defeat the minority’s choice.”).  
 168 This approach was used in roughly 10 percent of the cases in our sample (in 
which the third prong of Gingles was disputed and the district court reached the issue). 
By contrast, in 78 percent of the cases, the district court defined “usual defeat” or “lack of 
opportunity to elect” purely in terms of outcomes. (The remaining opinions could not be 
classified.) For examples of the opportunity-not-outcomes approach, see Jeffers v Beebe, 
895 F Supp 2d 920, 930–33 (ED Ark 2012) (three-judge panel) (holding that, as a matter 
of law, any district in which minority citizens compose a majority of the voting-eligible 
population cannot violate § 2 or meet the first Gingles precondition); Perez v Perry, 835 F 
Supp 2d 209, 223 (WD Tex 2011) (three-judge panel) (Smith dissenting) (same); Boddie v 
City of Cleveland, Mississippi, 297 F Supp 2d 901, 907 (ND Miss 2004) (determining, 
based on white crossover-voting rates of 14 percent to 52 percent, that “minority candi-
dates lost . . . because they failed to receive sufficient support in the majority-minority 
wards”); Smith v Brunswick County, Virginia, Board of Supervisors, 984 F2d 1393, 
1399–1401 (4th Cir 1993) (rejecting the claim because blacks composed a majority of the 
voting-eligible population, notwithstanding the fact that candidates preferred by 80 per-
cent of black voters were usually defeated); National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People, Inc v City of Columbia, South Carolina, 850 F Supp 404, 420 (D SC 1993) 
(finding the third Gingles condition not met, notwithstanding a record of minority losses, 
because blacks made up a large enough share of the voting-age population that they 
could have elected black candidates if they had mobilized and voted cohesively). 
 169 De Grandy, 512 US at 1009–16. See also id at 1014 n 11 (“[T]he ultimate right of 
§ 2 is equality of opportunity, not a guarantee of electoral success for minority-preferred 
candidates of whatever race.”); Session, 298 F Supp 2d at 504 n 176 (citing De Grandy for 
this proposition). 
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make realistic judgments about feasible rates of minority turn-
out and voting cohesion.170 Other judges deem minority voters to 
have the opportunity to elect as a matter of law in any district 
where they compose a majority of the voting-eligible population.171 
Because the great bulk of lower courts have approached the 
voting-power question by assessing the win rate of minority 
candidates of choice, the balance of this Section focuses on how 
courts identify such candidates and define “usual” defeat. 
a) Identifying the minority’s “candidates of choice.”  Judg-
es almost universally treat any plaintiff-race candidate who won 
a plurality of the minority vote as a candidate of choice.172 But 
judges have been much more reluctant to use vote shares alone 
to classify white candidates as minority candidates of choice. 
In the Third and Tenth Circuits, defendants may present 
evidence from white-versus-white elections to rebut the plain-
tiffs’ showing of minority cohesion and white bloc voting in in-
terracial elections.173 However, before crediting these rebuttal 
data, the judge must undertake a “detailed, practical evaluation” 
of whether particular white candidates are, “as a realistic mat-
ter,” champions of the minority community.174 Notice that this 
imports a candidate-level version of the 1970s-era government-
responsiveness inquiry into the racial-polarization analysis. (Re-
call Professor Guinier’s and Professor Issacharoff’s arguments 
 
 170 See, for example, Boddie, 297 F Supp 2d at 907–08 (analyzing how much support 
white candidates received from majority-minority wards to reject the plaintiffs’ § 2 claim 
under the third Gingles prong). 
 171 See, for example, Jeffers, 895 F Supp 2d at 930–33. 
 172 On occasion, courts have disregarded elections in which the minority candidate 
was backed by a local, predominantly white political faction—as opposed to being “spon-
sored” by the minority community. See, for example, Collins, 883 F2d at 1241–42. They 
have also disregarded elections in which minority turnout was unusually low. See, for 
example, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 850 F Supp at 417. 
But in only three cases in our sample (out of fifty-nine cases in which the court ruled on 
third-prong disputes) did the district court find that a minority candidate who won a 
plurality of the minority vote was not a candidate of choice of the minority community—
and in two of those cases, the district courts’ candidate-of-choice determinations were 
reversed on appeal. See Jenkins, 4 F3d at 1126–28 (“According to the district court’s 
finding, there was a strong correlation between the race of the candidate and the prefer-
ence of black voters. This raises an inference that any particular black candidate was the 
minority voters’ candidate of choice.”); Sanchez, 97 F3d at 1320 (reversing because, inter 
alia, the district court erroneously believed that “the race of the candidate is irrelevant 
to the racial bloc voting analysis”). 
 173 See Jenkins, 4 F3d at 1129 (stating that courts should consider white candidates 
to be minority preferred when, among other things, they are “sponsored” by the minority 
community); Sanchez, 97 F3d at 1321 (same). 
 174 Jenkins, 4 F3d at 1129. 
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that the whole point of the Gingles framework was to obviate the 
need for any such inquiry.)175 
The Second and Ninth Circuits have forcefully rejected the 
Third and Tenth Circuits’ “subjective” definition of “minority 
candidate of choice,” deriding the “detailed, practical evaluation” 
as “a dubious judicial task, and one that can degenerate into ra-
cial stereotyping of a high order.”176 The Second and Ninth Cir-
cuits’ “objective” alternative is to credit white-versus-white elec-
tions, but only if at least one candidate was strongly preferred to 
the others by minority voters.177 The Fourth Circuit has gone one 
step further and now requires plaintiffs to present data from all 
or a “representative sampling” of elections in the defendant ju-
risdiction during the relevant time period.178 Any candidate who 
would have won if only minority-cast ballots were counted is 
presumed to be a minority candidate of choice.179 
Even more striking than the diversity of legal doctrine 
across the circuits with respect to white-versus-white elections is 
its instability within circuits—and even within judicial opinions. 
Thus the Ninth Circuit, in the very same case in which it vehe-
mently rejected the Third and Tenth Circuits’ subjective defini-
tion of “minority-preferred candidate,” held that voting data 
from elections without a minority-race candidate generally de-
serve less weight in the polarization analysis.180 How much less 
weight? The court did not say, and we do not see how one could 
make this judgment without assessing whether the white-
versus-white elections were fought over issues that divided the 
 
 175 See note 65 and accompanying text. 
 176 Ruiz, 160 F3d at 552, quoting National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People, 65 F3d at 1018. See also Blaine County, 363 F3d at 910 (stating that courts should 
not go beyond vote shares in judging cohesion because to ask about interests is to ask an 
“inherently [ ] political question”). 
 177 See, for example, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 65 
F3d at 1018–19 (requiring that any candidate receive at least 50 percent of the minority 
vote to be considered minority preferred); Ruiz, 160 F3d at 552 (requiring that a candi-
date receive “sufficient votes to be elected if the election were held only among the mi-
nority group in question”—but not necessarily 50 percent of the minority vote—to qualify 
as minority preferred); Martinez v Bush, 234 F Supp 2d 1275, 1280 n 6 (SD Fla 2002) 
(three-judge panel) (adopting a standard identical to that in Ruiz v City of Santa Maria, 
160 F3d 543 (9th Cir 1998)). 
 178 Lewis, 99 F3d at 605–08. Thus, in the Fourth Circuit (unlike in the Second and 
Ninth Circuits), minority cohesion and white bloc voting can in theory be disproved with 
reference to white-versus-white elections in which no candidate was strongly preferred to 
the others by minority voters. 
 179 See id at 611–15. 
 180 See Ruiz, 160 F3d at 552–54. 
 2016] Racially Polarized Voting 623 
 
white and minority communities—a question that can be an-
swered only through the kind of contextual, stories-behind-the-
elections inquiry favored in the Third and Tenth Circuits. The 
Ninth Circuit is not an outlier. Judges in the Second and Sixth 
Circuits, which nominally follow the objective approach, also 
give an indeterminate amount of additional weight to polariza-
tion evidence from interracial elections.181 
Even the Fourth Circuit has wavered. Initially, it espoused 
a version of the subjective approach.182 When the Fourth Circuit 
subsequently created the representative sampling requirement, 
the court spelled out bright-line vote-share rules about which 
candidates are “minority preferred” in elections in which several 
candidates are chosen concurrently.183 But the court also allowed 
that “individualized assessment[s]” of particular candidates may 
be warranted in certain borderline cases.184 A decade later, the 
Fourth Circuit held that with respect to elections in which no 
candidate received a majority of the minority vote, the fact find-
er should consider “testimony from political observers and the 
candidates themselves” to determine whether any of the candi-
dates “can be fairly considered a representative of the minority 
community.”185 This is the crux of the subjective approach, as 
practiced in the Third and Tenth Circuits. 
But it is not as if the courts are generally converging on 
the subjective approach. We see just as much movement in the 
other direction. The Eighth Circuit, which initially embraced 
 
 181 See, for example, Village of Port Chester, 704 F Supp 2d at 427–30 (sorting elec-
tions by probativeness and giving the most weight to multiracial elections when the race 
or ethnicity of the minority candidate was widely known); Reed, 914 F Supp at 879 (stat-
ing that exogenous elections can still be probative when they are multiracial); Clarke, 40 
F3d at 810–13 (insisting that white-versus-white elections are relevant to gauging mi-
nority cohesion and white bloc voting, but criticizing the district court because it gave 
equal weight to evidence from interracial and monoracial elections). 
 182 See Collins, 883 F2d at 1238–40 (holding that two white candidates who received 
minority interest group endorsements were not true candidates of choice because, inter 
alia, they failed to adopt certain issue positions that the court believed to be important to 
minority voters).  
 183 See Lewis, 99 F3d at 614: 
[I]n multi-seat elections in which voters are permitted to cast as many votes as 
there are seats, at the very least any candidate who receives a majority of the 
minority vote and who finishes behind a successful candidate who was the first 
choice among the minority voters is automatically to be deemed a black-
preferred candidate, just like the successful first choice. 
 184 Id (considering borderline cases to be those in which the candidate received less 
than 50 percent of the minority vote). 
 185 Levy v Lexington County, South Carolina, 589 F3d 708, 717–18 & n 14 (4th Cir 2009). 
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the subjective approach,186 subsequently upheld a district court’s 
decision that understood a “minority candidate of choice” as “any 
candidate who gets enough votes to be elected if only minority 
ballots are counted.”187 A similar transition seems to have oc-
curred in the Eleventh Circuit.188 In short, the courts are going 
in circles. 
b) Quantifying “usual defeat.”  The question of what 
counts as “usual defeat” (or its obverse, “opportunity to elect”) 
within the meaning of Gingles has received little elaboration. 
Courts variously ask whether the minority community has a 
“fighting chance,”189 a “good chance,”190 or a “reasonable likeli-
hood”191 of electing its candidates of choice, or whether minority 
voters constitute an “effective political force.”192 It is very hard to 
pin down what judges actually mean by these formulations. One 
of us tried to code our random sample of district court opinions 
for three plausible conceptions of what is required to establish 
“usual defeat”: (1) a win rate of less than 50 percent; (2) a win 
rate of much less than 50 percent, such that victories are rare; 
or (3) a win rate resulting in the election of a disproportionately 
small number of minority candidates of choice relative to the 
minority’s population share. In 90 percent of the cases, the coder 
was unable to say which if any of these conceptions the court 
was using.193 “Usual defeat” is a legal black box. 
 
 186 See Harvell v Blytheville School District # 5, 71 F3d 1382, 1386 (8th Cir 1995) 
(holding that “[t]he preferences of the minority voters must be established on an election-
specific basis, viewing all the relevant circumstances”). 
 187 Clay v Board of Education of the City of St. Louis, 90 F3d 1357, 1361–62 (8th 
Cir 1996). 
 188 Compare Askew, 127 F3d at 1377–82 (adopting a “somewhat subjective,” totality-
of-the-circumstances approach to the definition of “minority-preferred candidate”), with 
Johnson v Hamrick, 296 F3d 1065, 1072–81 (11th Cir 2002) (sustaining a district court 
decision premised on the idea that any candidate who wins a majority of the minority 
vote is by construction a minority candidate of choice). 
 189 McDaniels v Mehfoud, 702 F Supp 588, 592–93 (ED Va 1988), citing generally 
McGhee, 860 F2d 110. 
 190 Voinovich v Quilter, 507 US 146, 153 (1993). 
 191 Aldasoro v Kennerson, 922 F Supp 339, 370–72 (SD Cal 1995). 
 192 Page v Bartels, 144 F Supp 2d 346, 365 (D NJ 2001) (three-judge panel). 
 193 Specifically, in 90 percent of the cases, the court’s conception of “usual defeat” did 
not fit into one of these categories. This may be due in part to the fact that, in most cases 
in our sample, the court did not need to choose between these conceptions, as minority 
candidates of choice had almost never been elected. 
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4. A note on geographic scale. 
Some courts assess racial polarization at the geographic 
scale of the polity as a whole, or at least over the same region 
that the court uses to gauge proportionality between the number 
of minority opportunity districts and the minority’s population 
share.194 (Proportionality is often a central consideration at the 
totality-of-the-circumstances stage of vote dilution cases.)195 
Other courts focus more narrowly on the plaintiff’s electoral dis-
trict.196 In cases about at-large elections, there is no daylight be-
tween these approaches; the plaintiff’s electoral district is geo-
graphically coterminous with the polity.197 But in the more 
typical case today, addressing the configuration of single-
member districts rather than the choice between districted and 
at-large elections, the scale issue may be very consequential. It 
determines whether minority voters in locally polarized subsets 
of a generally nonpolarized state or city can bring a vote dilution 
claim. It may also affect whether “opportunity districts”198 for 
minorities in a relatively nonpolarized area can be used to rem-
edy dilution in more-polarized areas.199 
C. Summary 
The racial-polarization test falls far short of its manageabil-
ity aspirations. As things stand today, there are no established 
 
 194 See, for example, Old Person v Brown, 312 F3d 1036, 1047–48 (9th Cir 2002) 
(holding that the racial-polarization analysis should take place at the same geographic 
scale as the proportionality analysis); Rural West Tennessee African-American Affairs 
Council v Sundquist, 209 F3d 835, 843–44 (6th Cir 2000) (same); Solomon v Liberty 
County Commissioners, 221 F3d 1218, 1220–21 (11th Cir 2000) (en banc) (assessing ra-
cial polarization at the polity- or countywide level); African American Voting Rights Le-
gal Defense Fund, Inc v Villa, 54 F3d 1345, 1353–55 (8th Cir 1995) (same). In our sample 
of district court opinions, student coders reported that the court addressed white bloc 
voting at the level of the polity in forty cases, at the level of the district in twelve cases, 
and at an intermediate regional level in five cases. 
 195 See Katz, et al, 39 U Mich J L Ref at 730–32 (cited in note 137) (noting that “De 
Grandy introduced ‘proportionality’ as a consideration in the totality of the circumstanc-
es analysis”). 
 196 See note 194. See also, for example, Cano v Davis, 211 F Supp 2d 1208, 1239–40 
(CD Cal 2002) (three-judge panel). 
 197 See, for example, Solomon, 221 F3d at 1220–21 (analyzing an at-large election 
method for county offices at a countywide level). 
 198 “Opportunity district” is a term of art for districts in which the minority community 
has a realistic opportunity to elect candidates of its choice. See LULAC, 548 US at 427–42. 
 199 See id at 430 (“[T]he State’s creation of an opportunity district for those without 
a § 2 right offers no excuse for its failure to provide an opportunity district for those with 
a § 2 right.”). 
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quantitative cutoffs to distinguish polarized from nonpolarized 
communities, no clear-edged rules about which elections to in-
clude in the polarization analysis and how to weight them, and 
no settled understanding of what constitutes “usual defeat” or 
“lack of opportunity to elect.” Moreover, racial assumptions play 
critical roles in judicial fact-finding about minority cohesion and 
in the identification of minority candidates of choice. (Hidden 
racial assumptions are also baked into the statistical tools for 
estimating candidates’ vote shares by racial group. More on this 
in a moment.)200 
To be sure, some broad guidelines are well established: in-
terracial elections are more probative than same-race elections, 
and endogenous elections are more probative than exogenous 
elections. But these guidelines hem in judicial discretion only at 
the margins.201 Given the general directive to weigh voting data 
in view of their “probativeness,” taking account of pertinent 
“special circumstances,” fact finders are encouraged—and in 
some circuits, required—to pay close attention to “the political 
stories behind the election returns.”202 
Yet it is not as if the manageability aspirations have been 
lost on the courts. We see them manifested in, for example, the 
Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits’ “objective” definitions of 
minority candidate of choice;203 in the Fourth Circuit’s “repre-
sentative sampling” requirement;204 in the occasional attempts to 
define minority political cohesion or white bloc voting using 
quantitative thresholds;205 and in the occasional pushback 
against liberal use of the special-circumstances doctrine.206 The 
 
 200 See Part III.C. 
 201 This is not to say that there have never been easy cases. But the low-hanging 
fruit—Southern jurisdictions with at-large elections, large segregated black populations, 
and an unbroken history of all-white representation—has already been picked. And it is 
not clear to us that the racial-polarization test did any real work in those cases. They 
would have come out the same way if the judges applied the simpler test (as they may 
have sub silentio), according to which § 2 liability exists in a jurisdiction whenever: 
(1) no minority candidate has ever been elected; (2) there is a history of discrimination; 
(3) there is an at-large or multimember district electoral structure; and (4) a reasonable, 
compact, majority-black single-member district could be drawn. 
 202 Blacksher and Menefee, 34 Hastings L J at 53 (cited in note 11). This is a re-
quirement in those circuits that use the subjective definition of “minority candidate of 
choice.” See Part II.B.3.a. 
 203 See Part II.B.3.a. 
 204 See Part II.B.2.c. 
 205 See Part II.B.2. 
 206 See, for example, Clarke, 40 F3d at 813 (restricting special-circumstances argu-
ments based on incumbency); Alamosa County, 306 F Supp 2d at 1032–33 (rejecting the 
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convention of determining minority cohesion through a rote analy-
sis of minority vote shares for coethnic candidates (without paying 
much attention to the particulars of those candidates and their 
opponents) can also be understood as one means by which courts 
have tried to accommodate concerns about manageability.207 
Nor has the injunction against race-based assumptions been 
ignored. Most courts have refused to embed into law the notion 
that only minority-race candidates can be candidates of choice 
for minority communities.208 And some prominent judges have 
rejected doctrines that make candidate-of-choice determinations 
depend on anecdotal testimony and the judge’s prior beliefs 
about what minority voters want.209 
The puzzle of racial-polarization law is not that the Su-
preme Court’s manageability and racial-assumption concerns 
have been ignored but that the various judicial efforts to build 
doctrine responsive to these concerns have proved so halting. 
That is to say, there has been no general movement toward 
bright-line preference-polarization cutoffs; toward the repre-
sentative sampling requirement; toward an objective, race-
neutral definition of the “minority candidate of choice”; toward a 
conceptually transparent definition of voting power (lack of oppor-
tunity to elect); or toward a limiting construction of the special-
circumstances doctrine. This is in marked contrast to the lower 
courts’ development of the first prong of Gingles; nearly all 
courts anticipated the Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland, 
holding that plaintiff-race voters must compose a literal, numer-
ic majority of the proposed remedial district.210 
Why has the law of racial polarization not developed in 
keeping with the Supreme Court’s expectations? We turn to this 
question next. 
 
defendants’ argument that three elections—one involving Hispanic candidates who 
downplayed their ethnicity, one involving a Hispanic Republican, and one that took place 
after the filing of the § 2 litigation—should be excluded or down-weighted in the analysis 
of white bloc voting). 
 207 See Part II.B.2.a. 
 208 See Part II.B.3.a. 
 209 See notes 176–79 and accompanying text. 
 210 See, for example, Hall v Virginia, 385 F3d 421, 423 (4th Cir 2004); McNeil, 851 
F2d at 942–44; Meza, 322 F Supp 2d at 57–58; Valdespino v Alamo Heights Independent 
School District, 168 F3d 848, 852–53 (5th Cir 1999); Hastert v State Board of Elections, 
777 F Supp 634, 654–55 (ND Ill 1991) (three-judge panel); McGhee, 860 F2d at 116. The 
lone federal court decision going the other way on this question is Metts v Murphy, 363 
F3d 8, 11–12 (1st Cir 2004) (declining to reject a § 2 claim in which the remedial district 
was only 26 percent minority). 
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III.  THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS 
As we have seen, the racial-polarization test is supposed to 
be informative about preferences and power. Polarized voting 
per Gingles signifies that voters within a racial group want the 
same things in the political sphere (preference cohesion within 
groups);211 that voters in different racial groups want different 
things (preference polarization between groups);212 and that 
preference polarization coupled with the defendant jurisdiction’s 
demographics and electoral system means that minority voters 
have insufficient voting power—that is, insufficient opportunity 
to elect their candidates of choice.213 
The racial-polarization inquiry is also supposed to be free of 
racial assumptions.214 The judge’s task is to learn whether the 
racial groups are in fact relevantly cohesive—and whether par-
ticular candidates were in fact the minority community’s candi-
dates of choice—without stereotyping minority or white voters in 
the process. But as this Part explains, there are three massive 
obstacles to the development of a polarization test that is at once 
objective and consistently applied, uncontaminated by “prohibit-
ed” racial assumptions, and diagnostic of preference polarization 
and voting power. 
The first fundamental problem, addressed in Part III.A, is 
the lack of an agreed-upon normative definition of racial vote di-
lution. Several competing theories with very different implica-
tions for the Gingles test each have some support in the case law. 
The second fundamental problem, addressed in Part III.B, is 
that vote shares by racial group are an undependable proxy for 
latent political preferences, owing to strategic behavior on the 
part of candidates, other political elites, and voters. It is a huge 
stretch to assume, in line with the Gingles Court and many 
judges and commentators since, that the average degree of polar-
ization in typical elections for the government body at issue is high-
ly probative of polarization in underlying political preferences. It is 
equally implausible to assume that a candidate’s minority vote 
 
 211 Gingles, 478 US at 51 (“If the minority group is not politically cohesive, it cannot 
be said that the selection of a multimember electoral structure thwarts distinctive mi-
nority group interests.”). 
 212 Id at 48 (“The theoretical basis for [racial vote dilution] is that where minority 
and majority voters consistently prefer different candidates, the majority, by virtue of its 
numerical superiority, will regularly defeat the choices of minority voters.”). 
 213 Id at 51 (“[T]he minority must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes 
sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.”). 
 214 See text accompanying notes 80–91. 
 2016] Racially Polarized Voting 629 
 
share signals how close she is to being the ideal candidate of the 
minority community. 
The third problem, which is the subject of Part III.C and 
Appendix A, is that the estimation of candidates’ vote shares by 
racial group from precinct-level vote totals requires expert wit-
nesses to make racial-homogeneity assumptions similar to those 
the Supreme Court has deemed “prohibited.”215 
Notice that the second and third problems are by-products 
of the convention of basing polarization determinations on “vot-
ing preferences expressed in actual elections.”216 These problems 
could in principle be solved by using other kinds of evidence to 
screen vote dilution claims, as we explain in Part IV. 
A. Normative Theory and the Diagnostic Value of the 
Polarization Test 
Professor Guinier once quipped that the VRA is “a statute in 
search of a theory.”217 Her observation still rings true today. 
Several competing theories of racial vote dilution find some sup-
port in the case law, and to date the Supreme Court has declined 
to choose among them. This much is well understood in the legal 
academy, but legal scholars have largely failed to consider how 
normative disputes color the racial-polarization analysis. (It is 
telling that the leading casebook notes only one point of connec-
tion between the second and third prongs of Gingles and norma-
tive disagreements about the meaning of racial vote dilution.)218 
The separate opinions of Justices Brennan, O’Connor, and 
White in Gingles seeded three of the competing normative theo-
ries, which we call, respectively, the proportional representation, 
coalitional-breakdown, and voter-discrimination accounts of vote 
 
 215 LULAC, 548 US at 433. 
 216 Gomez v City of Watsonville, 863 F2d 1407, 1415 (9th Cir 1988). See also Part II.B.1. 
 217 Guinier, 108 Harv L Rev at 113 (cited in note 15). 
 218 Issacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes, The Law of Democracy at 702–20 (cited in note 
107) (surveying the law regarding the second and third prongs of Gingles and noting, in 
discussion of the third prong, that normative disputes persist in the lower courts over 
whether white bloc voting must be “caused” by race to be legally significant). See also 
Katz, et al, 39 U Mich J L Ref at 663–75 (cited in note 137) (providing an in-depth review 
of lower courts’ applications of the second and third prongs, without tying the different 
approaches to competing normative theories of vote dilution). 
 The lack of scholarly attention to the ways in which normative disagreements about 
the meaning of racial vote dilution have colored judicial fact-finding about minority co-
hesion and white bloc voting is curious, because commentators in the immediate after-
math of Gingles saw the racial-polarization test as capturing something of great norma-
tive significance. See notes 65–66 and accompanying text.  
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dilution. Justice Kennedy’s opinion for five justices in LULAC 
gestures toward yet another theory, still dim in its outlines, 
which we call the LULAC theory. Part III.A.1 briefly describes 
these four theories, and Part III.A.2 draws out their conflicting 
implications for the racial-polarization test. 
Most judicial opinions in vote dilution cases are nominally 
atheoretical,219 but it does not follow that the theories are incon-
sequential. To the extent that a judge exercises discretion when 
applying the Gingles test, that discretion is likely informed by 
whatever theory the judge finds intuitively congenial, even if she 
does not articulate it. 
1. Four theories of racial vote dilution. 
a) Proportional representation theory.220  Brennan’s opin-
ion in Gingles embraced Blacksher and Menefee’s conception of 
vote dilution,221 which O’Connor fairly characterized as “an enti-
tlement to roughly proportional representation [for geograph-
ically and politically cohesive minority groups] within the 
framework of single-member districts.”222 On this view, voting 
power is defined in terms of the opportunity to elect ideally pre-
ferred representatives, and the fairness benchmark is propor-
tionality: the ratio of the number of districts that provide the 
minority community with this opportunity to the total number of 
districts should roughly equal the ratio of the minority popula-
tion to the total population.223 
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions, most notably De 
Grandy and LULAC, emphasize (without making decisive) 
whether the minority community has the opportunity to elect 
candidates of its choice in rough proportion to its numbers.224 As 
for the lower courts, Professor Ellen Katz and her coauthors 
 
 219 We had our law-student coders assess the theoretical basis of the district court 
opinions they coded, but after reviewing a sample of their work, we lack confidence in their 
judgments about this difficult question. Our assertion that “most opinions are atheoretical” 
is based on our own reading of the cases. In a typical case, the judge simply goes through 
the motions of applying Gingles and then reviewing the Senate report factors and anything 
else that seems relevant as part of the totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry. 
 220 For a leading articulation and defense of the proportional representation theory, 
see Karlan, 24 Harv CR–CL L Rev at 213–19 (cited in note 64). 
 221 Gingles, 478 US at 48–51. 
 222 Id at 93 (O’Connor concurring in the judgment). 
 223 See Part II.B.4. 
 224 See De Grandy, 512 US at 1013–17 (treating “proportionality” as a key consider-
ation in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis); LULAC, 548 US at 436–37 (begin-
ning the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis with an examination of proportionality). 
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reviewed all published § 2 opinions through 2005, and they re-
port that liability rulings in the eighteen lawsuits in which 
courts “made a finding on proportionality” were very highly cor-
related with that finding.225 
b) Coalitional-breakdown theory.226  The coalitional-
breakdown theory begins with the premise that, in a system of 
plurality-winner elections, there is nothing abnormal about a po-
litical minority being unable to elect its ideally preferred candi-
dates.227 Political minorities obtain representation instead by 
banding together with others in an umbrella coalition that com-
petes for control of the legislative body.228 A political minority’s 
vote is “diluted” if and only if it lacks the opportunities to partic-
ipate in coalitional politics that political minorities normally en-
joy. Racial vote dilution occurs when a racial minority that is al-
so a political minority lacks such opportunities. 
Rooted in the foundational 1970s cases Whitcomb v 
Chavis229 and White v Regester,230 as well as Justice Thurgood 
Marshall’s dissent in City of Mobile, Alabama v Bolden231 (the 
case that Congress overruled in 1982232), the coalitional-
breakdown theory found expression in Gingles through 
O’Connor’s concurrence.233 She further advanced the theory in 
 
 225 Katz, et al, 39 U Mich J L Ref at 730 (cited in note 137). Ten courts found propor-
tionality and no liability. Four of the five courts that found a lack of proportionality found 
liability. No information on the remaining three decisions is reported. Id at 730–31. 
 226 For articulations of the coalitional-breakdown theory of vote dilution, see Issacharoff, 
90 Mich L Rev at 1860–62 (cited in note 62); Kathryn Abrams, “Raising Politics Up”: Mi-
nority Political Participation and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 63 NYU L Rev 449, 
452–53 (1988); Abigail M. Thernstrom, Whose Votes Count? Affirmative Action and Mi-
nority Voting Rights 23 (Harvard 1987). See also Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The Con-
stitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 Harv L Rev 29, 83–99 (2004) (raising the 
question whether racial vote dilution safeguards are necessary under conditions of robust 
two-party competition when a racial minority group is a major player in one party). 
 227 See Whitcomb v Chavis, 403 US 124, 156 (1971) (rejecting the “general proposi-
tion that any group with distinctive interests must be represented in legislative halls if it 
is numerous enough to command at least one seat”). 
 228 See Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice III § 13.5 at 271–76 (Cambridge 2003) (dis-
cussing empirical evidence for Duverger’s law, which holds that plurality-winner elec-
tions induce a two-party system). 
 229 403 US 124 (1971). 
 230 412 US 755 (1973). 
 231 446 US 55 (1980). See also id at 122 (Marshall dissenting) (“The vote-dilution 
doctrine can logically apply only to groups whose electoral discreteness and insularity 
allow dominant political factions to ignore them.”). 
 232 See notes 51–52 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s amendment of § 2 
to overrule Bolden’s discriminatory-purpose requirement). 
 233 Gingles, 478 US at 105 (O’Connor concurring in the judgment). Criticizing Brennan, 
O’Connor wrote that courts assessing the “voting strength” of a racial minority must 
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Georgia v Ashcroft,234 a case that arose under § 5 rather than § 2 
of the VRA.235 
The Court’s post-Georgia decisions in LULAC and Strick-
land strongly suggest, however, that plaintiffs may not use the 
coalitional-breakdown theory as a sword in § 2 cases. Per 
LULAC, vote dilution claims cannot be predicated on mere lack 
of “influence,” as opposed to the inability to elect candidates of 
choice.236 Similarly, the Strickland plurality declares, “Nothing 
in § 2 grants special protection to a minority group’s right to 
form political coalitions [with majority-race voters].”237 
Yet the coalitional-breakdown theory may still be available 
to defendants as a shield.238 Referencing Georgia’s discussion of 
“influence” and “crossover” districts, the Strickland plurality 
states, “Much like § 5, § 2 allows States to choose their own 
method of complying with the Voting Rights Act.”239 The argua-
ble implication is that defendants can escape liability under § 2 
by structuring electoral systems so as to integrate minority 
groups into competitive political coalitions. The VRA allows state 
and local governments to make the “political choice of whether 
substantive or descriptive representation is preferable.”240 
The coalitional-breakdown theory nicely rationalizes a 
number of lower court decisions that reject liability even though 
the minority group was unable to elect a roughly proportional 
number of its candidates of choice and more majority-minority 
districts could have been drawn. Courts finding for defendants 
notwithstanding a lack of proportionality have often pointed to 
circumstances such as robust mobilization of minority voters and 
rough parity in turnout rates, minority participation in candidate 
slating, nomination and election of minority-race candidates 
 
consider “access to the political process generally,” not just opportunities to elect their 
most-preferred candidates. Id (O’Connor concurring in the judgment). 
 234 539 US 461 (2003). 
 235 Writing for five justices, O’Connor held that minority voting power encompasses 
all forms of actual or potential political influence, including the ability to elect minority 
candidates of choice, influence over other legislators, and opportunities for minority rep-
resentatives to serve in legislative leadership positions as part of the majority coalition. 
Id at 478–85. 
 236 LULAC, 548 US at 445–46 (Kennedy) (plurality) (“The failure to create an influ-
ence district . . . thus does not run afoul of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.”). 
 237 Strickland, 556 US at 15 (Kennedy) (plurality). 
 238 See Crayton, 64 Rutgers L Rev at 982–84 (cited in note 17) (discussing the use of 
racial-polarization data for both offensive and defensive purposes). 
 239 Strickland, 556 US at 23 (Kennedy) (plurality). 
 240 Georgia, 539 US at 483. 
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(even if they are not the minority group’s candidates of choice), 
and government responsiveness to the particularized interests 
or needs of the minority community.241 Viewed together, such 
facts tend to indicate that the minority group has been incorpo-
rated into the normal push and pull of coalitional politics, even 
if it cannot usually elect a roughly proportional number of its 
ideal candidates. 
c) Voter-discrimination theory.242  In contrast to the pro-
portional representation and coalitional-breakdown theories of 
vote dilution, the voter-discrimination theory emphasizes the 
reasons why minority-preferred candidates lost. The core issue is 
disparate treatment: whether white voters give less support to 
minority candidates than to otherwise-similar white candidates.243 
Justice Byron White’s concurring opinion in Gingles 
launched the voter-discrimination theory.244 White joined most of 
Brennan’s opinion, but he forcefully rejected Brennan’s premise 
that “there is polarized voting if the majority of white voters 
vote for different candidates than the majority of the blacks, re-
gardless of the race of the candidates.”245 White surmised that 
Brennan’s test would require a finding of polarization if whites 
vote as a bloc for Republicans and blacks for Democrats, even if 
whites are perfectly willing to support black Republicans.246 
 
 241 See, for example, Solomon v Liberty County, Florida, 957 F Supp 1522, 1565–71 
(ND Fla 1997); National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Inc v City of 
Niagara Falls, New York, 65 F3d 1002, 1019–24 (2d Cir 1995). See also Harvell v Blythe-
ville School District # 5, 71 F3d 1382, 1395 (8th Cir 1995) (Loken dissenting) (“I am partic-
ularly distressed by the court’s . . . criticism of the manner in which successful African-
American candidates ‘managed to obtain and retain their seats’ [in coalition with whites].”); 
United States v Alamosa County, Colorado, 306 F Supp 2d 1016, 1031 n 39 (D Colo 2004): 
[A] mix of elections, some between Hispanic candidates, some between Anglo 
candidates, and some with both Hispanic and Anglo candidates suggests sub-
stantial political participation by Hispanic residents and voter preferences that 
extend beyond ethnic identity. . . .[C]andidates must factor into their campaign 
strategies the practical knowledge that all voters, whether members of a mi-
nority or majority group, must seek out common political ground . . . in order to 
advance a political agenda. 
 242 For academic articulations and defenses of the voter-discrimination theory, see 
Aleinikoff, 63 U Colo L Rev at 355–64 (cited in note 66); Elmendorf, 160 U Pa L Rev at 
417–48 (cited in note 87). 
 243 The theory may be extended to cover discrimination by conventional state actors 
as well. See Elmendorf, 160 U Pa L Rev at 417–48 (cited in note 87). 
 244 Gingles, 478 US at 82–83 (White concurring). 
 245 Id at 83 (White concurring). 
 246 Id (White concurring). 
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“This is interest-group politics,” he lamented, “rather than a rule 
hedging against racial discrimination.”247 
Riffing on White’s opinion, prominent judges on the First, 
Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits have further developed the 
voter-discrimination theory.248 But most courts have said that 
while evidence of voter discrimination deserves some weight249—
maybe a lot of weight250—subjective discrimination by voters (or 
conventional state actors) is not a necessary condition for liabil-
ity under § 2.251 The notion of giving only some, rather than deci-
sive, weight to evidence of voter discrimination seems more in 
keeping with the coalitional-breakdown theory, as voter discrim-
ination is one of several factors that could make it difficult for 
racial minorities to participate in normal coalitional politics.252 
d) The LULAC Theory?253  Breaking with previous vote 
dilution jurisprudence, the Supreme Court in LULAC held that 
Texas’s reconfiguration of an existing majority-minority district 
violated § 2, even though Texas did not change the number of 
majority-minority districts, which remained proportional to the 
minority’s population share, and even though the district court 
 
 247 Id (White concurring). 
 248 See Uno v City of Holyoke, 72 F3d 973, 981 (1st Cir 1995) (Selya) (“[P]laintiffs 
cannot prevail on a VRA § 2 claim if there is significantly probative evidence that whites 
voted as a bloc for reasons wholly unrelated to racial animus.”); Goosby v Town Board of 
the Town of Hempstead, New York, 180 F3d 476, 502–03 (2d Cir 1999) (Leval con-
curring) (proposing a burden-shifting standard to allow defendants to avoid § 2 lia-
bility for results unrelated to voter discrimination); League of United Latin Ameri-
can Citizens, Council No 4434 v Clements, 999 F2d 831, 856–59 (5th Cir 1993) (en 
banc) (Higginbotham) (relying on the opinions of White and O’Connor in Gingles in 
holding that plaintiffs cannot prevail when partisan politics rather than race best ex-
plains voting patterns); Nipper v Smith, 39 F3d 1494, 1524 (11th Cir 1994) (en banc) 
(Tjoflat) (“The defendant may rebut the plaintiff ’s evidence by demonstrating the ab-
sence of racial bias in the voting community.”). 
 249 See Katz, et al, 39 U Mich J L Ref at 670–72 & n 138 (cited in note 137) (collect-
ing cases). 
 250 See, for example, United States v Charleston County, South Carolina, 365 F3d 
341, 349 (4th Cir 2004) (“[T]he reason for polarized voting is a critical factor in the totali-
ty analysis.”). 
 251 The only circuit courts to have made this a necessary condition in vote dilution 
cases are the First and Fifth Circuits. See note 139 and accompanying text. In the sam-
ple of district court opinions coded by our students, roughly 19 percent appeared to give 
some weight to evidence of voter discrimination (or its absence) under the third prong of 
Gingles. 
 252 See, for example, John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial 
Review 145–70 (Harvard 1980); Aleinikoff, 63 U Colo L Rev at 355–64 (cited in note 66); 
Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv L Rev 713, 732–33 (1985).  
 253 For a helpful articulation of what is arguably the LULAC theory, see Richard H. 
Pildes, The Decline of Legally Mandated Minority Representation, 68 Ohio St L J 1139, 
1142–49 (2007). 
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found that the substantially reconfigured district was more likely 
to elect a minority candidate of choice than the previous district.254 
The reconfigured district was “noncompact,” wrote Kennedy, be-
cause it combined two geographically and socioeconomically dis-
tinct Latino communities.255 Because of this, he continued, it 
should not count in the proportionality analysis.256 But the really 
revolutionary idea came next. Even assuming that the shortfall 
from proportionality was “insubstantial,” that “would not overcome 
the other evidence of vote dilution for Latinos in District 23.”257 
Whereas the proportional representation, coalitional-
breakdown, and even, arguably, the voter-discrimination theo-
ries focus on aggregate opportunities for the minority group 
throughout the defendant jurisdiction, the LULAC Court took 
the view that a particular geographic cluster of minority voters 
could suffer dilution irrespective of the representational oppor-
tunities available elsewhere to the minority group. 
Yet since De Grandy, it has been settled that majority-
minority districts need not be created for every “potential major-
ity” cluster of minority voters.258 So what exactly was the prob-
lem with Texas’s dismantling of District 23? Commentators and 
lower courts have puzzled over this question. One possibility is 
that LULAC turned on the appearance of intentional discrimina-
tion. Kennedy wrote that the state’s dismantling of a majority-
minority district whose voters were about to unseat a disliked 
incumbent “b[ore] the mark” of intentional discrimination.259 On 
this reading, § 2 prohibits not only state actions that are in fact 
intentionally discriminatory but also those for which there is 
some visible (but perhaps equivocal) evidence of intentional or 
disparate treatment discrimination.260 
LULAC can also be read for the proposition that § 2 protects 
all “naturally occurring” majority-minority districts—that is, 
 
 254 Chief Justice John Roberts’s opinion nicely explains the break with previous ju-
risprudence. LULAC, 548 US at 493–511 (Roberts concurring in part, concurring in the 
judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
 255 Id at 431–35. 
 256 Id at 435–38. 
 257 Id at 438. 
 258 De Grandy, 512 US at 1016 (reversing the district court, which had erroneously 
relied on the “rule of thumb” that “anything short of the maximum number of majority-
minority districts consistent with the Gingles conditions would violate § 2”). 
 259 LULAC, 548 US at 440. 
 260 See Elmendorf, 160 U Pa L Rev at 403 (cited in note 87) (arguing that LULAC 
“created a building block for reorienting Section 2 toward circumstances that bespeak . . . 
‘a significant likelihood’ of discriminatory intent”). 
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those likely to be drawn by a politically neutral redistricter ap-
plying traditional criteria such as compactness, respect for com-
munities of interest, and minimization of political subdivision 
splits.261 Building on this reading of LULAC, Judge Easterbrook 
wrote for the Seventh Circuit that the failure to draw a majority-
minority district violates § 2 only if the defendant created fewer 
compact majority-minority districts than a politically neutral 
computer algorithm likely would have drawn.262 
The “appearance of discrimination” and “naturally occurring 
opportunity district” glosses on LULAC are close kin, because 
reasonable observers may fairly wonder whether a state has 
acted for discriminatory reasons if it willfully departs from tra-
ditional districting principles and thereby fragments a cohesive 
minority community into districts in which it is powerless. 
2. Implications for the polarization test. 
For the Gingles factors to speak to liability, they must say 
something about whether the distribution of political prefer-
ences in the defendant jurisdiction creates a risk of vote dilution 
and, conditional on such a risk, about whether the state has 
done enough to mitigate it by enabling minority “voting power.” 
(In the extreme case in which the distributions of political pref-
erences among white and minority voters were identical, there 
would be no possibility of racial vote dilution. The minority 
group would lack distinct political interests, and minority voters’ 
opportunity to elect the representatives that they prefer would 
be unaffected by the racial makeup of electoral districts.) 
As this Section explains, the four theories of racial vote dilu-
tion have quite different implications for what is a legally signif-
icant distribution of political preferences across racial groups—
that is, a distribution that presents a significant risk of unlawful 
vote dilution—and also for what constitutes a legally sufficient 
opportunity to exercise voting power when such preference dis-
tributions exist. We will also see that many of the lower courts’ 
disagreements about how to implement the racial-polarization 
test are precisely the disagreements that one would expect to 
find if different judges subscribed, sub silentio, to different nor-
mative theories of dilution. 
 
 261 See Pildes, 68 Ohio St L J at 1146–47, 1156 (cited in note 253). 
 262 See Gonzalez v City of Aurora, Illinois, 535 F3d 594, 599–600 (7th Cir 2008). 
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To be clear, this Section does not provide a definitive ac-
count of what each of the theories implies regarding legally sig-
nificant preference distributions or the hallmarks of a legally 
sufficient state accommodation for minority voters. The theories 
are still inchoate, so what we say here should be taken as only 
suggestive. Our limited goal is to show that the theories (plausi-
bly) point in opposite directions on a number of key questions 
that have befuddled and divided judges, such as the proper geo-
graphic scale of the polarization analysis, the definition of “mi-
nority candidate of choice,” the meaning of “usual defeat,” and 
the relative weight to be given to voting patterns in primary 
versus general elections. 
It follows that insofar as judges exercise discretion over such 
matters—and currently they have a lot of discretion—
inconsistent application of the polarization test should be re-
garded as normal and expected, rather than aberrational. Appel-
late judges who are worried about inconsistent (“unmanageable”) 
application of the polarization test ought to be at least as con-
cerned with the normatively obscure and fragmented state of 
vote dilution law as they are with the absence of bright-line 
rules under the second and third Gingles prongs. 
a) Geographic scale of the polarization inquiry.  If the 
three Gingles prongs were only about potential remedies, it 
would make sense to apply them at the scale of the plaintiff’s 
electoral district, irrespective of one’s normative theory of dilu-
tion. Proof that a geographic cluster of minority voters cannot 
elect their preferred candidates but would be able to do so in a 
proposed remedial district is necessary to establish that minori-
ty voting strength can be increased. 
But if the Gingles test is to be diagnostic of liability, paring 
the universe of potential claims down to a smaller number pre-
senting serious risks of a statutory violation, then the appropri-
ate geographic scale will vary with one’s theory of dilution. The 
proportional representation and coalitional-breakdown theories 
require a polity-wide assessment of minority cohesion and white 
bloc voting, since the theories focus on the minority’s represen-
tational opportunities within the legislature as a whole. 
The same may be true of the voter-discrimination theory, 
although this is uncertain. Pellucid in what it condemns (voter 
discrimination), this theory is less clear about what constitutes a 
legally sufficient representational opportunity for racial minori-
ties in the teeth of voter discrimination. One might posit that an 
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electoral system should be deemed compliant if the racial minor-
ity enjoys a realistic opportunity to elect a roughly proportional 
number of minority-race candidates in the jurisdiction as a 
whole, notwithstanding voter discrimination. Or the system 
might be held compliant if the number of districts where minori-
ty candidates are disadvantaged by voter discrimination is offset 
by an equal number where the median voter prefers minority-
race candidates over otherwise-similar white candidates. Then 
again, one might argue that if voter discrimination is particular-
ly pronounced in certain neighborhoods or regions of the defend-
ant jurisdiction, compliance with § 2 should be assessed in terms 
of the representational opportunities provided for minority vot-
ers solely in the problematic area, rather than polity-wide. 
The LULAC theory uniquely compels a district-specific po-
larization inquiry. It is concerned with commonality among dis-
tinct territorial communities that could form local, district-level 
majorities. If Asian Americans in one neighborhood are liberal 
Democrats and Asian Americans in another are conservative 
Republicans, each Asian American community could in principle 
claim dilution under the LULAC theory, provided of course that 
it could form a majority of a “natural” legislative district. By 
contrast, the political distance between these Asian American 
communities would preclude a vote dilution claim if political co-
hesion were assessed at the scale of the polity, as the proportional 
representation and coalitional-breakdown theories suggest. 
Similarly, the LULAC theory calls for white bloc voting to 
be assessed at the level of the plaintiffs’ current legislative dis-
trict, rather than throughout the jurisdiction. If a district-level 
white majority has radically different political preferences than 
the minority voters, this implies that the district was not drawn 
in accordance with “community of interest” districting princi-
ples. By contrast, if the local white majority’s political aims are 
not so discordant with those of minority voters in the district, 
the state’s failure to draw the majority-minority district sought 
by the plaintiffs is less likely to look like a grave and possibly 
discriminatory departure from traditional districting criteria. 
b) “Legally significant” racial-group cohesion (preference 
polarization).  Beyond the issue of geographic scale, the theories 
of dilution rest on different ideas about the type of preference 
cohesion within and divergence between racial groups that trig-
ger state obligations under § 2. 
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The sharpest contrast is between the proportional represen-
tation and voter-discrimination theories. The former requires the 
minority community to be strongly politically cohesive and to 
hang together not simply as Democrats or as Republicans but as a 
political faction that could be expected to form its own party in a 
system conducive to multiparty politics. The point of § 2 under 
the proportional representation theory is to provide racial groups 
with the opportunity to elect authentic champions for their inter-
ests. As such, if a racial minority in the defendant jurisdiction has 
no distinctive interests beyond the commonalities that it shares 
with the other members of a bridging, umbrella-like political par-
ty, then there is no occasion for judicial intervention.263 
The voter-discrimination theory, by contrast, is largely in-
different to minority cohesion. If the purpose of § 2 is to remedy 
disparate treatment discrimination by majority-race voters, then 
any minority group whose members would prefer not to be dis-
criminated against should be deemed cohesive. This minimal 
form of cohesion should probably be presumed as a matter of 
law. Notice too that under the voter-discrimination theory—
unlike the proportional representation theory—there is not a 
monotonic relationship between polarization on the relevant di-
mension of political preference (candidate race) and the strength 
of the plaintiff’s claim. Preference polarization with respect to 
candidate race could reflect minority-voter discrimination 
against white candidates. While minority discrimination against 
white candidates need not foreclose a vote dilution claim under 
the voter-discrimination theory (what must be shown is majority-
group discrimination against minority-race candidates), pre-
sumably the theory would not reward it. 
It should also be clear that under the proportional represen-
tation theory, polarization on the dimension of candidate race is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for the racial groups to be 
deemed cohesive. The existence of strong political commonality 
within and distance between racial groups might induce voters 
to discriminate on the basis of candidate race; but then again, it 
might not, and either way it is the political commonality and not 
 
 263 If the racial group essentially composes all of the party, then no showing of intra-
party racial cohesion should be required. Notably, it is increasingly true that blacks essen-
tially compose all of the Democratic Party in the Deep South. See Stephen Ansolabehere, 
Nathaniel Persily, and Charles Stewart III, Regional Differences in Racial Polarization 
in the 2012 Presidential Election: Implications for the Constitutionality of Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act, 126 Harv L Rev F 205, 211–13, 217 (2013). 
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the discrimination that matters under the proportional repre-
sentation theory.264 
The hallmarks of a “legally significant” preference distribu-
tion are less clear under the coalitional-breakdown and LULAC 
theories of dilution. The LULAC theory seemingly requires the 
minority and white communities to be sufficiently distinct such 
that their inclusion in the same district amounts to a serious 
departure from traditional “community of interest” districting 
criteria.265 As for the coalitional-breakdown theory, one might 
posit that because the theory aims to integrate minorities into 
broad coalitions, a minority group should be deemed cohesive if 
its members have enough in common for a partisan umbrella co-
alition (under normal conditions) to make a pitch for the minori-
ty’s support. Then again, a pragmatic court seeking to limit the 
reach of § 2 might venture that the risks of enduring, race-
related coalitional breakdowns are not severe unless white vot-
ers discriminate against the racial minority, or unless the mi-
nority has dramatically different political preferences from 
whites overall. 
The competing normative theories make sense of several 
features of the law of group cohesion as it has developed in the 
lower courts. One is the conflict, noted earlier, about whether 
vote-share data from primary elections should receive more or 
less weight than data from general elections.266 Judges who sub-
scribe to the proportional representation theory naturally look to 
primary elections to see whether the minority community hangs 
together within a political umbrella coalition, whereas judges 
who subscribe to the voter-discrimination or coalitional-
breakdown theory need not give primaries special emphasis. 
Also illuminated is the circuit split about whether white 
bloc voting must be “caused” by race to be legally significant (for 
instance, do minority candidates receive less white-voter support 
than otherwise-similar white candidates?).267 The voter-
discrimination theory answers this question affirmatively; the 
proportional representation theory says that it is immaterial; and 
the coalitional-breakdown theory treats voter discrimination as 
 
 264 This presumably is why Brennan so forcefully objected to the idea that the race 
of successful and defeated candidates is relevant to gauging minority political opportuni-
ty. See Gingles, 478 US at 67–69 (Brennan) (plurality). 
 265 See Pildes, 68 Ohio St L J at 1145 (cited in note 253). 
 266 See text accompanying notes 148–54. 
 267 See text accompanying notes 137–42. 
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relevant but not decisive and therefore, presumably, as a factor 
to be weighed at the totality-of-the-circumstances stage of a § 2 
case (the position of most circuit courts). 
c) Minority opportunity I: who counts as a “minority can-
didate of choice”?  White bloc voting per Gingles is legally signif-
icant only if it “usually” results in the defeat of minority candi-
dates of choice.268 But who are these “candidates of [ ] choice”?269 
Under the proportional representation theory, they are the ideal 
or nearly ideal champions of the minority community. But under 
the coalitional-breakdown theory, almost any candidate of the 
umbrella coalition preferred by the minority community should 
probably count as a minority candidate of choice, because the de-
fendant’s compliance with § 2 under this theory is signaled by 
the minority’s integration into a competitive political coalition 
rather than by its ability to elect ideally preferred candidates. 
The proportional representation theory supports the Third 
and Tenth Circuits’ practice of considering only those elections 
contested by an authentic champion of the minority community, 
as determined by the court’s “detailed, practical” evaluation of 
the candidate’s campaign and positions.270 For courts that regard 
this inquiry as judicially unmanageable, the proportional repre-
sentation theory arguably suggests—in keeping with the Second 
Circuit—that a candidate is probably a candidate of choice only 
if she received a large proportion of the minority’s primary elec-
tion votes.271 
By contrast, the coalitional-breakdown theory attaches no 
particular significance to the defeat of minority champions in 
primary elections. Seeking to maintain influence within a coali-
tion, a political minority might from time to time field ideally 
preferred candidates in primary elections. Even if the primary 
challenge fails, the challenge may signal that the minority faction 
is a force to be reckoned with and may thereby strengthen the 
minority group’s position within the coalition. Racially polarized 
 
 268 Gingles, 478 US at 51, 54. 
 269 Id at 44. 
 270 See Part II.B.3.a. 
 271 See Part II.B.3.a. In Part III.B, we argue that vote shares by racial group in pri-
mary elections are not, in general, a very reliable signal of the extent to which minority 
voters have distinct political preferences from other members of the partisan coalition. 
But if primary voting is in fact racially polarized, this is some evidence of distinctive-
ness—although what it actually says about distinctiveness depends on the attributes of 
the candidates, voters’ awareness of those attributes, and the balance between sincere 
and strategic voting. 
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voting in primaries contested by the minority’s ideal candidates 
no more implies that the minority is excluded from the normal 
push and pull of coalitional politics than polarized primary vot-
ing between Tea Partiers and mainstream Republicans signifies 
that Tea Partiers have inadequate sway within the Republican 
coalition. 
The coalitional-breakdown theory lends some support to the 
Fourth Circuit’s rule requiring plaintiffs to produce evidence 
from a representative sampling of elections,272 as well as the 
Fourth Circuit’s definition of a “minority candidate of choice” as 
any candidate who won a majority of the minority votes.273 Since 
the theory presupposes that, in a system of plurality-winner 
elections, no group gets to elect its ideal candidates, there is no 
need for a particularized judicial inquiry into how ideal a given 
candidate is. A breakdown in coalitional politics can be said to 
have occurred, however, if data from a representative sample of 
elections show that the minority community almost always votes 
cohesively for losing candidates.274 This would suggest that there 
are some significant barriers to the formation of competitive, 
cross racial coalitions. 
Consider next the voter-discrimination theory. A judge who 
accepts this theory needs to learn whether non-plaintiff-race voters 
give less support to plaintiff-race candidates than to otherwise-
similar white candidates.275 It follows that any election with a 
minority-race candidate is at least potentially helpful for deter-
mining the legal significance of white bloc voting, regardless of 
whether the minority-race candidate has much backing in the 
minority community. The voter-discrimination theory thus lends 
some support to courts that have equated “minority candidate of 
choice” with “minority-race candidate”276—not because minority-
 
 272 See Parts II.B.2.c, II.B.3.a. 
 273 See Part II.B.3.a. 
 274 See Zoltan L. Hajnal, Who Loses in American Democracy? A Count of Votes 
Demonstrates the Limited Representation of African Americans, 103 Am Polit Sci Rev 37, 
44–47 (2009) (showing that African Americans vote for losing candidates more often than 
other groups, across a wide range of elections). 
 275 See Part II.B.2.b. 
 276 As noted earlier, courts have almost universally treated any minority-race can-
didate who wins a majority of the minority vote as a candidate of choice. See note 172. 
And in the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, courts appear to restrict the racial-polarization 
analysis to elections contested by a minority-race candidate. See Campos v City of Bay-
town, Texas, 840 F2d 1240, 1245 (5th Cir 1988) (suggesting that the racial-polarization 
analysis should be based on elections in which voters have the choice of a “viable” minor-
ity candidate who was “sponsored” by the minority community); Gonzalez, 535 F3d at 
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race candidates necessarily are, in fact, preferred by minority 
voters, but because the central legal question concerns the re-
sponse of other voters to candidate race.277 
Similarly, because the voter-discrimination theory aims to 
counteract discrimination on the basis of candidate race, it is at 
least arguable that the election of any minority-race candidates 
should weigh in the court’s evaluation of whether the state has 
made adequate accommodations for minority representation. 
 What about the LULAC theory? Because this theory as ap-
plied in the namesake case focuses on objective commonalities 
among minority voters rather than on subjective preferences, it 
may not have much to say about the definition of a minority 
candidate of choice. But analogizing to the facts of LULAC, one 
might venture that a minority candidate of choice is any candi-
date whom most minority voters in an electoral district would 
prefer to the incumbent.278 
d) Minority opportunity II: what constitutes “usual defeat” 
of minority candidates of choice?  Gingles tied the legal signifi-
cance of white bloc voting to the “usual defeat” of minority-
preferred candidates.279 “Usual defeat” is essentially a test of 
 
598 (characterizing “candidate[ ] of [ ] choice” as a euphemism for “minority candidate”); 
Barnett v City of Chicago, 141 F3d 699, 702 (7th Cir 1998) (defining “polarized voting” as 
“members of various racial or ethnic groups hav[ing] a strong preference for a candidate 
that belongs to their group”). 
 277 See, for example, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 65 
F3d at 1015 (noting that “the appropriate weight to afford white-white elections in § 2 
cases” is “part of a broader debate about the extent to which plaintiffs must prove racial 
bias to prevail under § 2”); Williams v City of Dallas, 734 F Supp 1317, 1388 (ND Tex 
1990) (noting that elections with both white and minority candidates “provide the most 
direct test of the hypothesis that race is a factor in the election system under scrutiny”). 
 That said, courts that subscribe to the voter-discrimination theory have not fully as-
similated the fact that voter discrimination (in the sense of disparate treatment) cannot 
be estimated without a counterfactual. White bloc voting against a minority-race candi-
date is legally significant under this theory only if the candidate would have fared better 
among whites were she perceived to be white. Insofar as courts rely on observational da-
ta, the screening test under the voter-discrimination theory ought to involve a compari-
son of the white vote share of minority-race candidates with the white vote share of simi-
lar nonminority candidates matched up against similar opponents. The need for a 
counterfactual or comparison candidate is overlooked by the common convention of re-
buttably presuming white-voter discrimination from a substantial divergence between 
white and minority vote shares for minority-preferred candidates. For examples of judi-
cial opinions adopting this convention, see Goosby, 180 F3d at 502–03 (Leval concurring); 
Uno, 72 F3d at 983; Nipper, 39 F3d at 1524–26; Teague v Attala County, Mississippi, 92 
F3d 283, 290 (5th Cir 1996). 
 278 See LULAC, 548 US at 427 (noting that more than 90 percent of Latinos had 
voted against the incumbent in the previous election). 
 279 Gingles, 478 US at 51. 
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whether the state has sufficiently enabled the exercise of minor-
ity voting power. The four theories of vote dilution place quite 
different obligations on the state, and they therefore suggest dif-
ferent definitions of usual defeat—provided of course that the 
Gingles test is meant to be diagnostic of liability.280 
Under the LULAC theory, one might say that minority-
preferred candidates are “usually defeated” whenever it is sub-
stantially harder for them to get elected in the challenged dis-
trict than it would be in the “natural” remedial district that the 
plaintiffs propose. Under the proportional representation and 
coalitional-breakdown theories, usual defeat must be assessed at 
a larger geographic scale—the polity as a whole—if the Gingles 
test is to separate strong from weak claims.281 Per the propor-
tional representation theory, “usual defeat” means “defeat at 
such a rate as to signify that the minority lacks a fair opportunity 
to secure roughly proportional representation.” The coalitional-
breakdown theory asks instead whether minority-preferred can-
didates consistently fail to win a majority of the seats in the leg-
islative body, as the purpose of the theory is to integrate racial 
minorities into competitive umbrella coalitions. 
What about the voter-discrimination theory? As we noted 
above, this theory leaves room for disagreement about what con-
stitutes an adequate representational opportunity for minority 
voters in the face of white-voter discrimination.282 Perhaps pro-
portional descriptive representation is enough, at least if the 
minority representatives are not stalking horses for a dominant 
political faction that is opposed to the minority’s agenda. Or 
perhaps the state must make some effort to offset white-voter 
discrimination, such as by creating an equal, offsetting number 
of districts in which the median voter is likely to discriminate in 
favor of minority-race candidates, or by trying to design districts 
so that white-voter discrimination is unlikely to determine out-
comes. For present purposes, it is enough to observe that what 
the state owes to minority voters, given a legally significant 
preference distribution, is likely to be different under the voter-
discrimination theory than under the proportional representa-
tion, coalitional-breakdown, or LULAC theory of vote dilution—
 
 280 See Part I.B. 
 281 See LULAC, 548 US at 436–37 (holding that in challenges to state legislative 
districts, proportionality should be assessed on a statewide basis). 
 282 See Part III.A.2.a. 
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and that the third prong of Gingles must be cashed out accord-
ingly if the Gingles test is to be probative of liability. 
3. Summary. 
The lower courts have split on a number of recurring issues 
in the analysis of racially polarized voting, including the rele-
vance of monoracial elections, the weight to be given to polariza-
tion evidence from primary as opposed to general elections, the 
definition of the “minority candidate of choice,” the proper geo-
graphic scale of the analysis, and the question whether white 
bloc voting must be “caused” by race to be legally significant.283 
Only the last of these issues is conventionally understood to re-
flect a core, normative disagreement over the meaning of racial 
vote dilution.284 But as this Section has shown, the competing 
theories of racial vote dilution have conflicting implications on 
each of these fronts. To the extent that governing doctrine leaves 
fact finders with discretion about which elections to include in 
the polarization analysis, how to weight them, and where to 
draw the line between polarized and nonpolarized preferences, 
inconsistent application of the polarization test should be ex-
pected—at least until such time as appellate courts make a deci-
sive choice among the competing theories. 
B. Votes and Preferences: Of Inferential Limits, Racial 
Assumptions, and “the Political Stories behind the Election 
Returns” 
Normative disagreements certainly complicate the develop-
ment of clear, prescriptive rules to implement the Gingles 
framework, but they are not the whole story. Even if the Su-
preme Court were to announce that § 2 supports only one theory 
of racial vote dilution and then carefully explained that theory, 
and even if the lower courts faithfully followed that theory, it 
would still be extraordinarily difficult (we think impossible) for 
the courts to develop an objective, constraining threshold test for 
preference polarization based on cross tabs of candidates’ vote 
shares by racial group. 
 
 283 See Part II.B.2.b. 
 284 See note 218 and accompanying text. 
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The underlying problem, which some judges no doubt sense but 
rarely wrestle with overtly, is that political actors are strategic.285 
Strategic behavior muddies the relationship between racial po-
larization in vote shares and racial polarization in underlying 
political preferences. 
Given strategic behavior by political actors, an analyst who 
wants to make inferences about latent political preferences 
based on candidates’ vote shares by racial group either needs 
lots of detailed, contextual information about the elections (what 
Blacksher and Menefee called “the political stories behind the 
election returns”286), or needs to make strong assumptions and 
throw away a lot of data. This Section develops these points. 
The Gingles Court implicitly assumed that there is a strong, 
monotonic relationship between the average level of racial polar-
ization in typical elections in the defendant jurisdiction and the 
degree of racial polarization in underlying political preferences. 
The same assumption undergirds the Strickland vote-share-
cutoff idea: cutoffs make sense only if the average level of white 
crossover voting is highly informative about the intensity and 
pervasiveness of white discrimination against minority-race 
candidates or of white opposition to the minority community’s 
political agenda. Similarly, a number of lower courts have as-
sumed that a candidate’s minority vote share signals how close 
she is to being the Platonic candidate of the minority communi-
ty.287 None of these assumptions is tenable in a world of strategic 
political actors. 
Part III.B.1 develops our point theoretically. Part III.B.2 
provides illustrations using data from a survey experiment. Fi-
nally, Part III.B.3 considers how courts might best use vote-
share data in light of the problems identified in the preceding 
sections. The main takeaway is that one of the key points of ten-
sion in the case law—between, on the one hand, the courts’ wish to 
avoid racial assumptions and, on the other, the courts’ desire for 
an objective, easy-to-apply polarization test—is essentially una-
voidable, regardless of one’s theory of racial vote dilution. Moreo-
ver, even if the courts were willing to make strong assumptions, 
 
 285 According to our student coders, in only three of the thirty-nine cases in our 
sample in which the district court passed on a dispute about the second prong of Gingles 
did the court overtly consider the problem of strategic behavior; similarly, in only three 
of the fifty-nine cases in which white bloc voting was a live issue at trial was strategic 
behavior factored into the court’s analysis.  
 286 Blacksher and Menefee, 34 Hastings L J at 53 (cited in note 11). 
 287 See Part II.B.3.a. 
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Strickland-style numeric polarization cutoffs would succeed only 
in targeting the most polarized communities under very unusual 
conditions. Specifically, the mix of observed candidate matchups 
in each community must be essentially identical. 
A note before proceeding: Throughout this Section, we refer 
to “preference polarization” while remaining agnostic on the 
questions of what dimensions of political preference are legally 
relevant and what preference distributions on those dimensions 
rise to “legal significance” under Gingles. (As the previous Sec-
tion explains, the answers to such questions depend on one’s 
normative theory of vote dilution.) Our premise is that per 
Strickland, the Supreme Court wants to foreclose vote dilution 
claims when preference polarization is not severe, and our aim is 
to show that this cannot reasonably be accomplished with bright-
line cutoffs if preferences are ascertained using vote shares. 
1. Candidate attributes, strategic behavior, and polarized 
voting. 
There is no necessary, logical relationship between racial 
polarization in political preferences and polarization in vote 
shares. Extreme preference polarization is compatible with non-
polarized voting, and minimally polarized preferences may 
sometimes yield extremely polarized voting. 
To see this, consider a simple model in which voters have 
preferences over three dimensions: candidate ideology (policy 
positions), candidate race, and candidate quality (that is, va-
lence traits such as probity, work effort, and intelligence). Imag-
ine further that white and minority voters have exactly the 
same preferences for candidate ideology and valence traits but 
that most voters slightly prefer coethnic representation. In a bi-
racial election between two candidates of similar quality who are 
positioned at the midpoint of the ideological spectrum, extreme 
racial polarization in votes is likely to occur. Because race is the 
only difference between the candidates, a slight preference for 
coethnic representation will translate into extremely polarized 
voting. Also, in this scenario, the difference between, say, bloc 
voting at the 60 percent level and at the 90 percent level is a 
function not of the average intensity of voters’ preference for 
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coethnic representation but rather of the commonality of that 
preference.288 
Now imagine another world in which there is very strong 
racial polarization on the ideology and race dimensions and, as 
before, imagine that all voters have the same preference for va-
lence traits. White voters prefer much more conservative candi-
dates than do minority voters, and voters of both racial groups 
are also willing to sacrifice a lot of candidate quality in order to 
elect coethnic candidates. Will we observe strong racial polariza-
tion in voting? It depends. In an election between two candidates 
of the same race positioned at the ideological midpoint, polariza-
tion is unlikely—the candidates are differentiated only by their 
valence quality, which by construction all voters value similarly. 
In a race between a conservative minority candidate and a liber-
al white candidate, polarization is also unlikely—the matchup 
forces voters in each group to trade off their preferences for ra-
cial and ideological proximity.289 But if a liberal minority candi-
date faces off against a conservative white candidate of similar 
quality, extreme racial polarization will probably result: minori-
ty (white) voters are closer to the minority (white) candidate on 
both the ideological and the race dimensions. 
Now, one might respond that some of these examples are 
unusual, and that unusual elections will not lead to mistaken 
polarization inferences so long as the court averages a large 
number of elections or excludes outliers (as Gingles instructs).290 
This response would be compelling if all elections took the form 
of two-candidate matchups in which the candidates’ attributes 
were determined by independent random draws from some pool 
of potential candidate attributes and if all voters had very good 
information about the candidates. In two-candidate, plurality-
winner elections, there is no incentive for strategic voting, so 
votes can be interpreted as sincere expressions of preference.291 
 
 288 By “within-group commonality,” we mean the proportion of voters within a racial 
group who share the (assumed-to-be-slight) preference for coethnic representation. 
 289 Of course, somewhat polarized voting could occur in this matchup if most voters 
have a much stronger preference for ideological rather than racial representation, or for 
racial rather than ideological representation. In that case, most voters would make the 
same trade-off—choosing, say, the ideologically proximate candidate over the racially 
proximate candidate—and latent racial polarization on the ideology dimension would 
manifest as racial polarization in vote choice. 
 290 See Parts II.B.1, II.B.2.c. 
 291 This is a slight oversimplification, since some voters might vote strategically with 
the goal of moving the balance of power in the legislative body closer to their ideal point 
rather than electing a candidate at their ideal point. See Michael Tomz and Robert P. Van 
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And if the candidates themselves are, in effect, just random 
clusters of attributes independently drawn from the pool of po-
tential candidate attributes, then differences across jurisdictions 
and over time in the average level of racial bloc voting will cor-
respond to differences in underlying political preferences. 
To see the intuition here, imagine that candidates differ only 
on the dimension of ideology. If all elections were contests be-
tween a slightly left-of-center candidate and a slightly right-of-
center candidate, then extremely polarized voting would be like-
ly if, say, the vast majority of minority voters were slightly left 
of center and the vast majority of white voters were slightly 
right of center. The resulting inference of a big difference be-
tween white and minority voters on the ideology dimension 
would be mistaken. 
Now imagine a counterfactual world in which each candi-
date’s ideology is determined by a random draw from the uni-
form distribution on the interval of potential ideology.292 Some 
elections feature two conservative candidates, other elections in-
volve two liberal candidates, still others a centrist and a liberal, 
others a conservative and a liberal, and so forth, with no two 
candidates exactly alike. If minority voters are slightly left of 
center and white voters are slightly right of center, racially po-
larized voting will not occur in most of these elections. Specifi-
cally, white and minority voters would back the same candidate 
in every election between a center-left and a far-left candidate, 
or a center-right and a far-right candidate. 
In a world of randomized candidates without strategic vot-
ing, it would also be easy enough to say how close a candidate is 
to being the ideal candidate of the minority community. If a giv-
en candidate runs in many elections and usually gains a strong 
supermajority of the minority vote, she is almost certainly close 
to ideal. No matter whom she is matched up against, she wins 
the minority vote by a landslide. Even if most candidates run on-
ly once, it would still be straightforward to estimate the minori-
ty community’s valuation of different candidate attributes and to 
 
Houweling, Candidate Positioning and Voter Choice, 102 Am Polit Sci Rev 303, 303–04, 
307–13 (2008) (estimating spatial and directional voting in the American electorate). 
 292 Under the uniform distribution, every possible value is equally likely to be 
drawn. See, for example, Jim Pitman, Probability 28 (Springer 2006). The domain of “po-
tential ideology” could be defined on the interval from the most liberal to the most con-
servative member of the electorate. 
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ground candidate-of-choice determinations on estimated prefer-
ences over attributes.293 
* * * 
The world of randomized candidates represents an interest-
ing thought experiment, but it bears no resemblance to actual 
politics. Political scientists have long realized that electoral sys-
tems create incentives for strategic behavior—by voters, candi-
dates, parties, and other political elites.294 Observed, real-world 
candidates are strategically composed, as it were, by a variety of 
political elites seeking to advance their respective interests, in-
cluding potential candidates, campaign donors, endorsers, politi-
cal party insiders, and, in some jurisdictions, slating organiza-
tions.295 All of these actors operate in a strategic environment 
that is jointly determined by electoral institutions, by the distri-
bution of preferences within the eligible electorate, by the distri-
bution of civic engagement within the eligible electorate (interest 
in voting and attention to the campaign), and of course by the ex-
istence and behavioral tendencies of other political elites.296 
Consider just a few examples of how these factors result in 
systematic differences across jurisdictions, districts, and types of 
elections in the candidate matchups that are observed, as well 
as in the balance between sincere and strategic voting. 
 
 293 For a demonstration of this point using fictional candidates, see Abrajano, 
Elmendorf, and Quinn, Using Experiments to Estimate Racially Polarized Voting at *30 
(cited in note 41).  
 294 For one of the more influential expositions of this idea, see generally Gary W. 
Cox, Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems (Cam-
bridge 1997). 
 295 The literature on strategic behavior by would-be candidates and their elite sup-
porters is vast. For some recent examples, see Kathleen Bawn, et al, A Theory of Political 
Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics, 10 Persp Polit 
571, 572 (2012) (arguing that political parties in the United States are “coalitions of in-
terest groups and activists” that use the government to control policymaking); Cherie D. 
Maestas and Cynthia R. Rugeley, Assessing the “Experience Bonus” through Examining 
Strategic Entry, Candidate Quality, and Campaign Receipts in U.S. House Elections, 52 
Am J Polit Sci 520, 521 (2008) (applying strategic-entry theory to nonincumbent fund-
raising); Insun Kang, Richard G. Niemi, and Lynda W. Powell, Strategic Candidate Deci-
sionmaking and Competition in Gubernatorial Nonincumbent-Party Primaries, 3 State 
Polit & Pol Q 353, 354 (2003) (concluding that “gubernatorial candidates respond to the 
same broad range of strategic considerations that influence the decisions of candidates 
for other high-level offices”). 
 296 See Eric McGhee, et al, A Primary Cause of Partisanship? Nomination Systems 
and Legislator Ideology, 58 Am J Polit Sci 337, 338 (2014) (discussing the various actors 
in the partisan electoral system). 
 2016] Racially Polarized Voting 651 
 
Primary versus general elections.  Primary elections are like-
ly to present much stronger incentives for strategic voting than 
general elections, both because of the number of serious candi-
dates in some primary races and because many voters’ most-
preferred primary candidate may be unelectable in the general 
election, given the distribution of preferences in the full electorate 
and the expected attributes of the other party’s nominee.297 
Strong versus weak slating organizations.  In a world with 
powerful slating organizations,298 a strong candidate in each 
election is likely to hew to the slating organization’s positions. In 
a world without such gatekeepers, one may observe more diver-
sity in candidates’ issue positions or packages of positions.  
Nonpartisan versus partisan elections.  Nonpartisan elec-
tions remove one of the main centrifugal forces operating 
against the standard Downsian incentive for candidates to posi-
tion themselves at the “ideal point” of the median voter.299 Be-
cause of this, there is likely to be less ideological distance on av-
erage between the candidates in a world of nonpartisan 
elections. On the other hand, there is likely to be greater hetero-
geneity in candidates’ positions and also a greater failure on the 
part of voters to see and respond to candidates’ positions.300 
Instant-runoff versus plurality-winner elections.  Proponents 
of “instant runoff” or “rank choice” voting have persuaded a 
number of cities to adopt this institution, arguing that it frees vot-
ers from the dilemma of choosing between their ideal candidate 
 
 297 See generally D. Sunshine Hillygus and Sarah A. Treul, Assessing Strategic Vot-
ing in the 2008 US Presidential Primaries: The Role of Electoral Context, Institutional 
Rules, and Negative Votes, 161 Pub Choice 517 (2014). 
 298 A slating organization is a group that puts together a package of candidates who 
share common objectives and then campaigns on behalf of the package, encouraging voters 
who like one of the candidates or who share the group’s objectives to vote for all of the candi-
dates. See generally Shanto Iyengar, Daniel H. Lowenstein, and Seth Masket, The Stealth 
Campaign: Experimental Studies of Slate Mail in California, 17 J L & Polit 295 (2001). 
 299 Regarding the Downsian model and various forces that may lead candidates not 
to converge to the median voter, see generally Bernard Grofman, Downs and Two-Party 
Convergence, 7 Ann Rev Polit Sci 25 (2004).  
 300 Greater heterogeneity is likely because the candidates do not qualify for the gen-
eral election through a party-screening process. Greater failure on the part of voters to 
see and respond to candidates’ positions is likely because there are no party labels on the 
ballot, and party labels provide some information about candidate ideology. See Cheryl 
Boudreau, Christopher S. Elmendorf, and Scott A. MacKenzie, Informing Electorates via 
Election Law: An Experimental Study of Partisan Endorsements and Nonpartisan Voter 
Guides in Local Elections, 14 Election L J 2, 15–19 (2015) (finding that providing voters 
with party labels in a nonpartisan city council election strengthens spatial voting). 
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and some more electable but not very exciting alternative.301 If vot-
ers behave accordingly, then first-choice votes in rank-choice-
voting elections should reveal more about preference polariza-
tion than votes in ordinary plurality-winner elections. 
Racist versus nonracist white voters.  In a world in which 
white voters are reluctant to support minority-race candidates, 
minority candidates are less likely to run, as well as less likely 
to be successful in raising money and garnering endorsements. 
Those minority candidates who do run are likely to be very dif-
ferent from “usual” minority candidates in an otherwise-
identical world without white-voter discrimination.302 
* * * 
Further examples could be multiplied ad infinitum. But to 
see how these issues play out in a real-world setting, consider 
the facts of LULAC,303 which nicely illustrate how strategic be-
havior may result in the most probative of candidate matchups 
not occurring, as well as the risk of mistaken inferences from 
vote shares in the races that do occur. 
At issue in LULAC was an unabashedly partisan gerry-
mander of Texas’s congressional districts.304 Among other things, 
the Republican gerrymander broke up a district with a substan-
tial black population—but not a black majority—that the white 
Democrat Martin Frost had long represented.305 Black plaintiffs 
argued that Frost was their candidate of choice, from which it 
followed that Frost’s district, though not a majority-minority 
district, was nonetheless a black opportunity district.306 (Assume 
for purposes of this discussion that the court followed the pro-
portional representation theory of vote dilution.) 
Unwilling to go on vote shares alone, the courts struggled 
with the question whether Frost was a black candidate of choice. 
Frost had represented substantially the same district for more 
than twenty years and had never faced a black challenger.307 Lo-
cal politicos offered inconsistent testimony about whether the 
 
 301 See, for example, What Is RCV? (FairVote), archived at http://perma.cc/EXC9-62Z8 
(noting that ranked-choice-voting systems “allow[ ] all voters to vote for their favorite 
candidate, while avoiding the fear of helping elect their least favorite candidate”). 
 302 See text accompanying notes 312–13. 
 303 LULAC, 548 US at 410–13 (Kennedy) (plurality). 
 304 Id at 411–13 (Kennedy) (plurality). 
 305 Id at 443–44 (Kennedy) (plurality). 
 306 Id at 443 (Kennedy) (plurality). 
 307 See Session v Perry, 298 F Supp 2d 451, 484 (ED Tex 2004) (three-judge panel). 
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black community really loved Frost or, if given a choice, would 
have preferred some other (presumably black) champion of the 
community.308 
Why had the voters not been given that choice? One expla-
nation is strategic abstention by would-be challengers. If Frost 
were the ideal or near-ideal candidate of the black community, 
no black politician worth his salt would bother mounting a pri-
mary challenge against him. The absence of black challengers is 
thus consistent with the plaintiffs’ argument that the black 
community was politically cohesive and that Frost was a minori-
ty candidate of choice. 
But the absence of a black challenger is also consistent with 
the hypothesis that the black community was cohesive and that 
Frost was not a black candidate of choice (with “candidate of 
choice” defined per the proportional representation theory). 
Black voters were a numeric minority in Frost’s district. If they 
had sharply different preferences from other voters, their back-
ing of an ideally preferred candidate in the primary—if success-
ful—might well have resulted in a white Republican winning the 
general election, someone whom black voters would greatly dis-
favor relative to Frost. The prospect of strategic black voting for 
Frost could have led authentic black candidates of choice to ab-
stain from running. 
Imagine for the sake of argument that the black community 
in Texas was politically cohesive (within the meaning of the pro-
portional representation theory) and that an authentic black 
candidate of choice had emerged to challenge Frost. Imagine fur-
ther that the black community split its vote in this election. The 
divided black vote would count strongly against minority politi-
cal cohesion if the judge followed the convention of measuring 
cohesion through vote shares in interracial elections, giving par-
ticular weight to primaries.309 Yet the split vote might well have 
been an artifact of divisions within the black community about 
whether to vote strategically or sincerely; of heterogeneity with-
in the black community with respect to knowledge about the 
ideally preferred black candidate’s prospects in the general elec-
tion; or even of heterogeneity with respect to the trade-off be-
tween representation by a senior, powerful member of Congress 
versus representation by a junior, less influential member whose 
 
 308 See LULAC, 548 US at 444–45 (Kennedy) (plurality).  
 309 See Mallory v Ohio, 173 F3d 377, 382–84 (6th Cir 1999) (upholding a finding of 
no cohesion when minority vote shares varied widely across elections). 
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policy positions are closer to the minority community’s. The split 
vote certainly would not establish that the black community 
lacked “common [political] beliefs, ideals, principles, [and] agen-
das”;310 by hypothesis, the black community was cohesive in pre-
cisely this sense. 
Even when voters have no incentive to vote strategically, 
strategic behavior by candidates and other elites such as major 
campaign donors can lead to badly mistaken inferences about 
preference distributions. Consider a stylized example in which 
the elections are single stage (that is, with no separate primary), 
only two candidates run in each election, the racial minority is a 
political minority, and white voters substantially prefer white 
candidates to otherwise-similar minority candidates. There is a 
fixed pool of potential minority candidates, some of whom are 
good fund-raisers with strong valence qualities, and others of 
whom are weak. Which minority candidates will select into run-
ning? If any run, they are likely to be the weaker candidates. 
Strong potential candidates probably have better things to do 
with their time than run for office in districts where they have 
little chance of winning. Faced with a choice between a weak 
minority candidate and a strong white candidate, the minority 
community might split its vote, with some members voting their 
valence preference and others their preference for policy or for de-
scriptive representation. This split vote could occur even if all mi-
nority voters have exactly the same ideal point on the policy di-
mension and the same preference for descriptive representation. 
Moreover, if only weak minority candidates select into run-
ning, observed white voting patterns may suggest disparate 
treatment (the core question per the voter-discrimination theo-
ry) when in fact little or none occurs. Assume the data show that 
white voters have given less support to minority Democrats than 
to white Democrats—a phenomenon that courts and commenta-
tors often treat as the sine qua non of voter discrimination.311 
 
 310 League of United Latin American Citizens, Council No 4434 v Clements, 986 F2d 
728, 744 (5th Cir 1993). 
 311 See, for example, Charleston County, 365 F3d at 353 (emphasizing that minority-
race, minority-preferred candidates were defeated more consistently than white, minority-
preferred candidates); Old Person v Cooney, 230 F3d 1113, 1128 (9th Cir 2000) (empha-
sizing that “Indian (Indian-preferred) candidates generally received a lower percentage 
of white votes than did white Indian-preferred candidates in the same district”); Pildes, 
80 NC L Rev at 1565–67 (cited in note 36) (questioning whether courts should regard 
voting as polarized if whites give similar support to black and white Democrats). To be 
sure, commentators and some courts have also recognized that this measure of discrimi-
nation could understate the true amount of discrimination, insofar as white support for 
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This might reflect disparate treatment, but it could also be an 
artifact of the observed minority candidates’ weak valence traits, 
and the weakness of observed minority candidates may be com-
pletely unrelated to white prejudice. For example, if white voters 
tend to be conservative and most potential minority candidates 
are very liberal, strong minority candidates may elect not to run 
because they are ideologically out of step. A court that inferred 
disparate treatment from white voters’ lack of support for minor-
ity Democrats relative to white Democrats could be doubly in er-
ror: white voting patterns may reflect ideological as well as va-
lence differences between minority candidates and the white 
candidates whom the court treats as counterfactuals. 
Then again, candidates’ strategic behavior in anticipation of 
white-voter discrimination may lead courts to make grave errors 
about who is a high-quality or low-quality candidate, and in con-
sequence to badly understate white-voter discrimination.312 
Candidate quality—in the sense of innate appeal, work effort, 
intelligence, and so forth—is difficult to gauge, so it is natural 
for judges to rely on signals of quality from people with better 
information such as major campaign donors and endorsers. But 
big donors and endorsers, being strategic, are unlikely to back a 
candidate who has little chance of winning. If white voters do 
discriminate against minority-race candidates, minority candi-
dates are unlikely to secure substantial financial support and 
important endorsements unless they are truly extraordinary. 
If the court, trying to assess disparate treatment, were to 
compare white vote shares for minority candidates with a given 
level of financial or endorsement support to white vote shares 
for white candidates with similar financial or endorsement sup-
port, the court would be treating intrinsically ordinary white 
candidates as counterfactuals for intrinsically extraordinary mi-
nority candidates. This would bias downward the estimate of 
disparate treatment. On the other hand, if the court were to ignore 
variation in financial support, the court might end up comparing 
intrinsically low-quality minority candidates with high-quality 
 
white Democrats is colored by the perception that Democrats cater to racial minorities. 
See, for example, Pildes, 80 NC L Rev at 1565–67 (cited in note 36); Pamela S. Karlan 
and Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is Different, 84 Cal L Rev 1201, 1222–24 (1996).  
 312 Professor Greiner has also noted that strategic behavior by candidates (among 
other problems) makes it treacherous for courts to try to infer voter preferences with re-
spect to candidate race from observational vote-share data. Greiner, 122 Harv L Rev at 
596 (cited in note 137). He does not discuss the fact that strategic behavior makes it just 
as difficult to infer voter preferences over any other dimension from observational data. 
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white candidates, thereby overestimating the disadvantage that 
minority candidates suffer because of their apparent race or 
ethnicity. 
Similar problems complicate efforts to infer polarization on 
the policy or ideology dimension, even if one looks only at 
matchups between two candidates of the same race. Strong can-
didates who are ideologically out of step with the district are un-
likely to select into running. The true extent of polarization on 
the ideology dimension may be obscured by minority citizens’ 
failure to vote for weak candidates whose issue positions are ac-
tually closer to the minority median than the issue positions of 
their opponents. 
Courts have long recognized that the inferences about racial 
polarization from any one election may be tenuous.313 Litigants 
are expected to present evidence from a number of elections over 
a period of time.314 But the problem we are discussing arises 
from systematic political incentives, not from random variation 
in candidate traits. Aggregating data from a number of elections 
over a period of years does not make the problem go away. 
2. Evidence from a survey experiment. 
To further illustrate the limits of inference from average 
vote shares, we report results from experiments in which we 
created an electoral environment with fully randomized candi-
dates and no incentive for strategic voting.315 Each candidate 
was represented with a name and a photograph, chosen so as to 
clearly signal the candidate’s race or ethnicity (white, black, or 
Latino). Respondents (“voters”) were informed about each candi-
date’s education, military service, and endorsements, as well as 
one additional piece of personal information. We established a 
set of possible values (“levels”) for these attributes, and we inde-
pendently randomized attribute levels for each candidate. Fig-
ure 1 provides a screenshot of a hypothetical respondent’s choice 
task; Table 1 shows the possible levels for each attribute. 
  
 
 313 See Gingles, 478 US at 57. 
 314 See id; J. Gerald Hebert, et al, The Realist’s Guide to Redistricting: Avoiding the 
Legal Pitfalls 55–56 (ABA 2d ed 2010). 
 315 For a fuller description of the experiments and other results, see generally Abrajano, 
Elmendorf, and Quinn, Using Experiments to Estimate Racially Polarized Voting (cited 
in note 41).  
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FIGURE 1.  PRESENTATION OF CANDIDATE PROFILES TO 
RESPONDENTS 
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TABLE 1.  ATTRIBUTES AND LEVELS FOR RANDOMIZED 
CANDIDATES 
Our randomization protocol ensured that there was no sys-
tematic relationship between a candidate’s race and any of his 
other characteristics or any characteristics of his opponent. Re-
spondents had no incentive to vote strategically, as they were 
asked to choose between pairs of candidates in a single-stage 
“election.” 
Though each respondent saw only eight matchups, it follows 
from randomization that, in expectation, the distribution of 
Attribute Levels 
Race Black  
White  
Latino 
Education “Did not graduate from college” 
“Graduated from a state university” 
“Graduated from a state university (with honors)”  
“Graduated from an Ivy League university” 
“Graduated from an Ivy League university (with honors)” 
Endorsement “The National Association for the Advancement of Col-
ored People (NAACP), the largest African American civil 
rights and advocacy organization in the United States” 
“The National Council of La Raza (NCLR), the largest 
Hispanic American civil rights and advocacy organization 
in the United States” 
“The Democratic Party” 
“The Republican Party” 
“The AFL-CIO, the largest association of labor unions in 
the United States” 
“The Chamber of Commerce, the largest association of 
business groups in the United States” 
“The Coalition for Sound Government” 
Military  
Service 
“Served in military; honored for valor in combat”  
“Served in military” 
“No military service” 
Other  
Information 
“Honored as whistle-blower for exposing corruption at a 
public agency” 
“Serves as board chairman of a not-for-profit hospital”  
“Was the starting quarterback for college football team”  
“Volunteers with parent-teacher association” 
“Charged with violating campaign-finance laws during 
previous run for office” 
“Accused of sexual harassment by several former 
employees” 
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white, black, and Latino voter preferences in each election (can-
didate matchup) is identical. 
Assume that we are in a circuit—like the Third or the 
Tenth—in which judges focus the polarization analysis on races 
contested by minority candidates who are “sponsored” by the mi-
nority community.316 In our setup, these are black candidates en-
dorsed by the NAACP and Latino candidates endorsed by NCLR. 
Matched up against “fully randomized” white candidates—
candidates who could have any level for any attribute other than 
race or ethnicity—such black candidates of choice on average 
earn about 54 percent of the black vote, 35 percent of the Latino 
vote, and 34 percent of the white vote. Latino candidates of 
choice earn 57 percent of the Latino vote, 47 percent of the black 
vote, and 36 percent of the white vote. (These results are from a 
convenience sample of Amazon Mechanical Turk workers, who 
are younger and more liberal than the national electorate.317 The 
vote shares we report here would no doubt be different if we had 
a more representative sample.) 
For courts that treat 60 percent as a rough threshold for 
group cohesion,318 these results suggest that the black and Lati-
no voters in our sample are at best marginally cohesive. But 
these average vote shares conceal a lot of variation. Note, for ex-
ample, that most of the endorsers in our study are liberal 
groups. This means that a “fully randomized” white candidate is 
on average moderately liberal. Minority-race, minority-endorsed 
candidates are also perceived as liberal.319 This may explain why 
the level of minority bloc voting in our study perhaps seems low. 
How does bloc voting change if the white candidate pitted 
against the minority candidate of choice has a conservative en-
dorsement? We can examine this by subsetting the data to cases in 
which the white candidate matched up against a black or Latino 
 
 316 See Part II.B.2.a. See also notes 173–75 and accompanying text. 
 317 Mechanical Turk workers are people who sign up to do small online tasks in re-
turn for (usually modest) sums of money. In recent years, this population has commonly 
been used as a convenience sample for research in political science and psychology. See 
Adam J. Berinsky, Gregory A. Huber, and Gabriel S. Lenz, Evaluating Online Labor 
Markets for Experimental Research: Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk, 20 Polit Analysis 
351, 366 (2012) (arguing that Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform “provides an im-
portant way to overcome the barrier to conducting research raised by subject recruit-
ment costs and difficulties by providing easy and inexpensive access to nonstudent adult 
subjects”). 
 318 See notes 118–26 and accompanying text. 
 319 See Abrajano, Elmendorf, and Quinn, Using Experiments to Estimate Racially 
Polarized Voting at *27 (cited in note 41).  
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candidate of choice was endorsed by the Republican Party or the 
Chamber of Commerce. In these matchups, Latino voters sup-
port their candidate of choice 76 percent of the time, with white 
voters backing the white conservative 60 percent of the time. 
Black voters support their candidate of choice 57 percent of the 
time, with white voters favoring the white conservative 62 per-
cent of the time. In each case, the fraction of the minority vote 
going to the minority candidate of choice increased; indeed, in 
the Latino case, the increase was a startling 19 percentage 
points. This is despite the fact that voter preferences did not 
change. The only things that changed in the two examples were 
the characteristics of the electoral opponent. The 19 percentage 
point swing in this simple example with fixed voter preferences 
illustrates the extreme difficulty of inferring voter preferences 
from simple tabulations of vote-share data—and the dubious-
ness of numeric bloc-voting cutoffs. 
Finally, we can see the inferential problems that arise under 
conditions in which only weak minority candidates select into 
running. In our study, candidates who did not graduate from col-
lege or who had been accused of sexual harassment or campaign-
finance violations were strongly disfavored by respondents in all 
racial and ethnic groups.320 We therefore treat the presence of 
one of these characteristics as indicating that the candidate is 
low quality. Looking at matchups featuring low-quality black, 
NAACP-endorsed candidates against random white candidates, 
we see that only 42 percent of black voters support the black 
candidate (down from 54 percent when the quality traits were 
randomized). In matchups between low-quality Latino, NCLR-
endorsed candidates against random white candidates, 39 per-
cent of Latinos support the Latino candidate (down from 57 per-
cent when the quality traits were randomized). Again, voter 
preferences did not change, but vote shares for nominal candi-
dates of choice changed dramatically. 
3. The courts’ dilemma. 
Once courts face up to the mistaken assumption of Gin-
gles—namely, that there is no monotonic relationship between 
racial polarization in political preferences and the average level 
of observed vote-share polarization in “usual” elections—what 
options are left? A very sensible response would be to abandon 
 
 320 See id at *28. 
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the proposition that preference polarization should be judged 
primarily on the basis of votes cast in actual elections. In Part 
IV and in other work, we discuss alternative sources of evidence. 
Before turning to those alternatives, it is worth considering 
how courts might best use the vote-share data that have been 
the staple of vote dilution litigation to date. This exercise will 
make sense of the tensions that we observed in the case law.321 It 
should also prove helpful to judges and litigators insofar as they 
continue to rely on vote-share evidence. And it will provide a 
glimpse at possible futures, should the Supreme Court follow 
through on Strickland’s dictum and establish numeric cutoffs for 
“legally significant” bloc voting. 
Broadly speaking, we see two ways for courts to use vote-
share data in full recognition of the contingent relationship be-
tween votes and preferences: One is to adopt a subjective, infor-
mal Bayesian approach to inferring preferences from votes.322 
The other is to base preference-polarization findings on a small 
number of “standard” elections—specifically, two-candidate, bi-
racial, general election matchups—which are assumed as a mat-
ter of law to be comparable across jurisdictions and over time. 
However, neither of these approaches satisfies all the criteria 
that the racial-polarization test is supposed to meet. 
As we have throughout this Section, we assume that the 
judge’s task is to make an approximate judgment about whether 
preference polarization in the defendant jurisdiction is severe or 
modest. When polarization is severe, the protections of § 2 kick 
in; when it is modest, minority voters must fend for themselves. 
(This comports with Strickland’s cutoff idea.)323 
a) The informal Bayesian approach.  Judges have prior 
beliefs about the distribution of political preferences within 
white and minority communities and about the extent to which 
any given candidate is close to ideal for minority voters. Candi-
dates’ vote shares by racial group also contain some information 
about these matters—depending on the candidates’ attributes, 
incentives for strategic voting, and so forth. As such, one way for 
judges to deal with the contingent relationship between votes 
 
 321 See Part II.B. 
 322 The Bayesian school of statistical inference takes as given that decisionmakers 
have prior beliefs about the matter under investigation, and it examines how those be-
liefs should be updated in light of newly available data. For an introduction to Bayes’s 
Rule and the logic of Bayesian updating, see Simon Jackman, Bayesian Analysis for the 
Social Sciences xxviii–xxxiv, 1–31 (Wiley 2009). 
 323 See notes 31–36 and accompanying text. 
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and preferences is to proceed as a good Bayesian would: learn 
everything you can about the backstory of each election present-
ed to the court; ask yourself, in light of that backstory, whether 
the candidates’ respective vote shares by racial group say some-
thing meaningful about racial polarization in preferences along 
any latent dimension that you believe to be legally relevant 
(such as candidate race, ideology, and so on); and then update 
your priors and repeat this process with the evidence from the 
next election.324 
Which elections will prove most probative under the infor-
mal Bayesian approach depends on what the judge wants to 
learn. For example, if she wants to learn about racial polariza-
tion on the dimension of ideology, she could look for elections in 
which a moderate candidate faces off against an extreme candi-
date of the same race and of similar quality. If whites vote by 
large margins for very conservative candidates against centrists 
and if there are no significant nonideological differences between 
the candidates, it follows that most whites are conservative. 
Similarly, if minorities vote by large margins for a very liberal 
candidate against an otherwise-similar centrist candidate, the 
minority voters have revealed themselves to be cohesively liberal. 
If the judge wants to investigate polarization on the dimen-
sion of candidate race, she might look for races that pit a weak 
white candidate against a strong minority candidate who is ideo-
logically similar, or a strong white candidate against a weak mi-
nority candidate who is ideologically similar. If voters choose a 
weak coethnic candidate over a strong noncoethnic opponent, 
this suggests that voters care a lot about descriptive representa-
tion. But the court should not attach any significance to particu-
lar quantitative thresholds. If a very weak minority candidate 
running against a very strong (and ideologically similar) white 
candidate wins, say, 50 percent of the minority vote, that signals 
not a lack of cohesion but rather a strong minority preference for 
coethnic representation. Conversely, if 100 percent of whites 
vote for the white candidate in the same matchup, this says 
nothing about whether whites generally prefer own-race repre-
sentation (or about white ideological cohesion), since the ob-
served white vote share is readily explained by the valence gap 
between the candidates. 
 
 324 For a discussion of Bayes’s Rule and judicial decisionmaking, see Richard A. 
Posner, How Judges Think 65–70 (Harvard 2008). 
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After considering all the vote-share data and reaching a 
conclusion about the important points of political commonality 
(if any) within the minority community, the informal Bayesian 
judge must determine which candidates were sufficiently close 
to the minority’s ideal as to be deemed candidates of choice. 
Having identified those candidates, she must then ask whether 
they were elected in sufficient numbers as to preclude a finding 
of legally significant white bloc voting. (These determinations 
will depend on her normative theory of dilution, not just on her 
updated beliefs about the distribution of political preferences in 
the minority and white communities.)325 
The problem with the informal Bayesian approach is that it 
cannot be squared with the Court’s manageability objectives. It 
puts front and center the very thing the courts were supposed to 
ignore: “the political stories behind the election returns.”326 It 
cannot be implemented using numeric cutoffs that separate po-
larized from nonpolarized communities as a matter of law, or 
that label candidates as minority candidates of choice. Those de-
terminations are left to hang on the judge’s prior beliefs—her 
stereotypes—about white and minority preferences, supple-
mented by whatever she may have learned from the vote-share 
evidence. 
b) Racial assumptions “as a matter of law.”  Assume that 
the courts want an objective polarization test, one that can be 
implemented by comparing average vote shares by racial group 
to some Strickland-style cutoff of legal significance. Can this be 
done in a nonarbitrary fashion, given the contingent relation-
ship between votes and preferences? 
Per our analysis in Part III.B.1, the following conditions 
must be satisfied for courts to reasonably conclude that the ra-
cial groups are more politically polarized in jurisdiction A than 
in jurisdiction B because the average difference between ob-
served vote shares by racial group was higher in A than in B: 
1. The candidate matchups (“elections”) that go into the av-
erages must be similar in both jurisdictions. 
2. The elections must be substantially free of strategic voting. 
3. The candidates in the elections must differ from one an-
other in ways that correspond to hypothesized differences 
in white and minority voter preferences. 
 
 325 See Part III.A.1. 
 326 Blacksher and Menefee, 34 Hastings L J at 53 (cited in note 11). 
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4. The candidates must be roughly equivalent in terms of 
attributes that are valued similarly by all voters (“va-
lence traits”). 
5. The “packages” of traits in each candidate should not run 
against the grain of latent preference correlations in the 
electorate. (A contest between a black conservative and a 
white liberal may not induce polarized voting if most 
black voters prefer black over white candidates and lib-
eral over conservative candidates, and if most white vot-
ers prefer white over black candidates and conservative 
over liberal candidates.)327 
These conditions suggest that an objective polarization test 
should be grounded on voting data from partisan, two-candidate, 
general elections, rather than on primaries or nonpartisan con-
tests. Only in two-candidate general election matchups can the 
court be reasonably confident—without any further background 
information—that citizens are voting sincerely rather than stra-
tegically.328 Also, because the Democratic and Republican parties 
are ideological, a court relying on data from partisan general 
elections can be fairly confident that the two candidates are dis-
tinct from one another along policy and ideology dimensions that 
may matter to the voters.329 
By restricting the analysis to general elections, it also be-
comes possible to identify and exclude elections with “against the 
grain” candidates (for example, black Republicans) on the basis of 
objective criteria. The court just needs to identify the political 
 
 327 Strictly speaking, relative comparisons between jurisdictions A and B would not be 
distorted by the existence of some contests with “against the grain” candidates, so long as 
these contests occurred with similar frequency in both jurisdictions. But if there are more 
such contests in jurisdiction A than B, the average level of observed polarization will be 
lower in A even if underlying preference polarization is the same in both jurisdictions. 
 328 See, for example, Hillygus and Treul, 161 Pub Choice at 529 (cited in note 297) 
(discussing the rate of strategic voting in the 2008 presidential election and noting that 
many individuals who voted strategically in the primary for Hillary Clinton voted sincerely 
for John McCain in the general election). 
 329 It is true that basing the analysis on general election data may make it hard to 
determine whether the minority community is politically distinct from white coparti-
sans—an important question under the proportional representation theory. See Part 
III.A.2. However, the risk of mistaken inferences from primary elections is so severe that 
we think primaries should be excluded from the analysis unless the court is willing to 
closely investigate the political stories behind the election returns. See Part III.B.1. Note 
also that general election results data will sometimes shed light on within-party differ-
ences, as reflected in, for example, differential rates of white and minority “defection” 
from various nominees of the minority-preferred party. 
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party that is preferred by most plaintiff-race voters and then ex-
clude those interracial general election matchups in which the 
minority-race candidate was nominated by the minority-
disfavored party. 
Finally, though reliance on general election matchups hard-
ly guarantees that the candidates are similar in terms of their 
valence attributes, the fact that the candidates have survived 
one screening test (the primary) means that extremely low-
quality candidates are less likely to be part of the mix than if the 
court were using matchups from primary elections or nonparti-
san races with low barriers to entry. (Note, though, that there is 
likely to be a strong negative correlation between incumbent va-
lence strength and challenger valence strength. Candidates 
running in open-seat elections are likely to be more balanced on 
valence traits.) 
In summary, the polarization analysis would run roughly as 
follows: 
1. Determine the political party that is preferred by most 
minority voters, based on vote shares in monoracial two-
candidate general election matchups. 
2. Estimate vote shares by race for each candidate in inter-
racial two-candidate general election matchups in which 
the minority candidate is the nominee of the minority-
preferred party. Average the estimates over all elections 
in the analysis. 
3. Make findings on minority cohesion. Cohesion might be 
said to exist if and only if the minority candidates in the 
second step received on average more than X percent of 
the minority vote, or if the average gap between those 
candidates’ minority and white vote shares exceeded some 
threshold of legal significance. (The latter approach would 
be preferable, as to some extent it controls for unmeasured 
differences in the quality of the minority and nonminority 
candidates in each matchup.)330 
 
 330 To see the problem, imagine an election in which the Republican incumbent is 
very strong and only very weak challengers seek the Democratic Party’s nomination. As-
sume that 95 percent of whites vote for the Republican incumbent in the general election 
(including almost all white independents and a nontrivial number of white Democrats) 
and 55 percent of minority voters vote for the minority-race Democratic nominee. The 
“low” rate of minority voting for the coethnic candidate might be thought to suggest 
noncohesion, but in this example it occurs due to the weakness of the minority candidate 
and the strength of his opponent. The gap (50 percentage points) between the white and 
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4. Make findings on the legal significance of white bloc vot-
ing, as appropriate. Under the Gingles plurality ap-
proach, this step reduces to asking whether the minority 
candidates considered at the second step were usually de-
feated. Under the Strickland vote-share-cutoff approach, 
legal significance also requires that the average crossover-
voting rate not exceed some fixed level established as a 
matter of law. Alternatively, in those circuits where voter 
discrimination must be shown, a court might hold that 
white bloc voting is legally significant only if white can-
didates of the minority-preferred party received a higher 
proportion of the white vote than minority candidates of 
the minority-preferred party. 
We call this the “minority-race/minority-party” protocol for 
quantifying racial polarization. While it avoids some of the diffi-
culties with relying on data from primaries and nonpartisan 
elections, it remains deeply problematic for several reasons. 
First, it severely winnows the universe of elections that may 
be included in the polarization analysis (even more so if the 
analysis is restricted to open-seat contests). If local white copar-
tisans of the minority community generally oppose minority-race 
candidates, minority candidates are unlikely to win local prima-
ries, so the polarization findings will have to be based on elec-
tions to offices responsible for much larger geographic areas 
(such as elections for governor, senator, or president). In some 
cases, particularly for Latino and Asian American plaintiffs,331 
there may not be any elections in which voters in the defendant 
jurisdiction had the opportunity to vote for a plaintiff-race can-
didate who won the primary of the plaintiff group’s preferred 
party. In other cases, the polarization estimates will simply be 
noisy, affected in unknown ways by idiosyncratic features of the 
small number of elections that make it into the analysis. And in 
many cases, the estimates will be of questionable relevance. 
Preferences in the space of national politics may or may not be 
highly correlated with preferences in the space of local school 
board or county commission elections. 
 
minority vote shares for the minority candidate is more telling of whether the minority 
group has distinct political interests. A few courts have recognized this point. 
 331 See Andrew L. Aoki and Okiyoshi Takeda, Asian American Politics 111 (Polity 
2008) (describing limited Asian American success in primary elections). 
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Second, the minority-race/minority-party protocol assumes 
that the mix of candidate matchups in each racial-polarization 
analysis is comparable.332 The assumption of candidate-matchup 
comparability would not be problematic if the analysis were re-
stricted to data from presidential elections, because in presiden-
tial elections, voters in every jurisdiction choose between the 
same candidates. But relying on presidential-election data will 
not work for cases brought by Latino or Asian American voters; 
even for black vote dilution claims, we cannot be sure whether 
between-jurisdiction variation in racially polarized voting in the 
2008 and 2012 presidential elections was due to between-
jurisdiction variation in latent polarization along the race and 
ideology dimensions, or to idiosyncratic differences in how voters 
evaluated other traits of President Barack Obama, Senator John 
McCain, and Governor Mitt Romney (professorial mannerisms? 
military service? Mormonism?).333 Beyond presidential elections, 
the assumption of candidate-matchup comparability is extreme-
ly tenuous. There are likely to be systematic between-
jurisdiction differences in partisan nominees for Congress, gov-
ernor, state legislature, city council, and the like, depending on 
the partisan and ideological composition of the electorate. In 
states or districts where a party has little chance of winning 
general elections, high-quality candidates are less likely to seek 
the party’s nomination. In jurisdictions that are much more con-
servative or liberal than the national norm, party elites and 
primary voters may try to push through relatively electable can-
didates who deviate from the party orthodoxy in important re-
spects. In low-profile elections, the candidates are less likely to 
be vetted by party elites.334 And so forth. 
 
 332 Only if the underlying candidate matchups are the same or very similar can a court 
conclude that jurisdiction A is more polarized than B because the average difference be-
tween white and minority vote shares for minority-race candidates of the minority-
preferred party is higher in A than in B. 
 333 Also, with just a single matchup between a center-left black candidate and a center-
right white candidate, one cannot learn much about the distribution of voter preferences 
within racial groups. Extremely polarized voting will be observed in both (1) a communi-
ty in which white voters are slightly right of center and slightly prefer white to black 
candidates and black voters are slightly left of center and slightly prefer black to white 
candidates, and (2) a community in which white voters are extremely conservative and 
hate black candidates and black voters are extremely liberal and strongly prefer black to 
white candidates. 
 334 See Casey Byrne Knudsen Dominguez, Before the Primary: Party Participation in 
Congressional Nominating Processes *125 (unpublished PhD dissertation, UC Berkeley, 
Spring 2005), archived at http://perma.cc/Q2XJ-2YPY (offering “evidence that although 
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Moreover, as we discussed above, the white and minority 
candidates of a given party are likely to differ from one another 
in systematic ways even within a jurisdiction, due to candidate-
entry incentives.335 Because of this, one cannot safely infer voter 
discrimination—or its absence—from the average difference in 
white support for white and minority candidates of the minority-
preferred party (as the minority-race/minority-party protocol 
supposes). 
The third vulnerability of the minority-race/minority-party 
protocol is that it effectively presumes as a matter of law that on-
ly minority-race candidates can be minority candidates of choice. 
This proposition has been strenuously rejected by many courts, on 
the ground that it reflects a “prohibited” racial assumption.336 
Might there be an objective, race-neutral alternative to the 
minority-race/minority-party protocol? One could posit, like the 
Second and Ninth Circuits, that any candidate who receives 
strong minority support in the primary should be deemed a mi-
nority candidate of choice.337 Or one might define minority can-
didates of choice as those candidates who were nominated in a 
racially polarized primary.338 Group cohesion findings under the 
second and third prongs of Gingles would then be based on voting 
patterns in general elections that are contested by winners of ra-
cially polarized primaries (without regard to the candidate’s race). 
 
the party network does, naturally, support higher rather than lower quality candidates, 
it is more likely to do so in unified ways in races that are important to the party”). 
 335 See text accompanying notes 311–13. 
 336 See Part II.B.3.a. Perhaps the solution here is for courts to expressly treat “can-
didate of choice” as a legal fiction, derived from courts’ senses of what the VRA should be 
interpreted to achieve. If “candidate of choice” were recognized as a legal fiction, then a 
court could say, for instance, that only minority-race candidates “count” in the opportunity-
to-elect analysis, not because they are the only candidates who could be bona fide candi-
dates of choice of the minority community but because the purpose of vote dilution law is 
to counteract white-voter discrimination against minority-race candidates. 
 337 See National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 65 F3d at 1019 
(noting that “the ballot box provides the best and most objective proxy for determining 
who constitutes a representative of choice” but cautioning that “a court need not treat 
the candidate [receiving greater than 50 percent minority support in the general elec-
tion] as minority-preferred when another candidate receiving greater support in the 
primary failed to reach the general election”); Ruiz v City of Santa Maria, 160 F3d 543, 
552 (9th Cir 1998) (following National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peo-
ple, Inc v City of Niagara Falls, New York, 65 F3d 1002 (2d Cir 1995)). 
 338 This would likely be an improvement over the Second and Ninth Circuits’ ap-
proach, since some candidates may receive strong minority support in the primary be-
cause of valence traits rather than because they cater to the minority’s particular inter-
ests or concerns. 
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But this race-neutral simplification could lead to very mis-
leading conclusions. Racial polarization in the primary is only a 
signal of minority voters’ preference for one candidate relative to 
the other available choices, not a signal of how much minority 
voters like the preferred candidate in any absolute sense. Even 
as a signal of relative preference, primary polarization—or its 
absence—is hard to interpret because the mix of sincere and 
strategic voting is unknown. Lest one think this inconsequen-
tial, recall that during the 2008 primaries, most blacks did not 
support Obama over Clinton until he won the Iowa caucus and 
proved himself electable with whites.339 
Bear in mind, too, that if white general election voters are 
hostile to the minority group and its political agenda, polarization 
estimates derived from general elections without a minority-race 
candidate may substantially understate latent preference diver-
gence between white and minority voters.340 To put this point 
differently, if the court quantifies “minority cohesion” and “white 
bloc voting” in terms of the average general election vote share 
(by racial group) of all minority-preferred candidates who won 
racially polarized primary elections, there will be arbitrary dif-
ferences across similarly polarized communities in the court-
determined level of polarization. In those communities where 
the candidates who won polarized primaries with minority back-
ing were often racial minorities, the observed level of general 
election polarization is likely to be higher, other things equal, 
than in communities where the candidates who won polarized 
primaries with minority support were usually white. 
c) The upshot.  The highly contingent relationship be-
tween vote shares and political preferences has the courts in a 
bind. There is simply no way to concurrently satisfy the princi-
pal criteria that the Gingles test is supposed to meet. The courts 
could make the test objective and clear-cut—but at the price of 
throwing away a lot of data, implausibly assuming that the dis-
tribution of observed general election matchups is the same 
across jurisdictions, and making racial assumptions that many 
judges have strenuously resisted. 
 
 339 See Paul Steinhauser, Poll: Obama Makes Big Gains among Black Voters (CNN, 
Jan 19, 2008), archived at http://perma.cc/X8G9-GVAQ. 
 340 The voting patterns in elections without a minority-race candidate obviously will 
not reflect voters’ preferences with respect to candidate race, and they may not reflect 
voters’ preferences with respect to the political agenda of minority elites. Even if one of 
the candidates in a white-versus-white election shares the minority elite’s agenda, this 
may not be apparent to many white voters, particularly in low-profile political races. 
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Alternatively, the courts could make the polarization in-
quiry expressly dependent on “the political stories behind the 
election returns,”341 in line with the informal Bayesian approach. 
This approach runs afoul of the Supreme Court’s manageability 
objectives. And although it avoids embedding racial assumptions 
in the law, it invites judges to rely on their personal stereotypes 
and prior beliefs about white and minority preferences. 
Given these choices, the current state of the law of racially 
polarized voting is perhaps unsurprising. As we have seen, the 
courts rely heavily on vote-share data from interracial elections, 
but they insist—perhaps for the sake of appearances—that 
these are not the only relevant, probative elections. And the 
courts fill their opinions with vote-share estimates—creating the 
appearance of an objective, even mathematical inquiry—without 
actually limiting their discretion to interpret those numbers 
however they wish.342 
C. The Hidden Problem: Race-Based Assumptions and 
Statistics 
The discussion of normative uncertainty and the contingent 
relationship between votes and preferences in Parts III.A and 
III.B implicitly assumes that it is possible to use statistical 
methods to estimate minority and white support for candidates 
running in arbitrary elections. This is true, but only if one 
makes an assumption that is in considerable tension with the 
antiessentialist strains of equal protection law. 
Appendix A explains this point in detail. For readers averse 
to formal notation, we offer a brief, intuitive explanation here. 
The data in vote dilution cases typically consist of precinct-level 
election returns and of estimates of precinct-level demographics 
from the Census. The race and the vote of each individual are 
not observed. (Exit poll data—with individual-level observations 
 
 341 Blacksher and Menefee, 34 Hastings L J at 53 (cited in note 11). 
 342 One other implication of our analysis is worth noting. To the extent that courts 
evaluating proposed remedial districts (at the remedy stage of a vote dilution case) aim 
to gauge whether the district will “perform” for minority voters, the courts should not 
simply assume that minority candidates in the remedial districts will receive the same 
shares of white and minority votes that minority candidates typically received prior to 
the remedy. The reason is that different types of candidates—perhaps stronger minority 
candidates—will select into running in the remedial district than they will under the 
system of districts (or at-large elections) that the court found unlawful. Thanks to Pro-
fessor Nathaniel Persily for suggesting this point. 
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on race and vote choice—have rarely been available.)343 The ana-
lyst uses variation across precincts in candidates’ vote shares 
and racial groups’ population shares to estimate the proportion 
of each racial group that voted for each candidate. These esti-
mates depend on a critical assumption: the proportion of white 
and minority voters who support each candidate is about the 
same in each precinct, subject to random noise. 
This is not the same as assuming that all minority voters 
“think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer 
the same candidates at the polls”344—the model is agnostic on 
exactly what proportion of minority voters supported each can-
didate.345 Nor does the model constrain the level of minority 
support for minority candidates to be the same in each precinct; 
random fluctuations from the estimated baseline level of support 
are allowed. But critically, the model does assume that support 
for each candidate by racial group does not vary in any system-
atic way across precincts. For example, minorities in relatively 
affluent and racially integrated precincts are treated as politi-
cally indistinguishable from minorities in poor, racially homoge-
neous precincts. 
This assumption, which has been overlooked or even denied 
(perhaps inadvertently) in much of the legal academic literature,346 
 
 343 See Bernard Grofman, Expert Witness Testimony and the Evolution of Voting 
Rights Case Law, in Bernard Grofman and Chandler Davidson, eds, Controversies in 
Minority Voting: The Voting Rights Act in Perspective 197, 217 (Brookings 1992). 
 344 LULAC, 548 US at 433, quoting Miller v Johnson, 515 US 900, 920 (1995). 
 345 That is, the model allows the average proportion of voters in a racial group who 
support each candidate group to vary from 0 to 1. This is the sense in which it does not 
assume that all voters of the group think alike. 
 346 In their influential book Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting Equal-
ity, Grofman, Handley, and Niemi acknowledge that “homogeneous precinct analysis” 
(estimating minority or white vote shares as the average vote share in racially homoge-
neous precincts) may yield misleading inferences because of systematic differences in 
political preferences between voters of the same race who live in homogeneous as op-
posed to integrated neighborhoods. Grofman, Handley, and Niemi, Minority Representa-
tion at 85 (cited in note 115). But they state that the “plausibility of th[e] assumption” 
that homogeneous-precinct voters are indistinguishable from voters of the same race in 
heterogeneous precincts can be “check[ed] . . . by comparing results from a homogeneous 
precinct analysis with those from an ecological regression (which, of course, includes da-
ta from racially mixed precincts).” Id. They fail to note that ecological regression esti-
mates depend on the very same homogeneity assumption. Grofman, Handley, and Niemi’s 
elision is repeated in the leading casebook on election law and the VRA. See Issacharoff, 
Karlan, and Pildes, The Law of Democracy at 678 (cited in note 107). See also Crayton, 
64 Rutgers L Rev at 981 (cited in note 17) (acknowledging the problematic assumption 
behind homogeneous-precinct analysis and presenting ecological inference as “the best 
available approach”). 
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is not innocuous.347 Consider it in light of Kennedy’s opinion for 
the Court in LULAC. Kennedy wrote that a particular disputed 
majority-minority district should not count in the analysis of 
minority political opportunity, because the district combined two 
geographically and socioeconomically disparate clusters of Lati-
no voters.348 The notion that these two Latino populations were 
jointly politically cohesive, wrote Kennedy, reflected the “prohib-
ited assumption” of political homogeneity within ethnic 
groups.349 Roberts answered: 
It is important to be perfectly clear about the following, out 
of fairness to the District Court if for no other reason: No 
one has made any “assumptions” about how voters in Dis-
trict 25 will vote based on their ethnic background. Not the 
District Court; not this dissent. There was a trial. At trials, 
assumptions and assertions give way to facts. . . . The Dis-
trict Court, far from “assum[ing]” that Latino voters in Dis-
trict 25 would “prefer the same candidate at the polls,” con-
cluded that they were likely to do so based on statistical 
evidence of historic voting patterns.350 
Roberts’s premise that “statistical evidence” is assumption-
free is simply wrong, and the assumptions used in ecological in-
ference are particularly strong—embodying the within-
race/across-space political-homogeneity premise to which Kennedy 
took offense. 
In principle, an expert witness could relax the assumption of 
spatial homogeneity within racial groups by conducting separate 
ecological-inference analyses on discrete geographic clusters of 
socioeconomically homogeneous voters. For example, the expert 
 
 347 In Garza v County of Los Angeles, California, 756 F Supp 1298, 1333–34 (CD Cal 
1990), the defendants’ experts pointed to the constancy assumption in trying to impugn 
the plaintiffs’ experts’ reliance on ecological regression. The defense showed that a dif-
ferent modeling assumption—the assumption that the probability of supporting a given 
candidate is constant across all voters within a precinct (while varying between pre-
cincts)—can generate drastically different estimates of racial polarization. The court 
found that this alternative assumption “impede[d] [the defendants’ model] from detecting 
the presence of polarized voting” and as such that it was “not a reliable method of inferring 
group voting behavior.” Id at 1334. This misses the point: nothing in the data allows one to 
adjudicate between these modeling assumptions. It would be just as apt to say that the 
standard, within-race homogeneity assumption impeded the plaintiff ’s model from detect-
ing the presence of within-precinct political homogeneity across racial groups. 
 348 LULAC, 548 US at 433–34. 
 349 Id at 433. 
 350 Id at 500 (Roberts concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and 
dissenting in part) (emphasis added). 
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witness in LULAC might have fitted the ecological-inference 
model initially with the precincts at the northern end of District 
25 (the Austin area) and then rerun the model with the pre-
cincts at the southern end of the district, along the Texas-Mexico 
border. Latino voters in District 25 would be deemed cohesive 
only if the separately fitted models showed them to have voted 
for the same candidates by similar margins. 
However, the logic of litigation encourages pooling rather 
than sequential estimation. The less pooling the analyst does, 
the less statistically precise (maybe falsely precise) the resulting 
estimates are, and a court faced with imprecise estimates may 
well conclude that the evidence does not support a finding of mi-
nority cohesion or white bloc voting.351 Also, the separate-
estimation strategy requires a method for partitioning the de-
fendant jurisdiction into subregions within which the racial and 
ethnic groups are reasonably homogeneous, and it is not clear 
how one would do this.352 
IV.  UPDATING GINGLES 
Racial vote dilution law has reached a crossroads. The Su-
preme Court has been persistently chipping away at this body of 
law, using two propositions as hammer and chisel: first, that ju-
dicial involvement in the business of adjudicating vote dilution 
claims requires clear rules and objective standards (at least at 
the screening stage);353 and second, that § 2 must be construed 
narrowly lest it “unnecessarily infuse race into virtually every 
redistricting, raising serious constitutional questions.”354 
 
 351 See Grofman, Handley, and Niemi, Minority Representation at 83–84 (cited in 
note 115) (interpreting Gingles as requiring evidence of a statistically significant correla-
tion between voter race and vote choice at the second prong).  
 352 We tried to obtain the experts’ reports to the district court in LULAC in order to 
figure out the geographic region over which they pooled, but the reports are not available 
free of charge. The portions of the record provided on appeal to the Supreme Court do not 
address the pooling issue. 
 353 See Strickland, 556 US at 17–20 (Kennedy) (plurality) (adopting the “majority-
minority requirement” for § 2 claims because of the need for “workable standards”); Hall, 
512 US at 881 (ruling out § 2 challenges to the size of a legislative body for want of an 
“objective and workable standard for choosing a reasonable benchmark by which to eval-
uate a challenged voting practice”); LULAC, 548 US at 485–86 (Souter concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (acknowledging the need for “clear-edged rule[s]” to govern the 
threshold stage of vote dilution cases). 
 354 LULAC, 548 US at 445–46 (Kennedy) (plurality). See also Strickland, 556 US at 
21–22 (Kennedy) (plurality). 
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These propositions are life-threatening to the law of vote di-
lution as it has developed to date. Rather than being objective 
and rule-like, the judicial inquiry into racially polarized voting 
invites district courts to make the kinds of “highly political”355 
and “race-based”356 judgments that the Supreme Court has 
warned against. Once the chasm between how the racial-
polarization test was expected to work and how it actually works 
becomes apparent, something has to give: either the justices ac-
cept the doctrinal status quo and revise their views about judi-
cially manageable standards and racial assumptions, or they can 
try to change the doctrine. 
One way to change the doctrine is to convert Strickland’s 
dictum into law, requiring plaintiffs to show that plaintiff-race 
voters typically vote together at rates exceeding X percent and 
that other voters cross over and vote for minority-preferred can-
didates at rates of less than Y percent.357 But this is a fool’s er-
rand, given the contingent relationship between preferences and 
votes and given the flexibility that lower courts otherwise enjoy. 
Lower courts could work around the thresholds of legal signifi-
cance by up-weighting or discounting evidence from particular 
elections on the basis of the election’s supposed probativeness, or 
by invoking the special-circumstances doctrine. Judges who 
want to find for the plaintiffs in a given case would just have to 
dig more deeply into the stories behind the election returns to 
“confirm,” as it were, that the elections in which voting was most 
polarized are in fact the most probative and that the elections 
with less-polarized voting are unrevealing. 
To be sure, in adopting numeric polarization cutoffs, the 
Court could warn against this sort of cherry-picking.358 But if the 
lower courts must adopt bright-line rules regarding which elec-
tions to include and exclude when analyzing polarization, the only 
remotely sensible choice is, as we have seen, to restrict the analy-
sis to two-candidate, biracial, partisan, general election match-
ups. Yet even this solution is deeply problematic, for reasons we 
have canvassed.359 And it does nothing to reduce the dependence 
 
 355 Strickland, 556 US at 17 (Kennedy) (plurality). 
 356 Id at 18 (Kennedy) (plurality). 
 357 See notes 83–86 and accompanying text. 
 358 Compare the Fourth Circuit’s “representative sample” requirement. See note 178 
and accompanying text. 
 359 See Part III.B.3. 
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of vote dilution cases on statistical techniques that depend on the 
within-race/across-space political-homogeneity assumption. 
The bottom line is that if the Court wants an objective 
screening test to filter out marginal vote dilution claims—and if 
the Court wants the test to be implemented without recourse to 
strong racial assumptions—the test should not be anchored to 
political preferences inferred from votes cast in actual elections. 
But what is the alternative? One option is to downplay the 
political-preferences inquiry, perhaps shunting it to the totality-
of-the-circumstances stage, and to instead screen claims using 
some more or less objective indicator of minority political incor-
poration or perhaps of intentional discrimination by the state 
actors responsible for the electoral system. A court following the 
latter approach might ask, as Judge Easterbrook has suggested, 
whether the number of majority-minority districts is roughly 
equivalent to the number likely to have been created by a race-
neutral redistricting algorithm,360 or whether the state split up 
minority communities in violation of community of interest dis-
tricting criteria.361 
A court focused on minority political incorporation might 
ask, instead, whether there is effective partisan or party-like 
competition for control of the legislative body, with at least one 
competitive faction actively campaigning for minority votes. Or 
the court might simply ask whether plaintiff-race candidates 
have managed to get elected (perhaps excluding any plaintiff-
race candidates who were actively opposed by most minority do-
nors and endorsers). Or, more objectively: Do minority citizens 
vote in local elections at rates comparable to white voters?362 
Some of these inquiries would require courts to dig into the po-
litical stories behind the elections, but the threshold test would 
not require judges to quantify the extent of preference polariza-
tion or to pronounce who is or is not a bona fide candidate of 
choice of the minority community. 
The other path forward is for courts to continue screening 
claims based on preference distributions, while inviting litigants 
 
 360 See Gonzalez v City of Aurora, Illinois, 535 F3d 594, 599–600 (7th Cir 2008).  
 361 Professor Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos’s spatial-diversity index provides one way 
of quantifying whether an actual or proposed majority-minority district should be re-
garded as “natural”—that is, drawn in accordance with community of interest principles. 
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, 125 Harv L Rev 1903, 1912–17 (2012). 
 362 Note, however, that estimates of minority-voter participation in an election will 
often depend on the same ecological-inference techniques (with their hidden racial as-
sumptions) used to generate vote-share estimates. 
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to make the associated showings using individual-level data, 
such as survey-based evidence of political preferences. Surveys 
can be used to measure racial polarization in policy preferences, 
general political ideology, racial attitudes, or even preferences 
over race and other candidate attributes as revealed by choices 
among randomized, hypothetical candidates. Because survey re-
searchers are not limited to asking about vote intentions, survey-
derived measures of racial polarization need not fall victim to 
the contingent relationship between preferences and votes. The 
same questions can be asked of voters in any jurisdiction, allow-
ing meaningful between-jurisdiction and, eventually, over-time 
comparisons to be made.363 
Back when Gingles was litigated, it would have been risible 
to think that racial polarization could be established through 
surveys. Surveys were expensive to conduct, and the available 
evidence from exit polls suggested that white voters often lied to 
survey takers about their support for black candidates. But 
times have changed. A number of important developments in the 
years since Gingles have made survey evidence much more ap-
propriate for vote dilution litigation. 
First, whites no longer overreport voting for minority candi-
dates in opinion polls.364 This is not to deny that “social desirabil-
ity” bias can contaminate responses to particularly sensitive 
survey questions. But researchers have developed a number of 
ingenious techniques for eliciting truthful answers.365 For exam-
ple, respondents may be told to flip a coin, answering Question 1 
if the coin comes up heads and Question 2 if it is tails. (Question 1 
is innocuous, while Question 2 is very sensitive.) The respondent 
answers yes or no without telling the researcher which question 
 
 363 We are currently working on several projects to develop survey-based estimates 
of group political cohesion and voter discrimination, but owing to space limitations we 
cannot get into the details here. See note 41. 
 364 See Daniel J. Hopkins, No More Wilder Effect, Never a Whitman Effect: When and 
Why Polls Mislead about Black and Female Candidates, 71 J Polit 769, 773–76 (2009).  
 365 These include so-called list experiments, endorsement experiments, and randomized-
response surveys. For examples of leading recent works, see generally Bryn Rosenfeld, 
Kosuke Imai, and Jacob N. Shapiro, An Empirical Validation Study of Popular Survey 
Methodologies for Sensitive Questions, Am J Polit Sci (forthcoming), archived at 
http://perma.cc/MAS7-8JZ3; Graeme Blair, Kosuke Imai, and Yang-Yang Zhou, Design 
and Analysis of the Randomized Response Techniques, 110 J Am Stat Assn 1304 (2015); 
Graeme Blair, Kosuke Imai, and Jason Lyall, Comparing and Combining List and En-
dorsement Experiments: Evidence from Afghanistan, 58 Am J Polit Sci 1043 (2014); 
Graeme Blair and Kosuke Imai, Statistical Analysis of List Experiments, 20 Polit Analy-
sis 47 (2012). 
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he is answering; the researcher later backs out population-level 
estimates of support for the socially sensitive proposition based 
on the known probability of answering that question and the 
known level of support for the innocuous proposition.366 
Another hugely important development is the emergence of 
low-cost, Internet-based survey methods. Over the last decade, 
political scientists have regularly fielded massive, cooperative 
surveys of the American electorate, using opt-in Internet sam-
ples that are reweighted to approximate the voting-eligible pop-
ulation. These surveys have been validated against a number of 
objective benchmarks,367 and for some purposes they can be 
pooled.368 Because the sample sizes are an order of magnitude 
larger than most previous national surveys, researchers can use 
the data to estimate opinions within subnational geographic 
units such as states or congressional districts. Also, online sur-
veys are less affected by social-desirability biases than in-person 
surveys.369 
New statistical techniques for modeling local public opinion 
as a function of demography and geography have emerged in 
tandem with the online surveys.370 These statistical techniques 
 
 366 See Blair, Imai, and Zhou, 110 J Am Stat Assn at 1307–15 (cited in note 365). 
 367 See, for example, Stephen Ansolabehere and Bryan F. Schaffner, Does Survey 
Mode Still Matter? Findings from a 2010 Multi-mode Comparison, 22 Polit Analysis 285, 
286 (2014); Stephen Ansolabehere and Douglas Rivers, Cooperative Survey Research, 16 
Ann Rev Polit Sci 307, 311 (2013). 
 368 See, for example, Chris Tausanovitch and Christopher Warshaw, Measuring 
Constituent Policy Preferences in Congress, State Legislatures, and Cities, 75 J Polit 330, 
333–34 (2013) (describing the pooling process for large-scale surveys). 
 369 See Frauke Kreuter, Stanley Presser, and Roger Tourangeau, Social Desirability 
Bias in CATI, IVR, and Web Surveys: The Effects of Mode and Question Sensitivity, 72 
Pub Opinion Q 847, 858 (2008). 
 370 See, for example, Elmendorf and Spencer, 115 Colum L Rev at 2204–14 (cited in 
note 40) (using multilevel regression with poststratification); Christopher S. Elmendorf 
and Douglas M. Spencer, The Geography of Racial Stereotyping: Evidence and Implica-
tions for VRA Preclearance after Shelby County, 102 Cal L Rev 1123, 1156–59 (2014) (us-
ing disaggregation and multilevel regression); Yair Ghitza and Andrew Gelman, Deep 
Interactions with MRP: Election Turnout and Voting Patterns among Small Electoral 
Subgroups, 57 Am J Polit Sci 762, 763–65 (2013) (using multilevel regression with post-
stratification); Julianna Pacheco, Using National Surveys to Measure Dynamic U.S. 
State Public Opinion: A Guideline for Scholars and an Application, 11 State Polit & Pol 
Q 415, 419–20 (2011) (using multilevel regression, imputation, poststratification, and 
simple moving average); Jeffrey R. Lax and Justin H. Phillips, How Should We Estimate 
Public Opinion in the States?, 53 Am J Polit Sci 107, 109–10 (2009) (using disaggregation 
and multilevel simulation modeling); Andrew Gelman and Jennifer Hill, Data Analysis 
Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Models 301–10 (Cambridge 2007) (dis-
cussing the use of multilevel logistic regressions to estimate state-level opinions from 
national polls); David K. Park, Andrew Gelman, and Joseph Bafumi, Bayesian Multilevel 
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have been used to estimate public opinion within cities, counties, 
state legislative districts, and even school districts, using exist-
ing national data sets.371 Relatively inexpensive online surveys 
of the voting public within small geographic units can also be 
conducted by sampling from voter-registration files in proportion 
to estimated turnout propensities and then mailing invitations 
to participate in the online survey.372 
Finally, statisticians and computer scientists have made 
enormous strides in machine learning, the science of making 
predictions while remaining agnostic about how best to model 
the event or outcome one wishes to predict.373 For VRA purposes, 
machine-learning tools are important not simply because they 
usually enable one to make better predictions than would oth-
erwise be the case but also because they allow one to predict the 
political preferences of citizens with known demographic profiles 
(such as age, sex, education, race, income, marital status, com-
munity of residence, and so on) without making strong assump-
tions about political homogeneity within racial groups or even 
about the utility of race as a predictor of political preference. 
One can throw into the mix of prediction algorithms a model 
that assumes homogeneity within racial groups, but that model 
will be chosen or weighted heavily only if it does a better job 
predicting out-of-sample opinions than the algorithms that 
make no assumptions about the nature of the correlation be-
tween race and political preference. 
With a set of predictions in hand, one can estimate political 
opinion by racial group in any geographic unit for which the US 
Census Bureau releases microdata. One could also estimate the 
“opportunity to elect” in any district by comparing the estimated 
preferences of the median voter in the district to the preferences 
of the median white and the median plaintiff-race voter in the 
polity as a whole (on any dimension deemed legally relevant).374 
 
Estimation with Poststratification: State-Level Estimates from National Polls, 12 Polit 
Analysis 375, 376–77 (2004) (using multilevel logistic regression). 
 371 See note 370. 
 372 See Michael J. Barber, et al, Online Polls and Registration-Based Sampling: A 
New Method for Pre-election Polling, 22 Polit Analysis 321, 322 (2014). 
 373 For further explanation of the points made in this paragraph, see Appendix A. 
 374 Of course, what counts as an “opportunity district” will depend on one’s theory of 
dilution. Under the proportional representation theory, a district might be deemed an 
opportunity district only if the median (eligible?) voter in the district is close to the me-
dian voter of the minority community. Under the voter-discrimination theory, a district 
might be deemed an opportunity district if the median voter does not prefer white candi-
dates to otherwise-similar minority candidates. Under the coalitional-breakdown theory, 
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* * * 
That there are plausible options for revising the vote dilu-
tion screening test—in ways that would make it more clear-cut 
and less dependent on racial assumptions—does not mean the 
revision will be easy to achieve. Two obstacles loom. One is nor-
mative dissensus over the meaning of racial vote dilution. As we 
have seen, it is impossible to develop a threshold test that is di-
agnostic of liability without a theory of dilution, and any residu-
al discretion that district courts enjoy in implementing the 
threshold test is unlikely to be exercised consistently unless the 
Supreme Court provides normative guidance. Yet the Supreme 
Court has been deciding racial vote dilution cases for forty-five 
years without a clearly articulated theory of dilution. Mustering 
a five-justice majority for a theory would seem particularly diffi-
cult in the present era, in which the Court is closely divided be-
tween factions with very different approaches to race-
discrimination law.375 
The flexibility of the Gingles framework means that differ-
ent judges can adapt it to fit their own ideas about racial vote di-
lution. Perhaps this suits the institutional needs of the federal 
judiciary, as it allows judges to decide vote dilution cases in a 
seemingly law-like manner without actually resolving their 
normative disagreements.376 
The other challenge arises from the sheer range of possibili-
ties for revising the screening test. The current convention of 
basing findings about minority cohesion and white bloc voting 
on estimates of vote shares by racial group has the significant 
advantage, from a manageability perspective, of strictly limiting 
the universe of evidentiary materials. Likewise, statistical con-
ventions for estimating candidates’ vote shares by racial group 
from aggregate data have become pretty well established—even 
if not well justified or free of strong racial assumptions.377 
 
the district might be deemed an opportunity district if the median voter in the district 
prefers the platform of the minority-preferred umbrella coalition to the platform of the 
opposing coalition. 
 375 Regarding these different approaches, see Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to 
Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 Yale L 
J 1278, 1286–1303 (2011). 
 376 Thanks to Professors Heather Gerken and David Schleicher for suggesting this point. 
 377 For a general overview of issues in the estimation of racial bloc voting, see gen-
erally D. James Greiner, Ecological Inference in Voting Rights Act Disputes: Where Are 
We Now, and Where Do We Want to Be?, 47 Jurimetrics 115 (2007). 
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If litigants were invited to make polarization showings us-
ing survey data (for example), the universe of potentially rele-
vant data sources and statistical techniques would explode. Giv-
en this wide-open universe, it is a fair question whether the 
courts could develop clear-edged rules regarding data sources, 
modes of data analysis, and quantitative cutoffs to be used at 
the screening stage of vote dilution cases. The task seems better 
suited to administrative agencies, but Congress has not author-
ized any agency to issue rules with the force of law under § 2. It 
may be possible for the DOJ to help out by issuing advisory 
guidelines,378 but the Supreme Court has often been wary of ad-
ministrative agencies in civil rights cases.379 
In the near term, probably the best that the Supreme Court 
can do is to acknowledge the problems with the status quo and 
encourage lower courts and the DOJ to explore alternatives. 
That at least seems preferable to the course foretold in Strick-
land—for as we have seen, the establishment of numeric vote-
share cutoffs for legally significant minority cohesion and white 
bloc voting would lock in racial vote dilution law’s dependence 
on within-race/across-space political-homogeneity assumptions, 
and the limitation on judicial discretion would prove to be either 
illusory or arbitrary.380 
CONCLUSION 
Voting rights law has reached a turning point. The Supreme 
Court recently enjoined the VRA’s preclearance regime, which 
required many state and local governments to obtain federal ap-
proval before implementing changes to their election laws.381 The 
principal remaining safeguard is the “results test” of § 2. But § 2 
is also under assault, with critics—including the Supreme 
 
 378 See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Advisory Rulemaking and the Future of the Voting 
Rights Act, 14 Election L J 260, 268–75 (2015). 
 379 See Bertrall L. Ross II, Denying Deference: Civil Rights and Judicial Resistance 
to Administrative Constitutionalism, 2014 U Chi Legal F 223, 228–29 (explaining that 
whether the judiciary defers to administrative agencies in the civil rights context de-
pends on “judicial resistance to ‘administrative constitutionalism’”). 
 380 The constraint would be illusory insofar as district courts remained free to re-
verse engineer whether the cutoff is met via discretionary decisions about which elec-
tions to include in or exclude from the polarization analysis. See Part II.B.2.c (explaining 
the discretion that courts currently exercise in this respect). It would be arbitrary if the 
appellate courts established bright-line rules about which elections to include and re-
quired equal weighting of those elections. See Part III.B (explaining the contingent rela-
tionship between votes and political preferences). 
 381 See Shelby County, Alabama v Holder, 133 S Ct 2612, 2631 (2013). 
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Court’s median justice—questioning both its manageability and 
its constitutionality. Whatever one makes of the constitutional 
question, the manageability objection has force, at least if one 
accepts the ideas about manageability that are traditionally in-
voked to justify the Gingles framework. We have shown that in 
its present incarnation, the test for racially polarized voting is 
deeply discretionary, dependent on race-based assumptions, and 
untethered from normative accounts of the purpose of racial vote 
dilution law. Now and then, judges have tried to make the polar-
ization inquiry more rule-like, but these efforts have been large-
ly unavailing. 
The discretionary nature of the threshold test is to a large 
extent the ironic by-product of the courts’ decision to make can-
didates’ vote shares by racial group the central factor in screen-
ing vote dilution claims. This was supposed to make the test ob-
jective and constraining; but because candidate attributes 
mediate the relationship between racial polarization in political 
preferences and polarization in vote shares, and because ob-
served candidate attributes reflect strategic choices by candi-
dates and other actors, the screening test cannot be made con-
straining without also becoming absurd—that is, unless it is 
rebuilt on new evidentiary foundations. This Article has, we 
hope, made the problem clear, but the task of rebuilding the 
Gingles framework remains a project for another day—one that 
will require the sustained collaboration of courts, legal academ-
ics, statisticians, political scientists, and perhaps the DOJ. 
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APPENDIX A.  ASSUMPTIONS FOR CROSS-LEVEL INFERENCE 
This Appendix presents a more precise and modestly tech-
nical explanation of the racial assumptions used to estimate vote 
shares by racial group from aggregate precinct-level data. It also 
explains how individual-level data would allow political prefer-
ences by racial group to be estimated using weaker assumptions. 
We start with an example. Consider the hypothetical data382 
from three precincts presented in Table 1A. Voters in Precinct 1 
are overwhelmingly members of the minority group and, in the 
aggregate, 85 percent of Precinct 1 voters voted for Candidate A. 
Precinct 3 is a near mirror image of Precinct 1. Precinct 3 voters 
are 95 percent white and, in the aggregate, only 25 percent of 
Precinct 3 voters voted for Candidate A. Precinct 2 falls some-
where in between. Here, 60 percent of the voters are white and 
50.5 percent of the votes cast went to Candidate A. This much 
we know with certainty. 
However, for the purpose of determining whether voting is 
racially polarized, what we want to know are the number of mi-
nority voters who voted for Candidate A (the unknown entries in 
the upper-left corners of the subtables) and the number of white 
voters who voted for Candidate B (the unknown entries in the 
lower-right corners of the subtables). Empirical claims about 
these quantities depend on racial assumptions. 
Why do racial assumptions play a role, and how do they en-
ter into the standard ecological regression analyses? We begin 
by examining what we know about the relevant internal cells 
without making any assumptions. While we do not know the ex-
act values of the internal cells in Table 1A, we do know that 
these internal-cell entries must sum up to the values on the 
margins of the table. This allows us to calculate, with no as-
sumptions, logical bounds for each of the internal-cell entries. 
These bounds are presented in Table 2A. Note that we know 
quite a bit about the voting behavior of minority voters in Pre-
cinct 1 and about the voting behavior of white voters in Pre-
cinct 3. Without further assumptions, we know very little about 
the other internal cells. 
 
 382 In actual vote dilution cases, the data would typically include many more pre-
cincts (more tables) and the numbers of rows and columns in the tables would typically 
be larger. The conceptual points we draw from this example are not affected by the sim-
plicity of the hypothetical. 
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TABLE 1A.  HYPOTHETICAL VOTING BEHAVIOR BY RACE OF VOTER 
IN THREE PRECINCTS USING AGGREGATE DATA 
Precinct 1 





Minority Voters ? ? 900 
White Voters ? ? 100 
 850 150 1000 
 
Precinct 2 





Minority Voters ? ? 400 
White Voters ? ? 600 
 505 495 1000 
 
Precinct 3 





Minority Voters ? ? 50 
White Voters ? ? 950 
 250 750 1000 
 
Putting the relevant pieces together, we can calculate from 
Table 2A no-assumption bounds on the fractions of minority 
(white) voters who voted for Candidate A (B). These bounds are 
as follows: 
Minimum minority support for Candidate A: 
(750 + 0 + 0) / (900 + 400 + 50) = 0.556 
Maximum minority support for Candidate A: 
(850 + 400 + 50) / (900 + 400 + 50) = 0.963 
Minimum white support for Candidate B: 
(0 + 95 + 700) / (100 + 600 + 950) = 0.482 
Maximum white support for Candidate B: 
(100 + 495 + 750) / (100 + 600 + 950) = 0.815 
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TABLE 2A.  LOGICAL BOUNDS ON INTERNAL CELLS OF VOTING 
BEHAVIOR BY RACE OF VOTER FOR HYPOTHETICAL AGGREGATE 
DATA: THREE-PRECINCT EXAMPLE 
Precinct 1 





Minority Voters [750, 850] [50, 150] 900 
White Voters [0, 100] [0, 100] 100 
 850 150 1000 
 
Precinct 2 





Minority Voters [0, 400] [0, 400] 400 
White Voters [105, 505] [95, 495] 600 
 505 495 1000 
 
Precinct 3 





Minority Voters [0, 50] [0, 50] 50 
White Voters [200, 250] [700, 750] 950 
 250 750 1000 
 
Maximizing white support for Candidate B implies that mi-
nority support for Candidate A is also at its upper limit. Similar-
ly, minimizing white support for Candidate B implies that mi-
nority support for Candidate A is also at its lower limit. So, our 
observed data are logically consistent with either a highly polar-
ized world where 81.5 percent of white voters support Candi-
date B and 96.3 percent of minority voters support Candidate A 
or a nonpolarized world in which 48.2 percent of whites favor 
Candidate B and 55.6 percent of minority voters support Candi-
date A. Racial assumptions must be invoked to get beyond this 
indeterminacy. 
A standard assumption in ecological regression, also known 
as Goodman’s regression, is that the fraction of minority voters 
who support Candidate A does not vary by precinct, and that the 
fraction of white voters who support Candidate B also does not 
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vary by precinct.383 This is a racial assumption in that it posits 
that average, within-race political behavior does not vary by ge-
ography. Minority-group voters in Precinct 1 vote the same, on 
average, as minority-group voters in Precinct 2 or Precinct 3. 
The same sort of assumption is made about white voters. In 
view of the concerns expressed by the Supreme Court in LULAC, 
these are not innocuous assumptions.384 
What does the homogeneity assumption buy us? To see, let’s 
introduce some notation. Let ݕ௜ denote the votes received by 
Candidate A in Precinct i as a fraction of the total votes cast in 
Precinct i. Also, let ݓ௜ denote the fraction of voters in Precinct i 
who are white. Because our example features two candidates 
and two racial groups, it follows that 1 െ ݕ௜ is the fraction of to-
tal votes in Precinct i going to Candidate B and that 1 െ ݓ௜ is the 
fraction of Precinct i voters who are minority-group members. 
Given this notation and our assumption about the constancy of 
within-group voting behavior across precincts, we can write the 
following identity: 
ݕ௜ ൌ ߨ௠ሺ1 െ ݓ௜ሻ ൅ ߨ௪ݓ௜                 i = 1, 2, 3 
where ߨ௠ is the fraction of minority-group voters who voted for 
Candidate A (assumed to be constant across all precincts) and 
ߨ௪ is the fraction of white voters who voted for Candidate A 
 
 383 These particular constancy assumptions can be weakened. In particular, one 
could also assume that minority support for Candidate A varies by precinct but that mi-
nority support for Candidate A is statistically independent of the fraction of voters who 
are members of the minority group. Note that this weaker assumption is still a racial 
assumption in that it posits political behavior to be statistically independent of geogra-
phy given voter race. We focus on the stronger constancy assumption because it is easier 
to present to nontechnical readers. 
 Still another racial assumption is that minority voters and white voters within the 
same precinct support Candidate A at the same rate (and thus that both groups within 
the precinct also support Candidate B at an equal rate). This is the assumption underly-
ing the so-called neighborhood model. See David A. Freedman, et al, Ecological Regres-
sion and Voting Rights, 15 Evaluation Rev 673, 682–84 (1991). This might not seem like 
a racial assumption, because it assumes that geography trumps race. Nonetheless, as-
suming that minority-group members behave the same as geographically proximate 
whites is still an assumption about the political behavior of racial groups—not empirical 
evidence in its own right. 
 384 See text accompanying notes 347–50. See also Lewis v Alamance County, North 
Carolina, 99 F3d 600, 604 n 3 (4th Cir 1996) (warning “against overreliance on bivariate 
ecological regression analysis in the estimation of voter preferences” because “assuming 
that the level of minority support for the candidate is fairly constant across precincts . . . 
runs counter to the common sense observation that blacks and whites who live in inte-
grated neighborhoods are more likely to vote for candidates of another race”) (emphasis 
omitted). 
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(assumed to be constant across all precincts). A bit of simple al-
gebra allows us to rewrite this as: 
ݕ௜ ൌ ߨ௠ ൅ ሺߨ௪ െ ߨ௠ሻݓ௜	                 i = 1, 2, 3 
If the assumption that ߨ௠ and ߨ௪ are constant across pre-
cincts holds exactly, then we can simply solve for ߨ௠ and ߨ௪. In 
actual applications, this assumption does not hold exactly and 
one instead works with 
ݕ௜ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚݓ௜ ൅ ߳௜                       i = 1, 2, 3 
where ߙ ൌ ߨ௠, ߚ ൌ ሺߨ௪ െ ߨ௠ሻ, and ߳௜ is a disturbance term that 
is assumed to be uncorrelated with ݓ௜. Least squares regression 
of ݕ on ݓ can then be used to obtain estimates of ߙ and ߚ. With 
these in hand, it is straightforward to obtain ߨ௠ and ߨ௪ using 
the identities ߨ௠ ൌ ߙ and ߨ௪ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ. The fraction of white vot-
ers who support Candidate B is simply 1 െ ߨ௪. This procedure of 
using linear regression to estimate ߨ௠ and ߨ௪ is known as eco-
logical regression or Goodman’s regression.385 
Figure 1A plots ݕ on ݓ for our three precincts and superim-
poses the ecological regression line. Note that the regression line 
fits the three points nearly perfectly. The estimates of ߙ and ߚ 
are 0.92 and −0.71, respectively. Under the assumptions posited 
by the model, this implies that 92 percent of minority voters 
supported Candidate A and 79 percent of white voters supported 
Candidate B. 
One might be tempted to think that these estimates are high-
ly reliable—after all, the regression line fits the data points al-
most perfectly. That would be a mistake, though, as nothing in the 
scatterplot narrows the logical bounds discussed above. The quality 
of the inferences from ecological regression depends entirely on the 
racial assumption that ߨ௠ and ߨ௪ are constant across precincts (or 
the weaker assumption that they are each uncorrelated with ݓ). 
This assumption is what allows us to go from ߨ௠ ∈ ሾ0.556, 0.963ሿ to ߨ௠ ൌ 0.92 and from ሺ1 െ ߨ௪ሻ ∈ ሾ0.482, 0.815ሿ to ሺ1 െ ߨ௪ሻ ൌ 0.79, 
but nothing in the scatterplot logically implies the assumption. 
Put another way, the data in Figure 1A are just as compatible with 
a world where 56 percent of minority voters supported Candidate A 
 
 385 See Leo A. Goodman, Ecological Regressions and Behavior of Individuals, 18 Am 
Sociological Rev 663, 663–64 (1953) (outlining ecological regression methods and explain-
ing that “in very special circumstances the study of the regression between ecological var-
iables may be used to make inferences concerning the behavior of individuals”). 
 2016] Racially Polarized Voting 687 
 
and 48 percent of white voters supported Candidate B—obviously, 
this would imply a very different level of racial polarization. 
FIGURE 1A.  ECOLOGICAL REGRESSION FOR THE THREE-PRECINCT 
EXAMPLE 
The intercept is ߙ = 0.92 and the slope is ߚ = −0.71. Under the assumptions 
posited by the model, this implies that 92 percent of minority voters supported 
Candidate A and 79 percent of white voters supported Candidate B. 
There is an alternative to making strong, within-race homo-
geneity assumptions—but it requires individual-level data on 
vote choice and demographics, as might be generated through an 
exit poll or preelection survey. 
If one is able to draw a random sample of voters from the ju-
risdiction of interest and measure their political preferences 
through a well-designed instrument, then, in essence, no racial-
homogeneity assumptions need to be made. Random sampling 
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allows for principled, design-based statements about the propor-
tion of citizens of Group X who support Candidate Y and about 
the uncertainty of the estimates.386 If the number of sampled 
voters is large, the survey estimates will be quite accurate. 
Complications arise when it is not feasible to draw a large 
random sample from the jurisdiction in question. Estimates of 
jurisdiction-specific quantities of interest—such as the fraction 
of African American voters who support a particular candidate—
that are based solely on a small number of responses from the 
jurisdiction in question will tend to have so much sampling var-
iability as to be of little practical use. 
In situations such as this, it is common for survey research-
ers to move away from the relatively assumption-free world of 
design-based inference to an inferential stance that relies—to 
varying degrees—on statistical models.387 Statistical models can 
be thought of as collections of substantive and statistical as-
sumptions that provide inferential leverage. The stronger the 
assumptions, the greater the inferential leverage. The problem, 
of course, is that when modeling assumptions are doing much of 
the inferential work, the accuracy of one’s inferences depends 
heavily on the assumptions being at least approximately correct. 
The assumptions that are often employed can be seen to be 
particular forms of racial-homogeneity assumptions. For instance, 
if very few African American voters were surveyed in Region 1, 
then a researcher may assume that African American voter be-
havior in Region 1 is roughly similar to African American voter 
behavior in Regions 2 through 20. This assumption allows the re-
searcher to statistically pool information from all twenty regions 
when estimating the quantity of interest for Region 1. 
However, there are two important respects in which such 
survey-data-homogeneity assumptions are weaker than the 
aggregate-data-homogeneity assumptions traditionally used in 
vote dilution cases. First, insofar as the survey captures nonra-
cial demographic covariates such as age, sex, income, marital sta-
tus, occupation, religion, geographic location, and the like, the re-
searcher can build a prediction model to estimate the political 
 
 386 One can also make principled statements about many other quantities of interest 
beyond population means using a family of statistical techniques known as the “boot-
strap.” See generally Bradley Efron and Robert J. Tibshirani, An Introduction to the 
Bootstrap (Chapman 1993). 
 387 For examples, see note 370. 
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preferences of (for example) African American voters in particular 
geographic units that does not rely heavily on race as a predictor.388 
Second, the pooling assumptions generally can be evaluated 
in a principled way with the data at hand, using a technique 
known as “cross validation.”389 Cross validation works by repeat-
edly leaving out small chunks of data, fitting the statistical 
model to the remaining data, and then evaluating the model’s 
ability to predict the left-out data.390 Cross validation is widely 
used in the fields of statistics and machine learning to make 
near-optimal data-pooling assumptions.391 In principle, then, an 
expert witness with survey data should be able to construct an 
ensemble of political-preference prediction models, some of 
which rely heavily on race and others of which use race in differ-
ent ways or not at all, and then employ cross validation to 
choose among or weight the models in proportion to their predic-
tive accuracy.392 
Cross validation is not an option, however, if the expert has 
only the aggregate precinct-level data that have been the work-
horse of vote dilution litigation to date, because these data do 
not reveal the actual choices of individual voters, which is what 
the researcher needs in order to test the predictive accuracy of 
her model.   
 
 388 Indeed, if only data from African American survey respondents are used to fit the 
model, race will not enter the model as a predictor at all. See, for example, Elmendorf 
and Spencer, 115 Colum L Rev at 2200–04 (cited in note 40).  
 389 See Trevor Hastie, Robert Tibshirani, and Jerome Friedman, The Elements of Sta-
tistical Learning: Data Mining, Inference, and Prediction 241–47 (Springer 2d ed 2009). 
 390 See id. 
 391 See id at 241. 
 392 Two of the authors of this Article are currently working on a study implementing 
this idea. 
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APPENDIX B.  SAMPLING AND CODING JUDICIAL OPINIONS 
This Appendix explains how we selected and coded cases for 
purposes of characterizing the law of racially polarized voting,393 
as it is understood and applied by frontline fact finders—federal 
district judges presiding over § 2 bench trials.394 
We began with the database of § 2 decisions compiled by 
Professor Katz and her students at the University of Michigan 
Law School, which covers the period from 1982 through 2005.395 
Aided by law-student research assistants, we supplemented the 
Katz database with all § 2 opinions available on Lexis or 
Westlaw from January 1, 2006, to May 31, 2015. We then win-
nowed the combined data set, excluding: (1) opinions in which 
the district court did not rule on liability or on the likelihood of 
success; (2) opinions that did not apply the Gingles framework;396 
and (3) opinions that addressed § 2 only in the context of reme-
dying a one-person, one-vote violation.397 
For each remaining case, we identified what we called the 
primary district court opinion. For cases that went to trial, this 
was the opinion explaining the district court’s decision following 
the trial, and for cases that did not go to trial, this was the dis-
trict court’s merits ruling (such as the decision on a motion to 
dismiss, a motion for summary judgment, or a motion for a pre-
liminary injunction). We then subsetted the primary district 
court opinions to opinions that followed a bench trial, as we ex-
pected these opinions to be most informative about district 
courts’ understanding of how to ascertain racial polarization (or 
its absence). 
From this universe of posttrial liability rulings, we random-
ly selected twenty-seven opinions issued between the Supreme 
Court decisions in Gingles and De Grandy, and another twenty-
seven opinions issued between De Grandy and the Supreme 
 
 393 See Part II.B. 
 394 We have found no § 2 case that was tried before a jury. 
 395 For the final report produced by Katz and her students, see generally Katz, et al, 
39 U Mich J L Ref 643 (cited in note 137). For Katz’s data, see Ellen Katz and The Vot-
ing Rights Initiative, VRI Database Master List (Section 2 Litigation: 1982-2005) (2006), 
archived at http://perma.cc/Q792-DSQR. 
 396 These are largely the so-called vote-denial cases under § 2. See Daniel P. Tokaji, 
The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 SC L Rev 
689, 691 (2006) (defining “vote denial” as referring to “practices that prevent people from 
voting or having their votes counted”). 
 397 While these cases do contain information about judges’ understandings of § 2, we 
excluded them because they do not result from § 2 claims. If the plaintiff brought both a § 2 
claim and a one-person, one-vote claim against the challenged map, we included the case. 
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Court’s decision in Strickland.398 To that sample of fifty-four cas-
es, we added all seventeen posttrial liability rulings that post-
date Strickland. We used this stratification approach because, 
as explained in Part I, De Grandy and Strickland at least argu-
ably mark important changes in the Supreme Court’s under-
standing of § 2, and we thought that we might find correspond-
ing changes in the decisions of district courts and the behavior of 
litigants. (Our sample of cases could be reweighted to estimate 
properties of the full universe of primary district court opinions 
following trial, or to give equal weight to years or circuits.)399 
We then randomly assigned the sampled cases to one of nine 
coders (Elmendorf plus a team of students from the University of 
California, Davis, School of Law).400 Cases were coded for numer-
ous attributes, including the types of evidence introduced in the 
case, how the court used the evidence, the court’s normative con-
ception of vote dilution, and the court’s understanding of how the 
Gingles framework relates to the ultimate determination of liabil-
ity. Coders were provided with a detailed codebook and back-
ground memorandum on the law of § 2, but they were not told 
about the critique of the racial-polarization test that this Article 
advances. To illustrate the coding process, student coders were 
also given a spreadsheet with Elmendorf’s coding of four cases. 
Because of budgetary limitations, each case was assigned to 
only one coder. This is not ideal, because it means that we can-
not evaluate coding quality using measures of intercoder con-
sistency, and it also means that we cannot use inconsistent cod-
ing of the same field in the same case by different coders as a 
screening device to identify and rectify likely errors. We did, 
however, ask students to provide narrative descriptions with ci-
tations to justify their coding of certain fields, and Elmendorf 
checked each narrative description for consistency with the cod-
ing of the field and corrected the occasional inconsistent coding. 
Elmendorf also identified a small number of fields for which cer-
tain codings would be unusual (based on his prior knowledge of 
 
 398 It turned out that two of the sampled opinions from the first time period had been 
miscoded as primary district court opinions, so we were left with a sample of twenty-five 
cases from the first period, twenty-seven from the second, and seventeen from the third. 
 399 The summary statistics reported in Part II.B are unweighted. 
 400 Fields about the meaning of “usual defeat” of minority-preferred candidates were 
added to the codebook following the initial round of law-student coding, and these were 
coded for all cases by Elmendorf exclusively. 
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vote dilution law),401 and when these codings occurred, he read 
the underlying opinion to check the coding and made corrections 
if the coder had erred.402 
Based on our review of the coders’ work, we think the fields 
about the types of evidence introduced and relied on by the court 
are probably coded fairly well. We have much less confidence in 
the codings of the theory fields, so we have not relied on them in 
this Article. Corrected and uncorrected copies of the underlying 
data along with the codebook are available from the authors up-
on request. 
 
 401 Specifically, Elmendorf checked the underlying opinion if the coder indicated 
that: (1) litigants introduced survey data concerning political preferences; (2) the court 
did not use or prioritize voting data when analyzing minority cohesion and white bloc 
voting; (3) the court gave equal weight to data from elections with and without minority-
race candidates; (4) the court did not treat “usual defeat” of minority-preferred candi-
dates as a relevant consideration under the third prong of Gingles; (5) the court deemed 
evidence of minority cohesion or white bloc voting from estimated vote shares to be out-
weighed by contrary evidence from other sources (such as anecdotal testimony or sur-
veys); or (6) the court adjusted the weight given to voting data from different elections 
based on the candidates’ platforms or policy positions.  
 402 This decision reflects a trade-off between two sources of bias. To see the problem, 
assume that a variable has two possible values, 0 or 1. The true value is 1 with probabil-
ity 0.05 and 0 with probability 0.95. Coders err with probability 0.1. Given the underly-
ing distribution of true values, these coding errors will lead to many more false 1 codings 
than false 0 codings, biasing upward the estimated frequency of the rare event (1). Cor-
recting only the false 1 codings is low cost (because 1 codings are infrequent) and re-
moves this upward bias, but it is likely to result in a slight downward bias, because there 
may be some occurrences of the rare event that were miscoded as 0 and these will go un-
corrected. (In this example, the expected proportion of 1 values with coding errors and no 
correction is 0.14; with corrections, it is 0.045. Corrections bring the expected value of 
the estimate closer to the true value of 0.05.)  
